Acknowledgments |
|
xi | |
|
|
1 | (26) |
|
|
2 | (1) |
|
Naturalism, Consciousness, and Intentionality |
|
|
3 | (3) |
|
From Informational Content to Representational Content |
|
|
6 | (3) |
|
Original versus Derived Intentionality |
|
|
9 | (5) |
|
Representations, Targets, and Contents |
|
|
14 | (3) |
|
|
17 | (2) |
|
|
19 | (3) |
|
Overview of What Is to Come |
|
|
22 | (5) |
|
2 Positing Nonconceptual Representations |
|
|
27 | (20) |
|
|
28 | (1) |
|
A Second Example: AH's Visual Deficit |
|
|
29 | (3) |
|
The Inference to Normal Perceivers |
|
|
32 | (2) |
|
Representational (as Opposed to Informational) Content |
|
|
34 | (2) |
|
|
36 | (2) |
|
|
38 | (2) |
|
Sharpening the Methodological Conundrum |
|
|
40 | (2) |
|
|
42 | (3) |
|
|
45 | (2) |
|
3 Functional Analysis and the Species Design |
|
|
47 | (26) |
|
How-Questions and Why-Questions |
|
|
47 | (1) |
|
A Division of Explanatory Labor for SE and CR Functions? |
|
|
48 | (4) |
|
Minimal and Normal-Proper Functions |
|
|
52 | (4) |
|
|
56 | (2) |
|
Solving the Generalization Problem |
|
|
58 | (3) |
|
The Properly Functioning System |
|
|
61 | (5) |
|
|
66 | (2) |
|
|
68 | (3) |
|
|
71 | (2) |
|
4 The Methodological Argument for Informational Teleosemantics |
|
|
73 | (24) |
|
|
73 | (1) |
|
|
74 | (4) |
|
|
78 | (5) |
|
|
83 | (1) |
|
|
84 | (1) |
|
From Methodology to Metaphysics |
|
|
85 | (4) |
|
Teleosemantics: The Only Game in Town? |
|
|
89 | (1) |
|
Fodor's (Teleosemantic) Asymmetric-Dependency Theory |
|
|
90 | (3) |
|
Cummins' (Teleosemantic) Picture Theory |
|
|
93 | (3) |
|
|
96 | (1) |
|
|
97 | (28) |
|
Why Anuran Perception Is Not a Toy Example |
|
|
99 | (1) |
|
Sign-Stimuli and Prey-Capture in a Toad |
|
|
100 | (5) |
|
Information Flow in the Neural Substrate |
|
|
105 | (4) |
|
|
109 | (6) |
|
|
115 | (4) |
|
An Attenuated Form of Verificationism? |
|
|
119 | (3) |
|
|
122 | (3) |
|
|
125 | (24) |
|
Starting Teleosemantics at the Right End |
|
|
125 | (2) |
|
Functions as Selected Dispositions |
|
|
127 | (3) |
|
How Blind Is Natural Selection? |
|
|
130 | (4) |
|
Normal Conditions versus Normal Causes |
|
|
134 | (4) |
|
Unsuitable Analyses of Information |
|
|
138 | (4) |
|
A Simple Causal Analysis of Information |
|
|
142 | (3) |
|
Information-Carrying Functions |
|
|
145 | (2) |
|
|
147 | (2) |
|
7 The Content-Determinacy Challenges |
|
|
149 | (26) |
|
Six Content-Determinacy Challenges |
|
|
150 | (1) |
|
The Simple Starter Theory: CT |
|
|
151 | (4) |
|
Distinguishing Locally Co-Instantiated Properties |
|
|
155 | (4) |
|
Distinguishing Properties Mutually Implicated in Selection |
|
|
159 | (4) |
|
|
163 | (4) |
|
Seeing Green versus Seeing Grue |
|
|
167 | (4) |
|
Mach Diamonds versus Ordinary Squares |
|
|
171 | (3) |
|
|
174 | (1) |
|
8 Causally Driven Analogs |
|
|
175 | (42) |
|
Inner Worlds Mirroring Outer Worlds |
|
|
176 | (4) |
|
|
180 | (3) |
|
The Second-Order Similarity Rule |
|
|
183 | (4) |
|
Traditional Objections to Similarity-Based Content |
|
|
187 | (3) |
|
Who Specifies the Isomorphism? |
|
|
190 | (6) |
|
The Pictorial Intuition and Color Realism (Again) |
|
|
196 | (4) |
|
The Missing Shade of Blue |
|
|
200 | (3) |
|
Representing Determinates of Determinables |
|
|
203 | (2) |
|
Berkeley's Problem of Abstraction |
|
|
205 | (3) |
|
|
208 | (3) |
|
|
211 | (3) |
|
|
214 | (3) |
|
9 Distal and Distant Red Squares |
|
|
217 | (28) |
|
The Problem of Distal Content |
|
|
217 | (4) |
|
Informational Asymmetries in Response Functions |
|
|
221 | (3) |
|
|
224 | (3) |
|
Perceptual Constancies and Distal Content |
|
|
227 | (3) |
|
Hallucinated Red Squares: In the World or Just in the Head? |
|
|
230 | (2) |
|
Binding to Spatiotemporal Representation |
|
|
232 | (3) |
|
The Systematic Representing of Depth Relations |
|
|
235 | (2) |
|
A Few Words on Distal Content and Concepts |
|
|
237 | (2) |
|
|
239 | (6) |
Notes |
|
245 | (40) |
References |
|
285 | (24) |
Index |
|
309 | |