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E-grāmata: Knowledge at the Boundaries

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Knowledge at the BoundariesPalielināt
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The book offers a reflection on the nature, scope, and limits of knowledge that have been at the focus of the author's work over decades. The essays collected in this volume expound and extend these efforts in exploring the outer fringes of understanding: the outer boundaries of conceivability, the limits of cognition, and the ramifications of ineffability and paradox. They join in exploring the lay of the land at the boundaries of knowledge.

The first chapters address basic facts regarding the conceptualization of knowledge. This is followed by a study on how to deal with problems relating to the affirmation and considerations of truth. The final chapters scrutinize the limits of demonstration and the inherent impossibility of realizing an ideal systematization of our knowledge of totalities. The book affords novel perspectives regarding the thought of a widely appreciated philosopher. It is an original work aimed for readers interested in the theory of knowledge and philosophy of cognition.

Part I Issues of Specification and Conception
1 Default Reasoning
3(10)
1.1 Default Inference
3(2)
1.2 Facing the Prospect of Error
5(1)
1.3 Induction as Default Reasoning
6(1)
1.4 Default Reasoning as Nonmonotonic
7(1)
1.5 Some Comforting Considerations
8(5)
2 Vagueness: A Variant Approach
13(12)
2.1 The Sorites Paradox and Its Problems
13(2)
2.2 Vagueness as Vagrancy
15(1)
2.3 Vagrancy Roots in Limited Cognition
16(1)
2.4 A Vagrancy Approach to Vagueness
17(2)
2.5 Further Perspectives
19(1)
2.6 The Epistemological Turn
20(1)
2.7 Ramifications
21(1)
2.8 Why Vagueness Pays
22(3)
3 Conceivability
25(12)
3.1 Conceiving Facts
25(2)
3.2 Inconceivability
27(1)
3.3 Meaninglessness
28(3)
3.4 The Corrigibility of Conceptions
31(1)
3.5 A "Logic" of Inconceivability
32(1)
3.6 Inconceivable Possibilities
33(1)
3.7 Unrealizable Ideals
34(3)
4 Issues of Identity and Identification
37(12)
4.1 Identity and Identification
37(1)
4.2 Descriptive Identification
38(3)
4.3 Fallacies of Identification--Variant Identities
41(1)
4.4 Ostensive Identification
41(1)
4.5 Identification By Placement and Relation
42(1)
4.6 Respectival Identity
42(1)
4.7 Improper Identification
43(1)
4.8 The Prospect of Limited Resources
43(1)
4.9 Fallacies of Identification--Failed Requirements
43(1)
4.10 Totalization Problems
44(5)
Part II Issues of Truth and Knowledge
5 On Explanation and Understanding
49(14)
5.1 Introductory Preliminaries
49(2)
5.2 Types of Occurrence Explanation: Inevitable Versus Contingent
51(1)
5.3 Factual Explanation: Positive and Negative
52(1)
5.4 The Idea of Pan-Explanation
53(1)
5.5 Omitting "Why not Otherwise"
53(1)
5.6 Harmonizing Explanation
54(2)
5.7 Ultimate Explanation
56(1)
5.8 The Principle of Optimality
57(2)
5.9 Two Modes of Explanation
59(4)
6 Alethic Topology
63(14)
6.1 Origins of Semantical Topology
63(1)
6.2 Descriptive Basics
64(3)
6.3 Preview of Basic Machinery and Illustrations
67(1)
6.4 More Illustrations
68(2)
6.5 Paradoxes
70(1)
6.6 Algebraic Series
71(1)
6.7 Incoherence and Paradox in Alethic Topology
71(1)
6.8 Self-contradiction
72(1)
6.9 A Survey of Generalizations
73(2)
6.10 Some Applications
75(2)
7 Relevance and Its Problems
77(10)
7.1 What Relevance Is and Why It Matters
77(3)
7.2 Putative Versus Actual Relevance
80(1)
7.3 Thematic and Alethic Relevance
81(1)
7.4 Propositional Relevance as Basic
82(1)
7.5 Evidential Relevance
83(1)
7.6 The Systemic Integrity of Fact
84(2)
7.7 Relevancy Limits and Diminishing Returns
86(1)
8 The Logic of Knowledge Distribution
87(10)
8.1 Knowledge Quantity
87(1)
8.2 Any Versus Every
88(2)
8.3 Cognitive Incompleteness
90(1)
8.4 The Distribution of Knowledge
91(2)
8.5 A Conjecture
93(4)
Part III Issues of Paradox and Cognitive Incompleteness
9 Cognitive Reflexivity and Objective Knowledge
97(8)
9.1 Factual Knowledge and Its Modes
97(1)
9.2 Error
98(2)
9.3 Knowledge Reflexivity
100(1)
9.4 Subjectivity/Objectivity
100(3)
9.5 From Subjectivity to Objectivity
103(2)
10 Leibniz and "The Liar"
105(8)
10.1 The Liar
105(1)
10.2 Leibniz on "The Liar"
106(2)
10.3 Leibniz in Context
108(1)
10.4 Closing Considerations
109(4)
11 Did Leibniz Anticipate Godel?
113(22)
11.1 Godel's Belief in a Leibnizian Conspiracy
113(2)
11.2 Leibnizian Anticipations
115(10)
11.2.1 Propositional Id Numbering
115(1)
11.2.2 Mathematical Platonism
116(1)
11.2.3 Mind Not a Machine
117(2)
11.2.4 Intuition
119(2)
11.2.5 Truth by Calculation
121(1)
11.2.6 Quantitative Disparity and Provability Incompleteness
122(3)
11.3 Variant Perspectives Regarding Provability Incompleteness
125(2)
11.4 Establishing Incompleteness: Similarities and Differences
127(1)
11.5 Was There a Leibniz Conspiracy?
128(5)
References
133(2)
12 Reification Fallacies and Inappropriate Totalities
135(16)
12.1 Improperly Totalized Wholes and Illicit Reification
135(5)
12.2 Antinomies
140(2)
12.3 The Root of the Problem
142(1)
12.4 Russell's Vicious Circle Principle
142(2)
12.5 Impredicativity
144(2)
12.6 Eliminating Grelling's Paradox
146(1)
12.7 Historical Postscript: Kant as a Critic of Inappropriate Totalization
147(4)
13 Mind Questions
151(4)
14 Intuition and Mathematical Idealism
155(12)
14.1 Recourse to Intuition
155(3)
14.2 Mathematical Intuition
158(3)
14.3 The Problem of Overload
161(1)
14.4 An Alternative Strategy
161(2)
14.5 Idealistic Retrospect
163(4)
15 Outlandish Hypotheses and the Limits of Thought Experimentation
167(18)
15.1 Far-Fetched Hypotheses and Diminishing Returns
167(5)
15.2 Meaninglessness
172(2)
15.3 Suppositions that Go Too Far: Limits of Meaningfulness
174(3)
15.4 How Outlandish Hypotheses Pose Problems
177(2)
15.5 Use and Usage
179(2)
15.6 The Shipwreck of Conjectural Analysis in Philosophy
181(4)
16 Limitations and the World Beyond
185(28)
16.1 Introduction
185(1)
16.2 Limits from Axiomatization to Explanation
186(1)
16.3 Intrinsic Limits of Language and Truth
187(7)
16.4 Epistemic Reflections and Conceivability
194(4)
16.5 Facing Facts
198(4)
16.6 The World of Fact as Plenum
202(6)
16.7 Lessons
208(5)
Part IV Issues of Philosophizing
17 Philosophical Confrontations
213(12)
17.1 Philosophical Conflict
213(1)
17.2 St. Paul Versus The Greek Philosophers (Athens, ca. 50 A.D.)
213(1)
17.3 Las Casas Versus Sepulveda (Valladolid, 1550 A.D.)
214(1)
17.4 Leibniz Versus Clarke (Hannover/London, 1714-15)
215(1)
17.5 De Bois Reymond Versus Haeckel (Berlin, 1882-99)
216(2)
17.6 Cassirer Versus Heidegger (Davos, 1929)
218(3)
17.7 Popper Versus Wittgenstein (Cambridge, 1946)
221(1)
17.8 Conclusion
222(3)
18 The Limits of Philosophy
225(8)
19 Antiphilosophy (Philosophical Negativism)
233(16)
19.1 Introduction
233(1)
19.2 An Historical Survey
234(8)
19.2.1 Heraclitean Instability and Cratylean Vacuity
234(1)
19.2.2 Eleatic Paradoxology
234(1)
19.2.3 Protagorean Relativism
235(1)
19.2.4 Socratic Negativism
236(1)
19.2.5 Empiricist Skepticism (Pyrrhonism)
236(1)
19.2.6 Theological Fundamentalism
237(1)
19.2.7 Averroism
237(1)
19.2.8 Humean Skepticism (Hume and Appearance/Reality Skepticism)
237(1)
19.2.9 Positivism
238(1)
19.2.10 Pragmatic Skepticism (James)
239(1)
19.2.11 Wittgensteinean Positivism
240(1)
19.2.12 Heideggerian Indifference and Tranquility/Gelassenheit
240(1)
19.2.13 Rorty
241(1)
19.3 A Survey of Positions
242(1)
19.4 The Scandal of Philosophy
242(2)
19.5 Overcoming the Scandal: Why Antiphilosophy Fails
244(5)
20 The Rational Inescapability of Philosophizing
249(6)
20.1 The Line of Reasoning
249(1)
20.2 Illustrative Instanced
250(1)
20.3 The Socratic Discovery
251(1)
20.4 The Problem of Progress
252(3)
Name Index 255
NICHOLAS RESCHER is Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. In a productive research career extending over six decades he has well over one hundred books to this credit and fourteen books about Reschers philosophy have been published in five languages. He has served as a President of: the American Philosophical Association, the American Catholic Philosophy Association, the American G. W. Leibniz Society, the C. S. Peirce Society, and the American Metaphysical Society, as well as Secretary General of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Sciences. Rescher has been elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Academia Europea, the Royal Society of Canada, and the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain. He has been awarded the Alexander von Humboldt prize for Humanistic Scholarship in 1984, the Belgian Prix Mercier in 2005, the Aquinas Medal of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 2007, theFounders Medal of the Metaphysical Society of America in 2016, and the Helmholtz Medal of the Germany Academy of Sciences (Berlin/Brandenburg) in 2016. In 2011 he was awarded the premier cross of the Order of Merit (Bundesverdienstkreuz Erster Klasse) of the Federal Republic of Germany, and honorary degrees have been awarded to him by eight universities on three continents. In 2010 the University of Pittsburgh honored him with the inauguration of a biennial Rescher Medal for distinguished lifetime contributions to systematic philosophy, and in 2018 the American Philosophical Association launched a Rescher Prize with a similar objective.
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām
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