'Knowledge-First' constitutes what is widely regarded as one of the most significant innovations in contemporary epistemology in the past 25 years. Knowledge-first epistemology is the idea that knowledge per se should not be analysed in terms of its constituent parts (e.g., justification, belief), but rather that these and other notions should be analysed in terms of the concept of knowledge. This volume features a substantive introduction and 13 original essays from leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of knowledge-first philosophy. The contributors' essays range from foundational issues to applications of this project to other disciplines including the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of perception, ethics and action theory. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind aims to provide a relatively open-ended forum for creative and original scholarship with the potential to contribute and advance debates connected with this philosophical project.
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vii | |
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1 Knowledge First: An Introduction |
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1 | (18) |
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Part I Foundational Issues |
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2 How and Why Knowledge is First |
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19 | (27) |
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3 Against Knowledge-First Epistemology |
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46 | (26) |
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72 | (23) |
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5 The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State |
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95 | (18) |
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6 On Putting Knowledge `First' |
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113 | (19) |
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa |
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7 No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion |
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132 | (31) |
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Part II Applications and New Directions |
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163 | (19) |
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182 | (18) |
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10 Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-individualism, and Knowledge-First Epistemology |
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200 | (23) |
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11 Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology |
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223 | (23) |
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12 In Support of the Knowledge-First Conception of the Normativity of Justification |
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246 | (13) |
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13 Sustaining Rules: A Model and Application |
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259 | (19) |
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14 `More Likely Than Not': Knowledge First and the Role of Bare Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law |
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278 | (15) |
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| Index |
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293 | |
J. Adam Carter is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. He works mainly in epistemology, where his work has appeared in such places as Nous, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies and Analysis. His book Metaepistemology and Relativism was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2016.
Emma C. Gordon is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh's Eidyn Research Centre. She works mainly in epistemology and bioethics, where her work has appeared in such places as Synthese, Bioethics, Philosophical Psychology, Canadian Journal of Philosophy and American Philosophical Quarterly. Her co-edited volume 'The Moral Psychology of Pride' is forthcoming with Rowman and Littlefield.
Benjamin Jarvis has been, most recently, Lecturer in Philosophy at Queen's University Belfast. His main research areas are in epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. Jarvis has published in Noūs, Philosophical Studies, Analytic Philosophy, the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Analysis, Synthese and the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. His book The Rules of Thought (co-authored with Jonathan Ichikawa) was published with Oxford University Press in 2013.
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