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1 | (60) |
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1.1 The Main Argument in the Wider CEE Context |
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7 | (6) |
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1.1.1 Unprecedented Attack on Press Freedom Since Accession to the EU |
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9 | (4) |
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1.2 Introduction of the Dependent Variable: Levels of Horizontal Accountability |
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13 | (5) |
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1.2.1 Conceptualizing the Axes of the Typology |
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14 | (2) |
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1.2.2 Specification of Actors and Time Frame |
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16 | (2) |
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1.3 Alternative Explanations |
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18 | (12) |
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1.3.1 Strong Civil Society and Whistle Blowers |
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18 | (1) |
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1.3.2 Economic Crises and Advertisement Spending |
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19 | (1) |
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1.3.3 Media Pluralism and Market Competition |
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20 | (1) |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (4) |
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1.3.6 Inter-Party Competition |
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26 | (4) |
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1.4 Developing the Argument |
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30 | (17) |
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1.4.1 Definition of Media Capture of Media Capture and Collusion |
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30 | (4) |
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1.4.2 The Principal-Agent Perspective on Party Leadership Selection |
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34 | (4) |
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1.4.3 Explaining Media Capture with Intra-Party Dynamics |
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38 | (9) |
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47 | (14) |
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48 | (13) |
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2 Measurement and Methods of Data Collection |
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61 | (26) |
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61 | (1) |
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2.2 The Case Study Method |
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61 | (3) |
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2.3 Measuring Media Capture |
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64 | (16) |
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2.3.1 Operationalizing Horizontal Accountability |
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65 | (3) |
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68 | (5) |
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73 | (7) |
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2.4 Measuring the Independent Variable: Intra-Party Dynamics |
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80 | (3) |
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2.4.1 Dimensions of Intra-Party Accountability |
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82 | (1) |
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83 | (4) |
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84 | (3) |
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3 Historical Overview---Establishment of Formal Particularism and the First Transition in the 1990s |
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87 | (32) |
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87 | (1) |
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3.2 The General Context of the First Transition |
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88 | (11) |
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3.2.1 Prologue to Democratic Change (1980--1989) |
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88 | (3) |
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3.2.2 The War and the Setup of Presidential-Parliamentarism |
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91 | (5) |
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3.2.3 Sweeping Replacement of the Elite |
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96 | (3) |
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3.3 Transition in the Media |
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99 | (8) |
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3.3.1 Putting the Mainstream Media Under State Control |
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100 | (2) |
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3.3.2 Limiting Freedom for the Private Press |
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102 | (2) |
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3.3.3 The HDZ Controls the Judiciary |
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104 | (2) |
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3.3.4 Tudjman Used Formal Particularism to Control the Media |
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106 | (1) |
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3.4 The HDZ Uses Popular Support After 1995 |
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107 | (5) |
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3.4.1 The Moderates and the Hardliners Use the Media for Their Infighting |
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109 | (2) |
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3.4.2 Run-Up to the 2000 Elections |
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111 | (1) |
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112 | (7) |
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113 | (6) |
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4 Ivica Racan and Jadranka Kosor: Steps to Universalism |
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119 | (40) |
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4.1 Ivica Racan, 12.1999--12.2003 |
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120 | (25) |
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4.1.1 The Media Scene at the Outset of the "Second Transformation" |
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121 | (3) |
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4.1.2 The Grupo Contract and Its Impact on the Croatian Media Scene |
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124 | (5) |
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4.1.3 The Media-Mafia Conglomerate Around Nacional |
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129 | (3) |
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4.1.4 PM Racan: Careful Universalism |
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132 | (8) |
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4.1.5 President Mesic and Nacional |
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140 | (2) |
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4.1.6 Summarizing the Roles of Racan and Mesic |
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142 | (1) |
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4.1.7 The Effects of Traditional Drivers |
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143 | (2) |
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4.2 Jadranka Kosor, 07.2009--12.2011 |
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145 | (8) |
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4.2.1 Kosor's Relations to Ninoslav Pavic and EPH |
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148 | (4) |
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4.2.2 The Effects of Traditional Drivers |
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152 | (1) |
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153 | (6) |
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154 | (5) |
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5 Ivo Sanader and Zoran Milanovic: Regression to Particularism |
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159 | (50) |
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5.7 Formal and Informal Particularism |
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159 | (2) |
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5.2 Ivo Sanader, 12.2003--07.2009 |
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161 | (26) |
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5.2.1 Capturing Media Using Informal Particularism |
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163 | (20) |
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5.2.2 The Effects of Europeanization |
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183 | (4) |
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5.3 Zoran Milanovic, 12.2011--12.2015 |
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187 | (15) |
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5.3.1 Informal Particularism |
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189 | (3) |
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5.3.2 Formal Particularism: Dispensing Rewards and Sanctions via Formal Policies |
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192 | (3) |
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5.3.3 Ivo Josipovic 2011--2015: Informal Particularism and Collusion |
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195 | (5) |
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5.3.4 The Effects of Europeanization |
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200 | (2) |
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202 | (7) |
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202 | (7) |
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6 Quantitative Text Analysis |
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209 | (26) |
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209 | (1) |
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6.2 Brief Description of Method and Data |
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210 | (4) |
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210 | (2) |
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212 | (2) |
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6.3 Testing the Hypotheses |
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214 | (16) |
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214 | (16) |
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6.4 Summary of the Reliability Assessment |
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230 | (1) |
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6.4.1 Limitations of Method and Data |
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230 | (1) |
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231 | (4) |
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232 | (3) |
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7 What Motivated the Shirts Between Particularism and Universalism? |
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235 | (32) |
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235 | (1) |
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7.2 Summary of the Argument |
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235 | (2) |
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7.3 Rootedness Relaxes the Need for Media Control |
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237 | (5) |
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237 | (1) |
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7.3.2 The Way Racan Acquired Party Leadership |
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238 | (1) |
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7.3.3 Contestation Was Not Personal But Over Ideological Questions |
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238 | (2) |
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7.3.4 Permitted Contestation |
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240 | (1) |
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7.3.5 Required Comparatively Little Media Support from Pavic |
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241 | (1) |
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7.4 Party-Internal Contestation and the Need to Control Media |
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242 | (19) |
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7.4.1 Jadranka Kosor---Weakly Rooted and Highly Contested |
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243 | (5) |
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7.4.2 Sanader and Milanovic---Controlling Contestation for the Leadership |
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248 | (13) |
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261 | (6) |
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262 | (5) |
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267 | (18) |
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267 | (2) |
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8.2 Synthesis of Empirical Findings |
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269 | (6) |
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8.2.1 Shape and Dynamics of Media Capture and Collusion |
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269 | (3) |
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8.2.2 Why Did Traditional Drivers Fail and What Has Been Driving Media Capture Instead? |
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272 | (3) |
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8.3 Theoretical, Conceptual and Methodological Implications |
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275 | (5) |
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8.3.1 Party Leadership Selection |
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275 | (2) |
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277 | (2) |
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279 | (1) |
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8.4 Policy Implications and Directions for Further Research |
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280 | (1) |
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8.4.1 Better Measures for Media Independence |
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280 | (1) |
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8.4.2 Testing the Intra-Party Competition Hypothesis on a Larger N |
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281 | (1) |
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8.4.3 Empirical Research on Informal Rules |
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281 | (1) |
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281 | (4) |
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282 | (3) |
Bibliography |
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285 | (34) |
Index |
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319 | |