Foreword |
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vii | |
Series Foreword |
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ix | |
Acknowledgements |
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xi | |
About the Contributors |
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xix | |
The Methodology of Constitutional Theory -- Introduction |
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1 | (16) |
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1 | (3) |
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II The Scope of the Volume |
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4 | (1) |
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III The Chapters and Thematic Groupings |
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4 | (13) |
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5 | (1) |
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6 | (2) |
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8 | (2) |
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10 | (2) |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (4) |
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1 The Significance of the Common Understanding in Legal Theory |
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17 | (24) |
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I Adherence to the Common Understanding |
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18 | (7) |
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A The Nature of the Common Understanding |
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19 | (2) |
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B The Invocation of the Common Understanding in Legal Theory |
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21 | (4) |
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II Paying Attention to the Common Understanding |
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25 | (4) |
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A An Argument from Intelligibility |
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26 | (1) |
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B An Argument from the Constitution of Social Institutions |
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26 | (1) |
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C An Argument from the Wisdom of Crowds |
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27 | (2) |
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III The Limitations of the Common Understanding |
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29 | (10) |
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A Where the Common Understanding is Inconclusive |
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29 | (3) |
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B Where the Common Understanding is Clear |
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32 | (7) |
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39 | (2) |
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2 In Defence of Traditional Methodologies |
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41 | (30) |
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41 | (1) |
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II The Orthodox Understanding |
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42 | (6) |
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42 | (1) |
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B Written Constitutions, Legislative Supremacy and Statutory Interpretation |
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43 | (5) |
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48 | (3) |
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IV Confusion between the Common Law and Other Kinds of Law |
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51 | (4) |
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V Constitution-making by Judges |
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55 | (3) |
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58 | (5) |
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VII Parliamentary Sovereignty Today |
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63 | (8) |
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3 Constitutional Methodology and Brexit: Adopting a Model-Theoretic Approach |
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71 | (32) |
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I Defining Model-Theoretic Approaches |
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73 | (5) |
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II What is Distinctive about a Model-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Theory? |
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78 | (3) |
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III Why Adopt a Model-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Theory? |
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81 | (8) |
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IV Brexit and Parliamentary Sovereignty |
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89 | (9) |
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98 | (5) |
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4 Slaying the Misshapen Monster: The Case for Constitutional Heuristics |
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103 | (28) |
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103 | (3) |
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II Facts, Theories and Traditions: Making the Constitutional World |
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106 | (8) |
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A The Social Epistemology of Constitutional Theory |
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106 | (1) |
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107 | (1) |
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C Continuity and the Ascription of Deontic Power |
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108 | (3) |
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D Core and Canon in Constitutional Theory |
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111 | (3) |
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III A Methodology for Constitutional Theory |
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114 | (8) |
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A A Taxonomy of Constitutional World-Views |
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114 | (2) |
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B The Constitution as a Shield |
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116 | (1) |
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C The Constitution as the Cornerstone of Social and Political Life |
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117 | (1) |
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D The Constitution as a Rulebook |
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118 | (3) |
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E The Constitution as a Truce |
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121 | (1) |
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IV Heuristics and the Limits of Rhetoric |
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122 | (6) |
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A Understanding the Impasse |
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123 | (2) |
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B From Rhetoric to Heuristics: Towards a Resolution |
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125 | (3) |
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128 | (3) |
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5 Why Common Law Constitutionalism is Correct (If It Is) |
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131 | (22) |
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131 | (1) |
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II Two Accounts of the British Constitution |
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132 | (10) |
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A Goldsworthy's Orthodoxy (GO) |
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132 | (1) |
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B Allan's Common Law Constitutionalism (CLC) |
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133 | (1) |
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C Are GO and CLC Commensurable? |
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134 | (6) |
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D The Motivating Question |
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140 | (2) |
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III What Makes GO or CLC Correct? |
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142 | (5) |
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IV GO and CLC as Rival Interpretations of British Constitutional Practice |
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147 | (5) |
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152 | (1) |
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6 Methodological Pluralism and Modern Administrative Law |
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153 | (26) |
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I Subordinating Administrative Law to Constitutional Law |
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154 | (5) |
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II New Methods of Administrative Law Theory |
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159 | (16) |
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A Administrative Law and Socio-Legal Methods |
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159 | (3) |
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B The Social Construction of Law: Facts and Values |
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162 | (4) |
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C The Plurality of Administrative Law Values and Methods |
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166 | (2) |
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168 | (3) |
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E Specialist and Generalist Administrative Law, Functionalism and Content Analysis |
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171 | (2) |
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F Computer Science Methods |
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173 | (2) |
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III Challenges and Opportunities of Methodological Pluralism in Administrative Law |
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175 | (4) |
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7 The Constitution of Legal Authority |
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179 | (32) |
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I Hart on the Constitution of Authority |
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181 | (4) |
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II Approaching Natural Law? |
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185 | (6) |
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III The Legal Man vs. the Legal Subject |
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191 | (12) |
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IV Acceptance, Legitimacy, and the Social Contract |
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203 | (8) |
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8 Constitutional Law as Legitimacy-Enhancer |
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211 | (22) |
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211 | (2) |
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II Moral Force and Settlement |
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213 | (3) |
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III Legitimacy vs. Justice |
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216 | (9) |
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A Legitimacy as Assurance |
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216 | (4) |
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B Assurance and Disagreement |
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220 | (2) |
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C Constitutionalism of Fear? |
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222 | (3) |
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IV Two Moralised Methodologies for Constitutional Theory |
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225 | (6) |
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A Constitutions as the Moral Footprints of Settlement |
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225 | (3) |
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B Assurance vs Moral Construction |
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228 | (3) |
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231 | (2) |
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9 A Positivist and Political Approach to Public Law |
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233 | (28) |
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233 | (1) |
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II A Basis for Positivist and Political Public Law |
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234 | (7) |
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A Loughlin's Theory of Public Law as Political Jurisprudence |
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235 | (2) |
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B Political Jurisprudence and Normative Legal Positivism |
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237 | (4) |
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III The Nature of Positivist and Political Public Law |
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241 | (7) |
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A Defining a Positivist and Political Approach |
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241 | (2) |
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B The Coherence of a Positivist and Political Approach -- Some Potential Objections |
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243 | (5) |
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IV The Value of a Positivist and Political Approach to Public Law |
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248 | (9) |
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A A Positivist and Political Analytical Framework |
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248 | (1) |
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B Explanation, Justification and Critique of Constitutional Structures |
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249 | (2) |
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C Explanation, Justification and Critique of Constitutional Practice |
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251 | (2) |
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D The Utility of Positivist and Political Public Law |
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253 | (4) |
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257 | (4) |
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10 The Material Study of the Constitutional Order |
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261 | (22) |
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I The Legal Theory of the Material Study |
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261 | (6) |
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II The Political Theory of the Material Study |
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267 | (6) |
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III Thematising the Constitutional Order as Legal Organisation |
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273 | (5) |
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IV Case Study: Constitutional Change |
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278 | (3) |
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281 | (2) |
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11 The British Constitution as an Improvised Order |
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283 | (28) |
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283 | (2) |
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II Spontaneous Order, Improvisation and Design |
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285 | (1) |
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III Theoretical Implications |
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286 | (2) |
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IV Interaction between Improvisation and Design |
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288 | (1) |
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V The Conflictual Side of Improvisation |
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289 | (1) |
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VI Assessing Improvisations |
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290 | (1) |
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VII Distinguishing Improvisation from Non-improvisation |
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290 | (2) |
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VIII Constitutional Improvisations |
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292 | (6) |
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A Reforms Proposed Very Early in the Life of a Government |
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293 | (3) |
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B Reforms Proposed in Chaotic Circumstances |
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296 | (2) |
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IX Good or Bad Improvisations? |
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298 | (7) |
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A Fixed-term Parliaments Act |
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299 | (1) |
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300 | (2) |
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C The 2005 Act: The Lord Chancellor, Judicial Appointments, and the Supreme Court |
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302 | (1) |
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D The 2010 Act: Prerogatives, the Civil Service and Treaties |
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303 | (2) |
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305 | (1) |
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XI Improvisation and Constitutional Theory |
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306 | (5) |
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12 A Proposal for Defining and Classifying Systems of Constitutional Government |
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311 | (30) |
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311 | (2) |
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II On Constitutional Government and its History |
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313 | (7) |
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III The Characteristics of Constitutional Government |
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320 | (9) |
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A The Elements of Constitutional Government |
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321 | (3) |
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B On Judicial Enforcement and Bills of Rights |
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324 | (3) |
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C Grimm's and Raz's Definitions of a Constitution |
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327 | (2) |
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IV Types of Constitutional and Non-constitutional Government |
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329 | (8) |
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A Types of Non-constitutional Government |
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329 | (4) |
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B Types of Constitutional Government |
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333 | (4) |
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337 | (4) |
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13 The View from Nowhere in Constitutional Theory: A Methodological Inquiry |
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341 | (20) |
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341 | (1) |
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II The Comparative Turn in Constitutional Theory |
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342 | (6) |
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A The Nature and Legitimacy of Constitutional Review |
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343 | (3) |
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B The Use of Comparative Material in Constitutional Adjudication |
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346 | (2) |
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III Constitutional Theory and Comparative Constitutional Change |
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348 | (9) |
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A The Revival of Constituent Power Theory |
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349 | (4) |
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B Constituent Power Theory and Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments |
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353 | (4) |
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357 | (4) |
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14 Common Understandings of Administrative Law |
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361 | (22) |
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361 | (1) |
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II The Puzzle of Administrative Law |
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362 | (2) |
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III Legality and Constitutional Formalism |
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364 | (4) |
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IV Dicey on the Absence of Administrative Law |
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368 | (4) |
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V Common Understandings of Administrative Law |
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372 | (10) |
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A Constitutional Formalism and Administrative Lawlessness |
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373 | (2) |
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B Liberty from Administrative Law |
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375 | (2) |
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C Formal Equality Through Judicial Review |
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377 | (2) |
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D Natural Justice and Administrative Law |
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379 | (3) |
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382 | (1) |
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15 Methodology in Constitutional Theory: The Case of the Administrative State |
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383 | (22) |
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383 | (3) |
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II Constitutionalising the Administrative State: Delineating the Object of Inquiry |
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386 | (2) |
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III Constitutionalising the Administrative State: The `Status' Intervention |
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388 | (5) |
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IV Constitutionalism and the Administrative State: Reflections from Australia |
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393 | (5) |
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V Constitutional Theory Revisited? The Provocation of the Administrative State |
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398 | (3) |
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401 | (4) |
Index |
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405 | |