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E-grāmata: Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants: Phase 2

  • Formāts: 238 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 06-May-2016
  • Izdevniecība: National Academies Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780309388894
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  • Formāts: 238 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 06-May-2016
  • Izdevniecība: National Academies Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780309388894
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The U.S. Congress asked the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a technical study on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident for improving safety and security of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. This study was carried out in two phases: Phase 1, issued in 2014, focused on the causes of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and safety-related lessons learned for improving nuclear plant systems, operations, and regulations exclusive of spent fuel storage. This Phase 2 report focuses on three issues: (1) lessons learned from the accident for nuclear plant security, (2) lessons learned for spent fuel storage, and (3) reevaluation of conclusions from previous Academies studies on spent fuel storage.

Table of Contents



Front Matter Synopsis Summary 1 Introduction 2 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Lessons Learned for Spent Fuel Storage 3 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Lessons Learned for Nuclear Plant Security 4 Reevaluation of Findings and Recommendations from Previous NAS Reports 5 Security Risk Assessment 6 Loss-of-Coolant Events in Spent Fuel Pools 7 Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel from Pools to Dry Casks References Appendix A: Committee and Staff Biographies Appendix B: Presentations Appendix C: Conversions and Units Appendix D: Acronyms
Synopsis 1(2)
Summary 3(8)
1 Introduction
11(8)
1.1 Study Process
15(1)
1.2 Strategy for Addressing the Study Charge
16(1)
1.3 Report Organization
17(2)
2 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Lessons Learned for Spent Fuel Storage
19(56)
2.1 Spent Fuel Storage at the Fukushima Daiichi Plant
19(6)
2.2 Impacts of Earthquake and Tsunami on the Unit 1-4 Spent Fuel Pools
25(21)
2.3 Committee Analysis of Unit 4 Pool Water Levels
46(7)
2.4 Finding and Recommendation
53(22)
Appendixes
2A Spent Fuel Storage in Units 5 and 6, the Common Pool, and Dry Cask Storage at the Fukushima Daiichi Plant
59(2)
2B Analysis of Spent Fuel Pool Heat-up
61(11)
2C Orifice Flow-Rate Correlation
72(3)
3 FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: LESSONS LEARNED FOR NUCLEAR PLANT SECURITY
75(13)
3.1 Lessons Learned for Security at U.S. Nuclear Plants
75(6)
3.2 Lessons Learned for Identifying and Applying Design-Basis Events for Accidents and Terrorist Attacks to Existing Nuclear Plants
81(7)
Appendixes
3A Security Systems at Nuclear Plants
86(2)
4 Reevaluation of Findings and Recommendations from Previous NAS Reports
88(26)
4.1 Terrorist Attacks on Spent Fuel Storage or Theft of Spent Fuel
90(4)
4.2 Safety and Security of Pool Storage
94(4)
4.3 Safety and Security of Dry Cask Storage and Comparison with Pool Storage
98(2)
4.4 Implementation Issues
100(14)
Appendixes
4A Dry Cask Storage Regulations
111(3)
5 Security Risk Assessment
114(18)
5.1 Background on Risk Assessment
115(1)
5.2 Application of Risk Assessment to Security
116(4)
5.3 Security Risk Assessment Methodologies
120(2)
5.4 Challenges for Applying Risk Assessment to Security
122(2)
5.5 Discussion
124(8)
Appendixes
5A Expert Elicitation
127(3)
5B CARVER Analysis
130(2)
6 Loss-of-Coolant Events in Spent Fuel Pools
132(23)
6.1 Response of Spent Fuel Pools to Loss-of-Coolant Events
134(13)
6.2 Mitigating Loss-of-Coolant Events in Spent Fuel Pools
147(8)
Appendixes
6A USNRC and Sandia Studies on Loss-of-Cooling Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools
151(4)
7 Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel from Pools to Dry Casks
155(46)
7.1 Background on USNRC Spent Fuel Storage Analyses
156(2)
7.2 Spent Fuel Pool Study
158(9)
7.3 Expedited Transfer Regulatory Analysis
167(5)
7.4 Discussion
172(19)
Appendixes
7A Spent Fuel Pool Racking
187(4)
References
191(10)
Appendixes
A Committee and Staff Biographies
201(10)
B Presentations
211(4)
C Conversions and Units
215(2)
D Acronyms
217