Atjaunināt sīkdatņu piekrišanu

E-grāmata: Law and Disaster: Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown in Japan

  • Formāts: 296 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 03-Sep-2018
  • Izdevniecība: Routledge
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781351059336
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
  • Formāts - EPUB+DRM
  • Cena: 50,08 €*
  • * ši ir gala cena, t.i., netiek piemērotas nekādas papildus atlaides
  • Ielikt grozā
  • Pievienot vēlmju sarakstam
  • Šī e-grāmata paredzēta tikai personīgai lietošanai. E-grāmatas nav iespējams atgriezt un nauda par iegādātajām e-grāmatām netiek atmaksāta.
Law and Disaster: Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown in JapanPalielināt
  • Formāts: 296 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 03-Sep-2018
  • Izdevniecība: Routledge
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781351059336
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

DRM restrictions

  • Kopēšana (kopēt/ievietot):

    nav atļauts

  • Drukāšana:

    nav atļauts

  • Lietošana:

    Digitālo tiesību pārvaldība (Digital Rights Management (DRM))
    Izdevējs ir piegādājis šo grāmatu šifrētā veidā, kas nozīmē, ka jums ir jāinstalē bezmaksas programmatūra, lai to atbloķētu un lasītu. Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu, jums ir jāizveido Adobe ID. Vairāk informācijas šeit. E-grāmatu var lasīt un lejupielādēt līdz 6 ierīcēm (vienam lietotājam ar vienu un to pašu Adobe ID).

    Nepieciešamā programmatūra
    Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu mobilajā ierīcē (tālrunī vai planšetdatorā), jums būs jāinstalē šī bezmaksas lietotne: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Lai lejupielādētu un lasītu šo e-grāmatu datorā vai Mac datorā, jums ir nepieciešamid Adobe Digital Editions (šī ir bezmaksas lietotne, kas īpaši izstrādāta e-grāmatām. Tā nav tas pats, kas Adobe Reader, kas, iespējams, jau ir jūsu datorā.)

    Jūs nevarat lasīt šo e-grāmatu, izmantojot Amazon Kindle.

On the 11th of March 2011, an earthquake registering 9.0 on the Richter scale (the most powerful to ever strike Japan) hit the Tohoku region in northern Japan. The earthquake produced a devastating tsunami that wiped out coastal cities and towns, leaving 19,000 people dead and registered as missing. Due to the disaster, the capability of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), was compromised, causing nuclear meltdown. The hydrogen blast destroyed the facilities, resulting in a spread of radioactive materials, and, subsequently, serious nuclear contamination. This combined event – earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown – became known as the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster.

This book examines the response of the Japanese government to the disaster, and its attempts to answer the legal questions posed by the combination of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown. Japanese law, policy, and infrastructure were insufficiently prepared for these disasters, and the country’s weaknesses were brutally exposed. This book analyses these failings, and discusses what Japan, and other countries, can learn from these events.

Preface xi
Introduction 1(8)
0.1 Earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown
1(2)
0.1.1 The Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami
1(1)
0.1.2 Meltdown at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima
2(1)
0.2 The Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster and failures of law and politics
3(2)
0.2.1 Failures of law and politics
3(1)
0.2.2 Why law and politics?
4(1)
0.3 Roadmap of the book
5(4)
0.3.1 Path to the disaster
5(1)
0.3.2 Disaster
6(1)
0.3.3 After the disaster
6(1)
0.3.4 Future
7(1)
0.3.5 Conclusions and lessons to be learned
7(2)
1 Japan and earthquakes: Before the Tohoku Earthquake 9(35)
1.1 Japan and earthquakes
9(10)
1.1.1 Powerful earthquakes in Japan
9(2)
1.1.2 Preparing for earthquakes
11(1)
1.1.3 Intensifying construction standards
12(1)
1.1.4 Earthquake insurance
13(1)
1.1.5 Earthquake preparedness measures
14(2)
1.1.6 Earthquakes and tsunamis in the Sanriku region
16(3)
1.2 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake
19(7)
1.2.1 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake
19(1)
1.2.2 Lessons from the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake
20(4)
1.2.3 Lessons learned
24(2)
1.3 Legal framework relating to earthquakes
26(18)
1.3.1 Constitutional basis for the government powers in time of emergency
27(1)
1.3.2 Framework for natural disaster countermeasures
28(2)
1.3.3 Disaster Assistance Act
30(1)
1.3.4 Basic Act on Disaster Countermeasures
31(2)
1.3.5 Disaster prevention
33(1)
1.3.6 "Disaster emergency countermeasures"
33(1)
1.3.7 Establishment of Disaster Response Headquarters
34(1)
1.3.8 "Emergency measures"
35(2)
1.3.9 "Disaster Emergency Situation" declaration
37(1)
1.3.10 "Emergency" declaration
38(1)
1.3.11 Disaster restoration
39(1)
1.3.12 Special Measures Act on Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures
39(2)
1.3.13 Earthquake Disaster Prevention Countermeasures Special Measures Act
41(3)
2 Tohoku Earthquake, tsunami, and aftermath 44(33)
2.1 The Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami
44(2)
2.1.1 The Tohoku Earthquake
44(1)
2.1.2 Tsunami
45(1)
2.2 Rescue
46(6)
2.2.1 Establishment of the headquarters
46(1)
2.2.2 Deployment of the Self Defense Forces
47(1)
2.2.3 Provision of shelter, food, and medical help
48(1)
2.2.4 Red tape
49(3)
2.3 Aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami
52(7)
2.3.1 No riots and no serious public disturbance
52(1)
2.3.2 Burial of the deceased
53(1)
2.3.3 Disposal of debris
54(1)
2.3.4 What should be done with debris left on private property?
55(2)
2.3.5 Disposal of damaged automobiles, home electronics, and other items
57(2)
2.4 Recovering from the disaster
59(9)
2.4.1 Government assistance
59(2)
2.4.2 Exceptions granted according to pre-existing statutes
61(2)
2.4.3 Exceptions granted by skewed statutory reinterpretation
63(1)
2.4.4 Granting exceptions through enactment of special legislation
64(2)
2.4.5 Granting exceptions through administrative discretion
66(2)
2.5 Earthquake, tsunami, and failures of law and politics
68(9)
2.5.1 What went wrong?
68(2)
2.5.2 Failures of law in the disaster preparation
70(1)
2.5.3 Failures of law in the disaster response
71(1)
2.5.4 The Tohoku Earthquake and much deeper failures of law
72(2)
2.5.5 The Tohoku Earthquake and failures of politics
74(3)
3 Nuclear meltdown in Fukushima 77(42)
3.1 Earthquake, tsunami, and the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
77(8)
3.1.1 Fukushima No 1 Nuclear Power Plant
77(2)
3.1.2 Loss of all electricity at the power plant
79(1)
3.1.3 Situation escalated
80(3)
3.1.4 Efforts to contain the disaster
83(2)
3.2 Regulatory system for nuclear power plants
85(6)
3.2.1 Basic Act on Atomic Energy
85(2)
3.2.2 Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act
87(2)
3.2.3 Nuclear Disaster Special Measures Act
89(1)
3.2.4 Nuclear power plant subsidies and safety agreement
90(1)
3.2.5 Nuclear Damage Award Act
91(1)
3.3 Government efforts to stabilize the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
91(8)
3.3.1 Government intervention
92(2)
3.3.2 Asking the local government for assistance
94(1)
3.3.3 Release of contaminated water into the sea
95(2)
3.3.4 Workplace safety
97(2)
3.4 Evacuation
99(5)
3.4.1 Evacuation instruction
99(3)
3.4.2 Expansion of the scope of evacuation instruction
102(2)
3.5 Contaminated vegetables, water, fish, and soil
104(6)
3.5.1 Contaminated vegetables
104(3)
3.5.2 Contaminated drinking water, soil, and fish
107(2)
3.5.3 Loss due to "bad reputation"
109(1)
3.6 Rolling blackouts and limitations on electricity consumption
110(3)
3.6.1 Rolling blackouts
110(1)
3.6.2 Limitations on electricity consumption
111(2)
3.7 Nuclear meltdown and failures of law and politics
113(6)
3.7.1 Nuclear meltdown and failures of law
113(1)
3.7.2 Nuclear meltdown and much deeper failures of law
114(1)
3.7.3 Nuclear meltdown and failures of politics
115(4)
4 Reconstruction of the Tohoku Region 119(44)
4.1 Assisting the disaster victims
119(8)
4.1.1 Casualties and damage
119(2)
4.1.2 Providing shelters and emergency assistance to victims
121(1)
4.1.3 Providing temporary places to stay
122(1)
4.1.4 Financial assistance for disaster victims
123(3)
4.1.5 Financial assistance for business operators
126(1)
4.2 Rebuilding communities
127(6)
4.2.1 Reconstruction and revival
127(2)
4.2.2 Preparing for the reconstruction
129(2)
4.2.3 Revamping tsunami preparation policy
131(1)
4.2.4 Group relocation program
132(1)
4.3 Reconstruction plan and reconstruction organization
133(4)
4.3.1 Disputes over the agency tasked with reconstruction
133(2)
4.3.2 Reconstruction plan
135(1)
4.3.3 Reconstruction agency and reconstruction
135(2)
4.4 Reconstruction measures
137(6)
4.4.1 Reconstruction housing
137(1)
4.4.2 Path to the reconstruction special zone program
138(1)
4.4.3 Reconstruction special zones
139(1)
4.4.4 Reconstruction grant
140(1)
4.4.5 Other reconstruction measures
141(1)
4.4.6 New Tohoku vision
142(1)
4.5 Reconstruction in progress
143(13)
4.5.1 No compensation for the damage
143(1)
4.5.2 Financial plight of disaster victims still dire
144(2)
4.5.3 Slow progress of reconstruction
146(2)
4.5.4 Business and industry still sluggish
148(3)
4.5.5 Is there something wrong with reconstruction measures?
151(1)
4.5.6 Is the reconstruction budget adequate?
152(1)
4.5.7 Frustration of disaster victims
153(1)
4.5.8 Questionable boost under the LDP government
154(2)
4.5.9 Is the "New Tohoku vision" realized?
156(1)
4.6 Reconstruction of Tohoku and failures of law and politics
156(7)
4.6.1 Reconstruction of Tohoku and failures of law
156(2)
4.6.2 Reconstruction of Tohoku and deeper failures of law
158(1)
4.6.3 Reconstruction of Tohoku and failures of politics
159(4)
5 Aftermath of the nuclear meltdown 163(47)
5.1 Roadmap to containment and abandonment
163(3)
5.1.1 Roadmap to containment
163(2)
5.1.2 Abandoning the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
165(1)
5.2 Disposal of contaminated waste
166(5)
5.2.1 Nuclear waste and its disposal
166(1)
5.2.2 Disposal of contaminated waste from inside the Fukushima Plant
166(3)
5.2.3 Disposal of contaminated waste outside of the Fukushima Plant
169(2)
5.3 Damage and compensation
171(17)
5.3.1 Tort liability of TEPCO and the government
171(2)
5.3.2 Liability under the Nuclear Damage Award Act
173(3)
5.3.3 First guideline and second guideline for damages
176(1)
5.3.4 Consolidated Interim Guideline
177(2)
5.3.5 Payment procedure
179(1)
5.3.6 Damage payment
180(1)
5.3.7 Requests for arbitration
181(2)
5.3.8 Lawsuits
183(2)
5.3.9 Splitting court judgments
185(1)
5.3.10 How long could the damage award continue after lifting the evacuation instruction?
186(2)
5.4 Support for TEPCO
188(3)
5.4.1 TEPCO's total amount of liability
188(1)
5.4.2 New scheme to support TEPCO
188(2)
5.4.3 Best choice?
190(1)
5.5 Allowing local residents to return
191(9)
5.5.1 Government assistance to evacuees
191(3)
5.5.2 Allowing local residents to return home
194(1)
5.5.3 Difficult choices for evacuees
195(1)
5.5.4 Decontamination
196(2)
5.5.5 Safety of returning residents
198(2)
5.6 Reconstruction of Fukushima
200(5)
5.6.1 Reconstruction plan
200(2)
5.6.2 Various reconstruction measures
202(1)
5.6.3 Frustration of local residents
203(2)
5.7 Aftermath of the Fukushima Accident and failures of law and politics
205(5)
5.7.1 Aftermath of Fukushima and failures of law
205(1)
5.7.2 Aftermath of Fukushima and deeper failures of law
206(1)
5.7.3 Aftermath of Fukushima and failures of politics
207(3)
6 Future of law and politics in Japan 210(47)
6.1 Preparing for future earthquakes and tsunamis
210(24)
6.1.1 Shortcomings of previous disaster prevention plan
210(2)
6.1.2 Revising the Basic Act on Disaster Countermeasures: The 2012 Amendments
212(2)
6.1.3 Revising the Basic Act on Disaster Countermeasures: The 2013 Amendments
214(2)
6.1.4 Enacting the Large-Scale Disaster Reconstruction Act
216(2)
6.1.5 Revising the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan
218(1)
6.1.6 Preparing for a future Kanto Earthquake
218(3)
6.1.7 Preparing for a future Tokai Earthquake
221(2)
6.1.8 Preparing for a possible future Nankai Trough Megathrust Earthquake
223(3)
6.1.9 Educating the public on preparing for earthquakes
226(1)
6.1.10 Preventing information blackouts
226(2)
6.1.11 Japanese FEMA?
228(2)
6.1.12 Kumamoto Earthquakes
230(3)
6.1.13 Prediction is simply impossible
233(1)
6.2 Future of nuclear power
234(15)
6.2.1 The future of nuclear power contested
234(2)
6.2.2 Establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority
236(2)
6.2.3 New safety standards for nuclear power plants
238(2)
6.2.4 Evacuation plans and nuclear disaster countermeasures
240(1)
6.2.5 Restarting the nuclear power plants
241(2)
6.2.6 Nuclear power plants above active fault lines
243(1)
6.2.7 Promotion of alternative energy
244(2)
6.2.8 Power companies and the electrical supply system
246(3)
6.3 Future of law and politics in Japan
249(11)
6.3.1 Lessons learned
249(1)
6.3.2 Any changes following the deeper failures of law?
250(2)
6.3.3 Any changes following the failures of politics?
252(5)
Conclusion 257(3)
Appendices 260(17)
1 Statutes and regulations
260(6)
2 Court judgments
266(1)
3 Glossary
267(10)
Index 277
Professor Shigenori Matsui is Director of Japanese Legal Studies, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia, Canada. He is an internationally renowned expert in the fields of Constitutional Law, Mass Media Law and Internet Law. Before joining the UBC Law School, he was a professor of Osaka University Law School. He has served for the Japanese government as a member of the National Freedom of Information Review Board, and as an examiner for the National Bar Examination Commission.
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/97813510593366e.html
Keywords: