Foreword |
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ix | |
Contributors |
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xi | |
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1 | (16) |
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1.1 Why a new book on norms? |
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1 | (4) |
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1.2 Why a book on cognition? |
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5 | (3) |
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1.3 Our perspective and approach |
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8 | (2) |
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1.4 Presentation of the volume and questions addressed |
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10 | (1) |
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11 | (1) |
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12 | (5) |
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2 Loops in Social Dynamics |
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17 | (17) |
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17 | (1) |
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2.2 The way up: Emergence |
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18 | (1) |
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2.3 The way back: Downward causation |
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19 | (9) |
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20 | (2) |
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2.3.2 Complex loop Incorporation |
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22 | (6) |
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2.4 Advantages of the present approach |
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28 | (1) |
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29 | (5) |
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3 Agent-Based Social Simulation and Its Necessity for Understanding Socially Embedded Phenomena |
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34 | (16) |
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3.1 Cognitive simulation modeling |
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34 | (1) |
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3.2 Agent-based architectures and frameworks |
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35 | (1) |
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3.3 The social intelligence hypothesis |
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36 | (1) |
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37 | (1) |
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3.5 Micro-macro complexity |
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38 | (1) |
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3.6 Types of social simulation |
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39 | (5) |
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3.7 Linking plausible theory and observed evidence |
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44 | (2) |
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3.8 Relevance vs. generality in simulation |
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46 | (1) |
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3.9 Emergence and immergence in simulations |
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46 | (1) |
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47 | (3) |
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4 How Are Norms Brought About? A State of the Art of Current Research |
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50 | (18) |
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4.1 Norms between conventions and legal norms |
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50 | (2) |
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4.2 The game-theoretical framework of simulating norms |
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52 | (4) |
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53 | (2) |
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55 | (1) |
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4.3 The cognitive method of modelling norms |
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56 | (3) |
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58 | (1) |
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4.4 Norms in current architectures |
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59 | (3) |
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60 | (1) |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (1) |
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4.4.4 Drawbacks of cognitive architectures |
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62 | (1) |
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4.5 Results and unresolved questions |
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62 | (6) |
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5 Modeling Hume's Theory of Norm Emergence |
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68 | (13) |
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5.1 Introduction and motivation |
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68 | (1) |
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5.2 Interaction structure and specialization |
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69 | (3) |
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5.3 The structure: Local groups and a central market |
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72 | (1) |
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73 | (1) |
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74 | (1) |
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5.6 A benchmark: Wealth under universal trust and trustworthiness |
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75 | (1) |
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5.7 The evolution of trust and division of labor---some first simulation studies |
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76 | (5) |
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6 Norms' Dynamics as a Complex Loop |
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81 | (13) |
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6.1 Normative prescriptions |
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81 | (1) |
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6.2 The missing link in the formal treatment of obligations |
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82 | (1) |
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6.3 The mental dynamics of norms |
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83 | (8) |
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84 | (3) |
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87 | (3) |
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90 | (1) |
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91 | (3) |
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7 Hunting for Norms in Unpredictable Societies |
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94 | (24) |
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94 | (1) |
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95 | (1) |
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7.3 The Norm Recognition Module |
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96 | (4) |
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7.4 Norm Detectives vs. Social Conformers |
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100 | (6) |
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7.4.1 Results of comparison |
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102 | (4) |
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7.5 Norm Detectives in a segregated world |
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106 | (8) |
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7.5.1 Effects of segregation |
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107 | (7) |
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114 | (4) |
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8 The Derivation of EMIL-S from EMIL-A: From Cognitive Architecture to Software Architecture |
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118 | (9) |
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8.1 General requirements of a multi-agent simulation system with normative agents |
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118 | (1) |
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118 | (2) |
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120 | (1) |
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8.4 Overview of the cognitive and normative architecture of EMIL-A |
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121 | (2) |
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8.5 Correspondence between EMIL-S and EMIL-A |
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123 | (1) |
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8.6 Differences between the cognitive and the implemented models |
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124 | (1) |
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8.7 Additional assumptions about cognitive processes used in EMIL-S |
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124 | (3) |
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9 Demonstrating the Theory: The Case of Wikipedia |
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127 | (26) |
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127 | (1) |
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128 | (12) |
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9.2.1 Social self-regulation in Wikipedia |
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128 | (1) |
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129 | (3) |
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132 | (6) |
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9.2.4 Discussion, conclusions and ideas for further empirical research |
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138 | (2) |
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9.3 Designing the Wikipedia simulation |
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140 | (2) |
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9.4 Simulation runs and results |
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142 | (7) |
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9.5 Conclusion: Comparison between the NetLogo prototype and the EMIL-S/Repast version |
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149 | (4) |
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10 The Role of Norm Internalizers in Mixed Populations |
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153 | (22) |
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153 | (2) |
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155 | (2) |
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10.3 A multi-step and flexible model of norm internalization |
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157 | (2) |
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10.4 Factors affecting internalization |
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159 | (3) |
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10.5 Internalizer: the EMIL-I-A architecture |
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162 | (4) |
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10.6 Simulating a social dilemma |
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166 | (4) |
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10.6.1 Experimental design |
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167 | (1) |
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10.6.2 Experimental results |
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168 | (2) |
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170 | (5) |
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11 Summary and Conclusions |
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175 | (6) |
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176 | (1) |
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177 | (2) |
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177 | (1) |
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11.2.2 How do norms emerge? |
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178 | (1) |
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11.2.3 How much mental complexity is needed? |
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178 | (1) |
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11.3 Balance and open questions |
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179 | (2) |
Index |
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181 | |