Atjaunināt sīkdatņu piekrišanu

E-grāmata: Market-Driven Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio

,
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
  • Formāts - PDF+DRM
  • Cena: 53,52 €*
  • * ši ir gala cena, t.i., netiek piemērotas nekādas papildus atlaides
  • Ielikt grozā
  • Pievienot vēlmju sarakstam
  • Šī e-grāmata paredzēta tikai personīgai lietošanai. E-grāmatas nav iespējams atgriezt un nauda par iegādātajām e-grāmatām netiek atmaksāta.
Market-Driven Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive RadioPalielināt
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

DRM restrictions

  • Kopēšana (kopēt/ievietot):

    nav atļauts

  • Drukāšana:

    nav atļauts

  • Lietošana:

    Digitālo tiesību pārvaldība (Digital Rights Management (DRM))
    Izdevējs ir piegādājis šo grāmatu šifrētā veidā, kas nozīmē, ka jums ir jāinstalē bezmaksas programmatūra, lai to atbloķētu un lasītu. Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu, jums ir jāizveido Adobe ID. Vairāk informācijas šeit. E-grāmatu var lasīt un lejupielādēt līdz 6 ierīcēm (vienam lietotājam ar vienu un to pašu Adobe ID).

    Nepieciešamā programmatūra
    Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu mobilajā ierīcē (tālrunī vai planšetdatorā), jums būs jāinstalē šī bezmaksas lietotne: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Lai lejupielādētu un lasītu šo e-grāmatu datorā vai Mac datorā, jums ir nepieciešamid Adobe Digital Editions (šī ir bezmaksas lietotne, kas īpaši izstrādāta e-grāmatām. Tā nav tas pats, kas Adobe Reader, kas, iespējams, jau ir jūsu datorā.)

    Jūs nevarat lasīt šo e-grāmatu, izmantojot Amazon Kindle.

This brief focuses on the current research on mechanism design for dynamic spectrum sharing in cognitive radio (CR) networks. Along with a review of CR architectures and characteristics, this brief presents the motivations, significances and unique challenges of implementing algorithmic mechanism design for encouraging both primary spectrum owners and secondary spectrum users to participate in dynamic spectrum sharing. The brief then focuses on recent advances in mechanism design in CR networks. With an emphasis on dealing with the uncertain spectrum availabilities, mechanisms based on spectrum recall, two-stage spectrum sharing and online spectrum allocation are introduced with the support of theoretic analyses and numerical illustrations. The brief concludes with a discussion of potential research directions and interests, which will motivate further studies on mechanism design for wireless communications. This brief is concise and approachable for researchers, professionals and

advanced-level students in wireless communications and networks.

Introduction.- Fundamentals of Mechanism Design.- Recall-Based Spectrum Auction Mechanism.- Two-Stage Spectrum Sharing Mechanism.- Online Spectrum Allocation Mechanism.- Conclusion and Future Research Directions.
1 Introduction
1(16)
1.1 Background and Aim of the Brief
1(4)
1.2 Overview of Dynamic Spectrum Sharing
5(12)
1.2.1 Architecture of Cognitive Radio Networks
5(3)
1.2.2 General Framework of DSA
8(4)
1.2.3 Market-Driven Dynamic Spectrum Sharing
12(2)
References
14(3)
2 Fundamentals of Mechanism Design
17(18)
2.1 Introduction
17(1)
2.2 Auction Mechanism Design
18(12)
2.2.1 Basics of Auction Mechanism
19(2)
2.2.2 Design Goals and Properties
21(2)
2.2.3 Second-Price Sealed-Bid Mechanism
23(1)
2.2.4 Vickrey--Clarke--Groves Mechanism
24(3)
2.2.5 Lehmann--Ocallaghan--Shoham Mechanism
27(3)
2.3 Applications of Mechanism Design in Spectrum Sharing
30(5)
2.3.1 Single-Sided Spectrum Sharing Mechanisms
30(1)
2.3.2 Double-Sided Spectrum Sharing Mechanisms
31(1)
2.3.3 Online Spectrum Sharing Mechanisms
32(1)
References
33(2)
3 Recall-Based Spectrum Auction Mechanism
35(24)
3.1 Introduction
35(1)
3.2 System Model
36(2)
3.3 Recall-Based Single-Winner Spectrum Auction
38(4)
3.3.1 Private Values of Secondary Users
38(1)
3.3.2 Optimal Strategies in RSSA
39(3)
3.3.3 Time-Line of RSSA
42(1)
3.4 Recall-Based Multi-Winner Spectrum Auction
42(5)
3.4.1 Strategies of Secondary Users in RMSA
43(1)
3.4.2 Actions of the Primary Spectrum Owner
44(3)
3.4.3 Time-Line of RMSA
47(1)
3.5 Performance Analyses
47(5)
3.5.1 Revenue of the Primary Base Station
47(2)
3.5.2 Utilities of Secondary Users
49(3)
3.6 Numerical Results
52(4)
3.7 Summary
56(3)
References
57(2)
4 Two-Stage Spectrum Sharing Mechanism
59(26)
4.1 Introduction
59(1)
4.2 System Model
60(2)
4.3 First Stage: Combinatorial Spectrum Auction
62(6)
4.3.1 Winner Determination Problem
63(1)
4.3.2 Polynomial-Time Approximation Algorithm for the WDP
64(2)
4.3.3 Payment Design
66(1)
4.3.4 Auction Properties
67(1)
4.4 Second Stage: Recall-Based Pricing Game
68(9)
4.4.1 Stackelberg Game Formulation
68(1)
4.4.2 Utilities of Primary Spectrum Owners and Secondary Users
69(3)
4.4.3 Nash Equilibrium of the Game Among Secondary Users
72(3)
4.4.4 Best Response of the Primary Spectrum Owner
75(2)
4.5 Performance Analyses
77(2)
4.5.1 Proof of Economic Properties
77(2)
4.5.2 Detailed Procedure of the Two-Stage Sharing Mechanism
79(1)
4.6 Numerical Results
79(4)
4.7 Summary
83(2)
References
84(1)
5 Online Spectrum Allocation Mechanism
85(14)
5.1 Introduction
85(1)
5.2 System Model
86(1)
5.3 Virtual Online Double Spectrum Allocation Mechanism
87(3)
5.3.1 Virtual Spectrum Sellers
87(1)
5.3.2 Design Requirements
87(2)
5.3.3 Admission and Pricing Mechanism
89(1)
5.4 Proof of Economic Properties
90(4)
5.4.1 Budge-Balance and Individual Rationality
91(1)
5.4.2 Incentive Compatibility
91(3)
5.5 Numerical Results
94(3)
5.6 Summary
97(2)
References
97(2)
6 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
99
6.1 Concluding Remarks
99(1)
6.2 Future Works
100
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/97833192969132e.html
Keywords: