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E-grāmata: Meaning of If

(Associate Professor of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
  • Formāts: 288 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 26-Apr-2022
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780190096724
  • Formāts - EPUB+DRM
  • Cena: 61,36 €*
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  • Formāts: 288 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 26-Apr-2022
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780190096724

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Despite its small stature, "if" occupies a central place both in everyday language and the philosophical lexicon. In allowing us to talk about hypothetical situations, "if" raises a host of thorny philosophical puzzles about language and logic. Addressing them requires tools from linguistics,
logic, probability theory, and metaphysics. Justin Khoo uses these tools to navigate a maze of interconnected issues about conditionals, some of which include: the nature of linguistic communication, the relationship between logical and natural languages, and the relationship between different kinds
of modality.

According to Khoo's theory, conditionals form a unified class of expressions which share a common semantic core that encodes inferential dispositions. Thus, rather than represent the world, conditionals are devices used to communicate how we are disposed to infer. Khoo shows that this theory can be
extended to predict the probabilities of conditionals, as well as how different kinds of conditionals differ both semantically and pragmatically.

Khoo's book will make for a significant contribution to the literature on conditionals and should be of interest to philosophers, linguists, and computer scientists.

Recenzijas

Khoo's book will make for a significant contribution to the literature on conditionals and should be of interest to philosophers, linguists, and computer scientists. * MathSciNet *

Preface xi
Introduction 1(12)
PART I FRAMEWORK
1 Bounding Puzzles
13(10)
1.1 Indicative Bounding
14(4)
1.2 Subjunctive Bounding
18(3)
1.3 Zooming Out
21(2)
2 Situating the Puzzles in the Literature
23(26)
2.1 Indicative Bounding
24(15)
2.1.1 Denying Conditionalization+
24(1)
2.1.2 Denying Weak Sufficiency
25(2)
2.1.3 Denying Strength
27(12)
2.2 Subjunctive Bounding
39(7)
2.2.1 Denying Conditionalization-
39(2)
2.2.2 Denying Weakness
41(4)
2.2.3 Denying Strong Sufficiency
45(1)
2.3 Summarizing
46(3)
3 Domain Inferentialism
49(42)
3.1 Inferential Dispositions
50(17)
3.1.1 Conditionals and Inferential Dispositions
51(4)
3.1.2 Belief and Inferential Dispositions
55(7)
3.1.3 Grounding Inferential Dispositions
62(3)
3.1.4 Constitutivism vs. Rationalism
65(2)
3.2 Leaving Open the Possibility of Conditionals
67(5)
3.3 Resolving the Bounding Puzzles
72(8)
3.3.1 Subjunctive Bounding Resolved
72(2)
3.3.2 Indicative Bounding Resolved
74(6)
3.4 Comparisons with Nearby Theories
80(11)
3.4.1 Factualist Indeterminacy
80(5)
3.4.2 Non-Factualist Invariantism
85(6)
4 Sequence Semantics
91(34)
4.1 From Selection Functions to Sequences
92(6)
4.2 Refined Contents and Inferential Dispositions
98(6)
4.3 Factual Determination
104(2)
4.4 Refined Belief
106(2)
4.5 Applications
108(12)
4.5.1 Non-Factual Ignorance
108(3)
4.5.2 Subjunctive Bounding
111(4)
4.5.3 Indicative Bounding
115(5)
4.6 Summary and Next Steps
120(5)
PART II PROBABILITIES
5 Probabilities of Conditionals
125(44)
5.1 Preliminaries
127(8)
5.2 Diachronic Triviality
135(9)
5.2.1 Denying Closure
138(6)
5.3 Synchronic Triviality
144(13)
5.3.1 Right-Nested Conditionals
144(5)
5.3.2 Left-Nested Conditionals
149(8)
5.4 Tenability
157(12)
6 Partition Dependence
169(28)
6.1 Introducing Partition Dependence
173(3)
6.2 Partition Semantics
176(5)
6.3 Partitional Pragmatics
181(9)
6.3.1 Applying the Partitional Constraint
186(2)
6.3.2 Overriding the Default
188(2)
6.4 Conclusion
190(7)
PART III SUBJUNCTIVE VS. INDICATIVE
7 Subjunctive Conditionals: The Role of Tense
197(10)
7.1 Against the Modal Past
202(5)
8 Temporal Past
207(45)
8.1 Deriving the Semantic Properties
207(10)
8.2 Non-Standard Predictions
217(10)
8.2.1 Epistemic Subjunctives
217(3)
8.2.2 Metaphysical Indicatives
220(2)
8.2.3 How Are the Two Readings Related?
222(5)
8.3 Objections and Replies
227(9)
8.3.1 Backwards Subjunctives
227(3)
8.3.2 Temporally Unusual Antecedents/Consequents
230(2)
8.3.3 The Problem of Hindsight
232(1)
8.3.4 Wishes and Weak Necessity
233(3)
8.4 Temporal Past: Deriving the Pragmatic Differences
236(9)
8.4.1 Leahy's Antipresupposition Theory
238(5)
8.4.2 Looking Elsewhere
243(2)
8.5 Summary
245(7)
9 Sufficiency Networks
252(56)
9.1 Goodman's Puzzle
252(6)
9.2 Sufficiencies and Interventions
258(10)
9.2.1 Fix: Governance
264(4)
9.3 Challenges to Interventionism
268(3)
9.4 The Historical-Sufficiency Theory of Subjunctive Conditionals
271(16)
9.4.1 Building Metaphysical Domains (Informally)
273(2)
9.4.2 Building Metaphysical Domains (Formally)
275(12)
9.5 What Makes for Backtracking?
287(11)
9.5.1 The Pragmatics of Conditional Time
289(9)
9.6 Elusive Miracles
298(4)
9.7 Beyond the Possible
302(5)
9.8 Summary
307(1)
10 Subjunctive Probabilities
308(22)
10.1 Probabilities for Subjunctives
309(9)
10.2 Triviality for Subjunctives
318(7)
10.2.1 Williams 2012
318(3)
10.2.2 Santorio's Triviality Result
321(4)
10.3 Subjunctive Tenability
325(5)
Conclusion 330(5)
Bibliography 335(16)
Index of Names 351(3)
Index of Terms 354
Justin Khoo is Associate Professor of Philosophy at MIT. He received his BA in philosophy from UC-Davis in 2006 and his PhD in philosophy from Yale in 2013. His research and teaching are focused primarily on philosophy of language, philosophical logic, meta-ethics, and metaphysics. His work has appeared in various journals, including Journal of Semantics, Mind, Noūs, and Philosophers' Imprint, among others. He co-edited (with Rachel Katharine Sterken) the Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language (2021).