Atjaunināt sīkdatņu piekrišanu

E-grāmata: Mob Control: Models of Threshold Collective Behavior

, ,
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
  • Formāts - EPUB+DRM
  • Cena: 106,47 €*
  • * ši ir gala cena, t.i., netiek piemērotas nekādas papildus atlaides
  • Ielikt grozā
  • Pievienot vēlmju sarakstam
  • Šī e-grāmata paredzēta tikai personīgai lietošanai. E-grāmatas nav iespējams atgriezt un nauda par iegādātajām e-grāmatām netiek atmaksāta.
Mob Control: Models of Threshold Collective BehaviorPalielināt
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

DRM restrictions

  • Kopēšana (kopēt/ievietot):

    nav atļauts

  • Drukāšana:

    nav atļauts

  • Lietošana:

    Digitālo tiesību pārvaldība (Digital Rights Management (DRM))
    Izdevējs ir piegādājis šo grāmatu šifrētā veidā, kas nozīmē, ka jums ir jāinstalē bezmaksas programmatūra, lai to atbloķētu un lasītu. Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu, jums ir jāizveido Adobe ID. Vairāk informācijas šeit. E-grāmatu var lasīt un lejupielādēt līdz 6 ierīcēm (vienam lietotājam ar vienu un to pašu Adobe ID).

    Nepieciešamā programmatūra
    Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu mobilajā ierīcē (tālrunī vai planšetdatorā), jums būs jāinstalē šī bezmaksas lietotne: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Lai lejupielādētu un lasītu šo e-grāmatu datorā vai Mac datorā, jums ir nepieciešamid Adobe Digital Editions (šī ir bezmaksas lietotne, kas īpaši izstrādāta e-grāmatām. Tā nav tas pats, kas Adobe Reader, kas, iespējams, jau ir jūsu datorā.)

    Jūs nevarat lasīt šo e-grāmatu, izmantojot Amazon Kindle.

This book presents mathematical models of mob control with threshold (conformity) collective decision-making of the agents.Based on the results of analysis of the interconnection between the micro- and macromodels of active network structures, it considers the static (deterministic, stochastic and game-theoretic) and dynamic (discrete- and continuous-time) models of mob control, and highlights models of informational confrontation. Many of the results are applicable not only to mob control problems, but also to control problems arising in social groups, online social networks, etc.Aimed at researchers and practitioners, it is also a valuable resource for undergraduate and postgraduate students as well as doctoral candidates specializing in the field of collective behavior modeling.

Introduction.- Models of Threshold Collective Behavior.- Micro- and Macromodels.- Deterministic Models of Mob Control.- Stochastic Models of Mob Control.- Game-Theoretic Models of Mob Control.- Dynamic Models of Mob Control in Discrete Time.- Dynamic Models of Mob Control in Continuous Time.- Micromodels of Informational Confrontation.- Macromodels of Informational Confrontation.- Models of Mob Self-Excitation.
1 Introduction
1(4)
2 Models of Threshold Collective Behavior
5(4)
3 Micro- and Macromodels
9(20)
3.1 Micromodel
9(1)
3.2 Macromodel
10(3)
3.3 Threshold Model of Agents Behavior
13(3)
3.4 Identification and Simulation Experiments
16(13)
4 Deterministic Models of Mob Control
29(14)
4.1 A Threshold Model of Mob Behavior
29(3)
4.2 Threshold Control
32(7)
4.3 Reputation Control
39(1)
4.4 Reflexive Control
40(3)
5 Stochastic Models of Mob Control
43(18)
5.1 Mob "Excitation" Control
44(3)
5.2 Mob "Immunization" Control
47(1)
5.3 Informational Confrontation
48(13)
6 Game-Theoretic Models of Mob Control
61(12)
6.1 Centralized Control Problem
62(2)
6.2 Decentralized Control Problems
64(9)
7 Dynamic Models of Mob Control in Discrete Time
73(14)
7.1 Mob Control Problem
73(1)
7.2 Models with Constraints on the Total Number of Provokers
74(2)
7.3 Continuous Control
76(7)
7.4 Probabilistic Models of Provokers Detection
83(4)
8 Dynamic Models of Mob Control in Continuous Time
87(10)
8.1 Attainability Set and Monotonicity
88(4)
8.2 Constant Control
92(1)
8.3 Excitation of Whole Mob
92(1)
8.4 Positional Control
93(4)
9 Micromodels of Informational Confrontation
97(8)
9.1 Micromodel and Informational Control
98(1)
9.2 "Antagonistic" Game
99(2)
9.3 "Nonantagonistic" Game
101(2)
9.4 Reflexive Game
103(1)
9.5 Secure Strategies Equilibrium
103(2)
10 Macromodels of Informational Confrontation
105(16)
10.1 Model of Informational Confrontation
105(1)
10.2 Normal-Form Game
106(3)
10.3 Threshold Goal Functions
109(5)
10.4 Hierarchical Game
114(3)
10.5 Reflexive Game
117(4)
11 Models of Mob Self-excitation
121(8)
Conclusion 129(2)
References 131
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/97833195186576e.html
Keywords: