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E-grāmata: Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality [Oxford Scholarship Online E-books]

(Barrister of Lincoln's Inn; Member of Essex Court Chambers, London)
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The margin of appreciation is a judicial doctrine whereby international courts allow states to have a measure of diversity in their interpretation of human rights treaty obligations. The doctrine is at the heart of some of the most important international human rights decisions. Does it undermine the universality of human rights? How should judges decide whether to give this margin of appreciation to states? How can lawyers make best use of arguments for or against the margin of appreciation?

This book answers these questions, and broadens the discussion on the margin of appreciation by including material beyond the ECHR system. It provides a comprehensive justification of the doctrine, and ALLFSCA14I the key cases affecting the doctrine in practice.

Part One provides a systematic defence of the margin of appreciation doctrine in international human rights law. Drawing on the philosophy of practical reasoning the book argues that the margin of appreciation is a doctrine of judicial deference and is a common and appropriate feature of adjudication. The book argues that the margin of appreciation doctrine prevents courts from imposing unhelpful uniformity, whilst allowing decisions to be consistent with the universality of human rights. Part Two considers the key case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the UN Human Rights Committee, documenting the margin of appreciation in practice. The analysis uniquely takes a broad look at the factors affecting the margin of appreciation. Part Three explores how the margin of appreciation operates in the judicial decision-making process, reconceptualising the proportionality assessment and explaining how the nature of the right and the type of case affect the courts' reasoning.
Table of Cases
xv
Table of Treaties and Legislation
xxi
List of Abbreviations
xxiv
1 Introduction
1(14)
1 The margin of appreciation in the ECtHR, IACtHR, and the UN HRC
3(3)
2 Book structure
6(4)
3 Approach
10(5)
PART I THEORY: CONCEPTUALIZING AND JUSTIFYING THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
15(52)
2 Deference: Reasoning Differendy on the Basis of External Factors
17(21)
1 Introduction
17(1)
2 Assigning weight differently on the basis of external factors
18(3)
3 Deference on the basis of external factors
21(3)
4 Types of reason for deference
24(2)
a Relationships and comity
24(1)
b Epistemic limitations and expertise
25(1)
5 Cases that demonstrate this approach in practice
26(11)
a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
27(4)
b Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
31(3)
c United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC)
34(3)
6 Conclusion
37(1)
3 Different Approaches to Deference in International Human Rights Law
38(29)
1 Introduction
38(2)
2 The margin of appreciation and relativism about human rights
40(10)
a The meaning of universality in moral discourse
42(1)
b Moral universality and the margin of appreciation
43(1)
c Legal rights that implement moral rights
44(1)
d Legal orders and comparisons
45(2)
e The margin of appreciation and relativism in practice
47(2)
f Summary
49(1)
3 Critiques of deference
50(8)
a The `one right answer' thesis
50(3)
b Harmonization and integration
53(2)
c Supporting case law
55(2)
d Summary
57(1)
4 Justifying the margin of appreciation
58(8)
a The Tribunals as forums for the contestation of sovereignty
58(3)
b Deference and subsidiarity
61(1)
c Views of commentators
62(1)
d The practice of the Tribunals
63(2)
e Summary
65(1)
5 Conclusion
66(1)
PART II PRACTICE: FACTORS AFFECTING THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
67(108)
4 Democracy and Participation
69(34)
1 Introduction
69(1)
2 Theories of judicial review and the justification of the margin of appreciation for democratic reasons
70(3)
3 The contribution of the Tribunals to theories of democracy in international law
73(2)
4 Democratic legitimacy as an external factor for the margin of appreciation in practice
75(8)
a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
75(4)
b Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
79(1)
c United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC)
80(1)
d Giving state legislatures time to change the law
81(2)
5 Cases in which democratic legitimacy is a factor in favour of granting the state a margin of appreciation
83(7)
a Conflicting private rights: testing the choice of the legislature
83(3)
b Conflicting personal-public freedoms: questions of moral or political controversy
86(4)
6 Cases in which democratic legitimacy issues heighten scrutiny
90(11)
a Democratic rights: the example of electoral participation
90(3)
b Minorities and vulnerable groups
93(3)
c A lack of societal/parliamentary debate
96(2)
d The application of legal formulae where the provisions are too broad-brush
98(2)
e Other rule of law concerns
100(1)
7 Conclusion
101(2)
5 Treaty Interpretation, Current State Practice, and Other International Law Influences on the Practice of Deference
103(42)
1 Introduction
103(1)
2 State consent and the legality of international agreements
103(3)
3 Treaty interpretation: Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the special status of human rights treaties
106(7)
a Original intent or evolutive interpretation
108(2)
b Treaty provisions with autonomous meanings
110(2)
c Summary
112(1)
4 Other approaches to the role of current state practice
113(3)
5 Current state practice as an external factor affecting the margin of appreciation in practice
116(14)
a Lack of consensus increases deference
116(4)
b Current state practice in the applicant's favour heightens scrutiny
120(4)
c Current state practice in the state's favour increases deference
124(3)
d Current state practice is not calculated with precision
127(3)
6 Deference to international norms, institutions, and organizations
130(13)
a Decisions of other international human rights tribunals
131(4)
b The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
135(2)
c Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
137(4)
d Other international law norms
141(2)
7 Conclusion
143(2)
6 Expertise and Competence
145(30)
1 Introduction
145(1)
2 Epistemology, expertise, and judicial responsibility
146(2)
3 Expertise as a factor for the margin of appreciation in practice
148(5)
a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
148(2)
b Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
150(2)
c United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC)
152(1)
4 Types of expertise where there are commonly stronger grounds for a margin of appreciation
153(14)
a National security
153(6)
b Child protection
159(3)
c Healthcare
162(1)
d Education
163(1)
e Policing and civil service
164(1)
f Economic matters
164(3)
5 Heightened scrutiny where the Tribunals have expertise
167(7)
a Legal procedures
167(4)
b Reasonable time
171(1)
c Legal interpretation
172(2)
6 Conclusion: expertise and subsidiarity
174(1)
PART III THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION: THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND PROPORTIONALITY
175(51)
7 Proportionality: Determining Rights
177(23)
1 Introduction
177(1)
2 The origins of proportionality
178(3)
3 Theories of rights: balancing, trumps, and human rights determinations
181(11)
a Interest-based theories
182(7)
b Rights as trumps (reason-blocking theories)
189(3)
4 The margin of appreciation and proportionality in human rights adjudication
192(6)
a The conceptual connection between the margin of appreciation and proportionality
194(2)
b Cases that demonstrate the connection between the margin of appreciation and proportionality
196(2)
5 Conclusion: the structure of decision-making in human rights law
198(2)
8 Nature of the Right and Type of Case
200(19)
1 Introduction
200(1)
2 How the `nature of the right' or `type of case' may affect the margin of appreciation or proportionality
201(3)
3 The nature of the right
204(12)
a Absolute rights: life and freedom from torture
204(6)
b Strong rights: fair trial, liberty, and derogations
210(1)
c Qualified rights: privacy, and freedoms of religion, association, speech, and non-discrimination
211(4)
d Weak rights: property, education, and free elections
215(1)
4 Types of case
216(1)
5 Conclusion
217(2)
9 Concluding Remarks
219(7)
Bibliography 226(5)
Index 231
Andrew Legg is a barrister practising from Essex Court Chambers in London. He has a broad commercial practice and a particular interest in public international law and human rights. Andrew holds a doctorate from the University of Oxford, where he taught law for four years and lectured on the European Human Rights Law course.