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E-grāmata: Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past

3.50/5 (11 ratings by Goodreads)
(Univeristy of Otago)
  • Formāts: 312 pages
  • Sērija : Mental Time Travel
  • Izdošanas datums: 19-Feb-2016
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262334570
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  • Formāts: 312 pages
  • Sērija : Mental Time Travel
  • Izdošanas datums: 19-Feb-2016
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262334570
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In this book, Kourken Michaelian builds on research in the psychology of memory to develop an innovative philosophical account of the nature of remembering and memory knowledge. Current philosophical approaches to memory rest on assumptions that are incompatible with the rich body of theory and data coming from psychology. Michaelian argues that abandoning those assumptions will result in a radically new philosophical understanding of memory. His novel, integrated account of episodic memory, memory knowledge, and their evolution makes a significant step in that direction.

Michaelian situates episodic memory as a form of mental time travel and outlines a naturalistic framework for understanding it. Drawing on research in constructive memory, he develops an innovative simulation theory of memory; finding no intrinsic difference between remembering and imagining, he argues that to remember is to imagine the past. He investigates the reliability of simulational memory, focusing on the adaptivity of the constructive processes involved in remembering and the role of metacognitive monitoring; and he outlines an account of the evolution of episodic memory, distinguishing it from the forms of episodic-like memory demonstrated in animals.

Memory research has become increasingly interdisciplinary. Michaelian's account, built systematically on the findings of empirical research, not only draws out the implications of these findings for philosophical theories of remembering but also offers psychologists a framework for making sense of provocative experimental results on mental time travel.

Preface xiii
Acknowledgments xvii
I Epistemology and Human Memory
1(56)
1 Three Questions about Memory
3(14)
1.1 What Is Memory?
3(5)
1.2 How Does Memory Give Us Knowledge?
8(4)
1.3 When and Why Did Memory Emerge?
12(1)
1.4 Overview
13(4)
2 Situating Episodic Memory
17(20)
2.1 Is Memory a Natural Kind?
17(1)
2.2 The Multiple Memory Systems Hypothesis
18(1)
2.3 A Standard Taxonomy of Memory Systems
19(2)
2.4 The Trilevel Approach
21(2)
2.4.1 The Concept of a Memory System
22(1)
2.4.2 Generating the Hierarchy of Kinds of Memory
22(1)
2.5 Declarative Memory
23(3)
2.5.1 Functionalism and Multiple Realizability
24(1)
2.5.2 Avoiding Overgeneration
25(1)
2.6 Nondeclarative Memory
26(4)
2.6.1 Implicit Representation
28(1)
2.6.2 Knowing How
29(1)
2.7 Toward a New Taxonomy
30(4)
2.7.1 Common Neural Mechanisms
32(1)
2.7.2 Interacting Systems
32(1)
2.7.3 General Theories of Learning
33(1)
2.8 Starting with Episodic Memory
34(3)
2.8.1 Episodic versus Autobiographical Memory
35(1)
2.8.2 Episodic versus Semantic Memory
35(2)
3 Memory Knowledge
37(20)
3.1 Naturalism and Reliabilism
37(11)
3.1.1 Normativity
40(3)
3.1.2 Pluralism
43(5)
3.2 The Reliability of Episodic Memory
48(9)
3.2.1 The Generality Problem and Memory
48(3)
3.2.2 Metamemory and Belief
51(1)
3.2.3 Episodic Content and Truth
52(2)
3.2.4 The Concept of Reliability
54(3)
II Episodic Memory as Mental Time Travel
57(66)
4 The Commonsense Conception
59(16)
4.1 The Experience Condition
61(1)
4.2 The Current Representation Condition
62(3)
4.2.1 Direct Realism
62(2)
4.2.2 Indirect Realism
64(1)
4.2.3 A Compromise View
64(1)
4.3 The Previous Representation Condition
65(1)
4.4 The Appropriate Connection Condition
66(1)
4.5 The Content-Matching Condition
67(1)
4.6 The Factivity Condition
68(2)
4.7 Distinguishing between Memory and Imagination
70(5)
4.7.1 Degree of Flexibility
71(1)
4.7.2 Level of Detail
72(3)
5 The Causal Theory
75(22)
5.1 The Causal Condition
75(1)
5.2 The Memory Trace Condition
76(3)
5.2.1 Traces in Philosophy and Psychology
77(1)
5.2.2 Local versus Distributed Traces
78(1)
5.3 The Continuous Connection Condition
79(1)
5.4 Properly Functioning Memory Systems
80(1)
5.5 Content Similarity
81(1)
5.6 Constructive Memory
82(7)
5.6.1 Encoding
86(1)
5.6.2 Consolidation and Reconsolidation
87(1)
5.6.3 Retrieval
87(2)
5.7 Approximate Content Similarity
89(2)
5.8 A Causal Theory of Constructive Memory
91(2)
5.8.1 Remembering and Updating
92(1)
5.8.2 Remembering and Pastness
92(1)
5.8.3 Remembering and Acceptance
93(1)
5.9 The Epistemology of Constructive Memory
93(4)
5.9.1 Preservationism
94(1)
5.9.2 Moderate Generationism
94(1)
5.9.3 Radical Generationism
95(2)
6 The Simulation Theory
97(26)
6.1 The Changing Concept of Episodic Memory
97(2)
6.2 Remembering as Mental Time Travel
99(4)
6.2.1 Constructive Episodic Simulation
100(1)
6.2.2 Scene Construction
101(2)
6.3 Remembering as Simulating the Past
103(2)
6.3.1 Nonexperiential Information
103(1)
6.3.2 Properly Functioning Episodic Construction Systems
104(1)
6.4 The Episodic Construction System
105(1)
6.5 The Personal Past
106(1)
6.6 Remembering and Merely Imagining the Past
107(3)
6.7 Beyond the Causal Theory
110(3)
6.8 Related Approaches
113(3)
6.8.1 Remembering and Imagining
113(1)
6.8.2 Remembering and Mindreading
113(2)
6.8.3 Remembering and Episodic Counterfactual Thought
115(1)
6.9 Objections to the Simulation Theory
116(4)
6.9.1 The Metaphysics of Mental Time Travel
116(1)
6.9.2 The Phenomenology of Mental Time Travel
117(1)
6.9.3 Memory without Experience
118(2)
6.10 Remembering as Imagining the Past
120(3)
III Mental Time Travel as a Source of Knowledge
123(78)
7 The Information Effect
127(22)
7.1 The Misinformation Effect: Harmful Incorporation
128(1)
7.2 Helpful Incorporation
129(4)
7.2.1 The Contamination View
130(1)
7.2.2 Interactions between Testimony and Memory
131(2)
7.3 Explaining the Appeal of the Contamination View
133(3)
7.3.1 Incorporation and Reliability
133(1)
7.3.2 Incorporation and Truth
134(1)
7.3.3 Incorporation and the Anti-Luck Condition
135(1)
7.4 Skeptical Implications of the Contamination View
136(2)
7.5 Initial Attempts to Avoid Skepticism
138(2)
7.6 Incorporation and Epistemic Luck
140(5)
7.6.1 The Modal Conception of Epistemic Luck
140(2)
7.6.2 The Honesty Bias
142(3)
7.7 The Information Effect
145(2)
7.8 Avoiding Skepticism
147(2)
8 Metamemory and the Source Problem
149(20)
8.1 The Source Problem
149(1)
8.2 Metacognitive Belief-Producing Systems
150(4)
8.2.1 Two-Level Systems
150(2)
8.2.2 Metacognition
152(2)
8.3 Reliability in Metacognitive Systems
154(4)
8.4 Power and Speed in Metacognitive Systems
158(4)
8.5 The Source-Monitoring Framework
162(4)
8.5.1 Effects on Reliability
163(2)
8.5.2 Effects on Power and Speed
165(1)
8.6 Metacognition in Internalism and Externalism
166(3)
9 Metamemory and the Process Problem
169(32)
9.1 The Process Problem
169(5)
9.2 Do Agents Face the Process Problem?
174(1)
9.3 How Hard Is the Process Problem?
175(4)
9.3.1 Mental Time Travel
176(2)
9.3.2 Mindreading and Related Processes
178(1)
9.3.3 Pure Forms of Imagination
178(1)
9.4 Do Agents Need to Solve the Process Problem?
179(1)
9.5 Do Agents Solve the Process Problem?
180(1)
9.6 Formal Process-Monitoring Criteria
181(4)
9.6.1 Flexibility
181(1)
9.6.2 Intention
182(2)
9.6.3 Spontaneity
184(1)
9.7 Content-Based Process-Monitoring Criteria
185(5)
9.7.1 Vivacity
185(3)
9.7.2 Coherence
188(1)
9.7.3 Affective Valence and Intensity
189(1)
9.8 Phenomenal Process-Monitoring Criteria
190(4)
9.8.1 The Feeling of Prior Belief
191(1)
9.8.2 The Feeling of Familiarity
191(1)
9.8.3 The Feeling of Pastness and the Feeling of Futurity
192(2)
9.9 Toward a Process-Monitoring Framework
194(4)
9.10 Process Monitoring and Mindreading
198(3)
IV The Evolution of Mental Time Travel
201(40)
10 The Puzzle of Conscious Episodic Memory
203(16)
10.1 When Did Episodic Memory Evolve?
204(2)
10.2 From Episodic-like Memory to Conscious Mental Time Travel
206(4)
10.2.1 Contextual versus Phenomenological Definitions
206(1)
10.2.2 The Phenomenology of Episodic Memory
207(3)
10.3 Subjective Time
210(3)
10.4 Consciousness of Subjective Time
213(3)
10.4.1 Anoetic Consciousness
213(1)
10.4.2 Noetic Consciousness
214(1)
10.4.3 Autonoetic Consciousness
214(1)
10.4.4 Chronesthesia
215(1)
10.5 Why Did Episodic Memory Evolve?
216(3)
11 Consciousness and Memory Knowledge
219(18)
11.1 Past-Oriented Explanations
219(2)
11.1.1 Episodic versus Procedural Memory
219(1)
11.1.2 Episodic versus Semantic Memory
220(1)
11.2 Social Explanations
221(1)
11.2.1 Impression Reevaluation
221(1)
11.2.2 Other Social Factors
222(1)
11.3 Future-Oriented Explanations
222(5)
11.3.1 Niche Construction
223(1)
11.3.2 Simulating the Future
224(2)
11.3.3 Reducing Delay Discounting
226(1)
11.4 Toward a Metacognitive Explanation
227(1)
11.5 Consciousness, Metamemory, and Subjective Certainty
228(6)
11.5.1 Consciousness and Source Monitoring
229(2)
11.5.2 Consciousness and Process Monitoring
231(1)
11.5.3 Interactions between Source Monitoring and Process Monitoring
232(2)
11.6 The Accuracy of Episodic Phenomenology
234(1)
11.7 The Necessity of Metamemory
235(2)
12 Conclusion
237(4)
Notes 241(12)
References 253(32)
Index 285