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Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics [Hardback]

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(Duke University)
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In A Mark of the Mental, Karen Neander considers the representational power of mental states -- described by the cognitive scientist Zenon Pylyshyn as the "second hardest puzzle" of philosophy of mind (the first being consciousness). The puzzle at the heart of the book is sometimes called "the problem of mental content," "Brentano's problem," or "the problem of intentionality." Its motivating mystery is how neurobiological states can have semantic properties such as meaning or reference. Neander proposes a naturalistic account for sensory-perceptual (nonconceptual) representations.

Neander draws on insights from state-space semantics (which appeals to relations of second-order similarity between representing and represented domains), causal theories of reference (which claim the reference relation is a causal one), and teleosemantic theories (which claim that semantic norms, at their simplest, depend on functional norms). She proposes and defends an intuitive, theoretically well-motivated but highly controversial thesis: sensory-perceptual systems have the function to produce inner state changes that are the analogs of as well as caused by their referents. Neander shows that the three main elements -- functions, causal-information relations, and relations of second-order similarity -- complement rather than conflict with each other. After developing an argument for teleosemantics by examining the nature of explanation in the mind and brain sciences, she develops a theory of mental content and defends it against six main content-determinacy challenges to a naturalized semantics.

Acknowledgments xi
1 Thinking about Thought
1(26)
Brentano's Problem
2(1)
Naturalism, Consciousness, and Intentionality
3(3)
From Informational Content to Representational Content
6(3)
Original versus Derived Intentionality
9(5)
Representations, Targets, and Contents
14(3)
Semantic Evaluations
17(2)
Teleosemantics
19(3)
Overview of What Is to Come
22(5)
2 Positing Nonconceptual Representations
27(20)
A First Example
28(1)
A Second Example: AH's Visual Deficit
29(3)
The Inference to Normal Perceivers
32(2)
Representational (as Opposed to Informational) Content
34(2)
Intensional Ascriptions
36(2)
The Formality Assumption
38(2)
Sharpening the Methodological Conundrum
40(2)
Semantic Externalism
42(3)
Concluding Remarks
45(2)
3 Functional Analysis and the Species Design
47(26)
How-Questions and Why-Questions
47(1)
A Division of Explanatory Labor for SE and CR Functions?
48(4)
Minimal and Normal-Proper Functions
52(4)
Questioning Thesis 3
56(2)
Solving the Generalization Problem
58(3)
The Properly Functioning System
61(5)
Is It Idealization?
66(2)
Related Views
68(3)
Concluding Remarks
71(2)
4 The Methodological Argument for Informational Teleosemantics
73(24)
The Bare-Bones Version
73(1)
Premise 1
74(4)
Premises 2 and 3
78(5)
Premises 4 and 5
83(1)
Premise 6
84(1)
From Methodology to Metaphysics
85(4)
Teleosemantics: The Only Game in Town?
89(1)
Fodor's (Teleosemantic) Asymmetric-Dependency Theory
90(3)
Cummins' (Teleosemantic) Picture Theory
93(3)
Concluding Remarks
96(1)
5 Simple Minds
97(28)
Why Anuran Perception Is Not a Toy Example
99(1)
Sign-Stimuli and Prey-Capture in a Toad
100(5)
Information Flow in the Neural Substrate
105(4)
The Localization Content
109(6)
What Is Represented?
115(4)
An Attenuated Form of Verificationism?
119(3)
Concluding Remarks
122(3)
6 Response Functions
125(24)
Starting Teleosemantics at the Right End
125(2)
Functions as Selected Dispositions
127(3)
How Blind Is Natural Selection?
130(4)
Normal Conditions versus Normal Causes
134(4)
Unsuitable Analyses of Information
138(4)
A Simple Causal Analysis of Information
142(3)
Information-Carrying Functions
145(2)
Concluding Remarks
147(2)
7 The Content-Determinacy Challenges
149(26)
Six Content-Determinacy Challenges
150(1)
The Simple Starter Theory: CT
151(4)
Distinguishing Locally Co-Instantiated Properties
155(4)
Distinguishing Properties Mutually Implicated in Selection
159(4)
A Note on Color Realism
163(4)
Seeing Green versus Seeing Grue
167(4)
Mach Diamonds versus Ordinary Squares
171(3)
Concluding Remarks
174(1)
8 Causally Driven Analogs
175(42)
Inner Worlds Mirroring Outer Worlds
176(4)
Analog Representations
180(3)
The Second-Order Similarity Rule
183(4)
Traditional Objections to Similarity-Based Content
187(3)
Who Specifies the Isomorphism?
190(6)
The Pictorial Intuition and Color Realism (Again)
196(4)
The Missing Shade of Blue
200(3)
Representing Determinates of Determinables
203(2)
Berkeley's Problem of Abstraction
205(3)
A Neo-Lockean Strategy
208(3)
A Neo-Humean Proposal
211(3)
Concluding Remarks
214(3)
9 Distal and Distant Red Squares
217(28)
The Problem of Distal Content
217(4)
Informational Asymmetries in Response Functions
221(3)
Other Solutions
224(3)
Perceptual Constancies and Distal Content
227(3)
Hallucinated Red Squares: In the World or Just in the Head?
230(2)
Binding to Spatiotemporal Representation
232(3)
The Systematic Representing of Depth Relations
235(2)
A Few Words on Distal Content and Concepts
237(2)
Summing Up
239(6)
Notes 245(40)
References 285(24)
Index 309