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E-grāmata: Measure of Madness

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(University of Adelaide)
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In The Measure of Madness, Philip Gerrans offers a novelexplanation of delusion. Over the last two decades, philosophers and cognitive scientists haveinvestigated explanations of delusion that interweave philosophical questions about the nature ofbelief and rationality with findings from cognitive science and neurobiology. Gerrans argues thatonce we fully describe the computational and neural mechanisms that produce delusion and the way inwhich conscious experience and thought depend on them, the concept of delusional belief retains onlya heuristic role in the explanation of delusion.

Gerrans proposes that delusionsare narrative models that accommodate anomalous experiences. He argues that delusions represent theoperation of the Default Mode Network (DMN) -- the cognitive system that provides the raw materialfor humans' inbuilt tendency to provide a subjectively compelling narrative context for anomalous orhighly salient experiences -- without the "supervision" of higher cognitive processespresent in the nondelusional mind. This explanation illuminates the relationship among delusions,dreams, imaginative states, and irrational beliefs that have perplexed philosophers andpsychologists for over a century. Going beyond the purely conceptual and the phenomenological,Gerrans brings together findings from different disciplines to trace the flow of information throughthe cognitive system, and applies these to case studies of typical schizophrenic delusions:misidentification, alien control, and thought insertion. Drawing on the interventionist model ofcausal explanation in philosophy of science and the predictive coding approach to the mindinfluential in computational neuroscience, Gerrans provides a model for integrative theorizing aboutthe mind.

Acknowledgments ix
Introduction xi
1 The Measure of Madness
1(20)
1.1 Integrative versus Autonomous Theoretical Explanation
1(3)
1.2 The Basis of Theoretical Autonomy
4(1)
1.3 Jaspers and the Inscrutability of Delusion
5(2)
1.4 Meaning Rationalism and Framework Propositions
7(6)
1.5 Neurobiological Eliminativism
13(7)
1.6 Cognitive Phenomenology
20(1)
2 Models, Mechanisms, and Cognitive Theories
21(22)
2.1 Cognitive Autonomy: Models and Multiple Realizability
21(2)
2.2 Causal Relevance and the Personal Level
23(3)
2.3 Cognitive Neuropsychiatry and Neurocognitive Psychiatry
26(2)
2.4 Autonomy Revisited
28(5)
2.5 The Cognitive Economy
33(2)
2.6 Theoretical Definition
35(8)
3 The Processing Hierarchy and the Salience System
43(24)
3.1 The Processing Hierarchy
43(3)
3.2 A Computational Framework
46(6)
3.3 The Salience System and Reward Prediction
52(5)
3.4 Salience and the Adaptive Critic
57(4)
3.5 Dopamine and Delusion
61(4)
3.6 Applications
65(2)
4 The Default Mode Network
67(22)
4.1 Simulations as Narrative Elements
67(2)
4.2 Mental Time Travel and the Default Network
69(3)
4.3 Delusions as a "Mixed Mode" of the Default Network
72(3)
4.4 The First-Person Perspective and Decontextualization
75(3)
4.5 The Default Network and the "Essential Indexical"
78(2)
4.6 Subjectivity, Affective Processing, and the Hub of the Default Network
80(3)
4.7 Default and Decontextualized Processes
83(3)
4.8 A Mundane Example
86(3)
5 Dreaming, Default Thinking, and Delusion
89(24)
5.1 Dreaming and the Default Mode Network
90(5)
5.2 The AIM Model
95(4)
5.3 Feature Binding and the Fregoli Delusion
99(9)
5.4 Context Binding in Dreams and Delusions
108(1)
5.5 Dorsolateral Deactivation in Dreams and Delusions
109(1)
5.6 Are Delusions Dreams?
110(3)
6 The Second Factor: Default or Doxastic Incorporation
113(22)
6.1 Doxastic Theories and the Second Factor
115(2)
6.2 Performance Accounts: Endorsement, Explanation, and Incorporation
117(5)
6.3 Interactionism, Explanationism, and Attributional Style
122(2)
6.4 Attributional Style and the Cotard Delusion
124(4)
6.5 Bias and Default Thinking
128(2)
6.6 Competence Accounts: Deficits of Belief Fixation
130(5)
7 Imagination Incorporated
135(28)
7.1 Incorporating Imagination
137(2)
7.2 Belief and Imagination; Congruence and Incongruence
139(4)
7.3 Joint Incorporation
143(2)
7.4 The Metacognitive Account
145(2)
7.5 Delusions and Default Processing
147(4)
7.6 The Dual Nature of Default Thoughts
151(3)
7.7 Imaginative Resistance and the Essential Indexical
154(2)
7.8 Cognitive Therapy for Doxastic Theorists
156(4)
7.9 Imagination and Psychological Structure
160(3)
8 The Sense of Agency, Lost and Found: Experience and Thought in Schizophrenic Delusion
163(46)
8.1 The Sense of Agency, Lost and Found
168(2)
8.2 The Priority of Visual Experience
170(3)
8.3 Predictive Mechanisms and Cognitive Architecture
173(3)
8.4 Experimental Evidence
176(7)
8.5 Awareness of Predictions in Schizophrenia
183(6)
8.6 Passivity and Externality
189(3)
8.7 Mirror Neurons and Other Bodies
192(5)
8.8 Passivity of Thought
197(4)
8.9 External Attribution of Thoughts
201(3)
8.10 External Attribution and Psychological Coherence
204(2)
8.11 Passivity of Experience, Externality of Thought
206(3)
9 Louis Sass and the Schizophrenic Lifeworld
209(14)
9.1 Schreber's Lifeworld
210(7)
9.2 Cognitive Phenomenology
217(6)
10 Conclusion
223(6)
Notes 229(2)
References 231(34)
Index 265