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E-grāmata: Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato New edition [Oxford Scholarship Online E-books]

(, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto)
  • Formāts: 320 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 02-Mar-2006
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199288670
  • Oxford Scholarship Online E-books
  • Cena pašlaik nav zināma
  • Formāts: 320 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 02-Mar-2006
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199288670
Knowing Persons is an original study of Plato's account of personhood. For Plato, embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal. The ideal person is a knower. Hence, the lives of embodied persons need to be understood according to Plato's metaphysics of imagery.

For Gerson, Plato's account of embodied personhood is not accurately conflated with Cartesian dualism. Plato's dualism is more appropriately seen in the contrast between the ideal disembodied person and the embodied one than in the contrast between mind or soul and body.

This study argues that Plato's analysis of personhood is intended to cohere with his two-world metaphysics as well as a radical separation of knowledge and belief. Gerson demonstrates that Plato's account of persons plays a key role not just in his theory of mind, but in his theory of knowledge, his metaphysics, and his ethics. A proper understanding of Plato's account of persons must therefore place it in the context of his doctrines in these areas. Knowing Persons fills a significant gap by showing the way to such an understanding.
Introduction
1. Souls and Persons 14(36)
1.1. Paradox and Selfhood
15(14)
1.2. Socrates and Self-Knowledge
29(11)
1.3. Protagoras and the Power of Knowledge
40(10)
2. Immortality and Persons in Phaedo 50(49)
2.1. The Structure of the Proof of the Immortality of the Soul
52(11)
2.2. The Cyclical Argument
63(2)
2.3. The Recollection Argument
65(14)
2.4. The Affinity Argument
79(9)
2.5. The Objections of Simmias and Cebes
88(4)
2.6. Socrates' Reply to Cebes and the Argument from Exclusion of Opposites
92(7)
3. Divided Persons: Republic and Phaedrus 99(49)
3.1. Tripartition and Personhood
100(24)
3.2. Tripartition and Immortality in Republic Book 10
124(7)
3.3. Phaedrus
131(17)
4. Knowledge and Belief in Republic 148(46)
4.1. Knowledge vs. Belief
148(25)
4.2. The Form of the Good
173(7)
4.3. The Divided Line and the Allegory of the Cave
180(14)
5. Theaetetus: What is Knowledge? 194(45)
5.1. Interpreting Theaetetus
194(6)
5.2. Knowledge is Not Sense-Perception
200(14)
5.3. Knowledge is Not True Belief
214(12)
5.4. Knowledge is Not True Belief with an Account
226(13)
6. Personhood in the Later Dialogues 239(37)
6.1. Timaeus
239(12)
6.2. Philebus
251(14)
6.3. Laws
265(11)
Concluding Remarks 276(6)
Bibliography 282(10)
Index of Texts 292(10)
Index of Modern Authors 302(3)
General Index 305