Strategic behavior is the key to social interaction, from the ever-evolving world of living beings to the modern theatre of designed computational agents. Strategies can make or break participants" aspirations, whether they are selling a house, playing the stock market, or working toward a treaty that limits global warming. This book aims at understanding the phenomenon of strategic behavior in its proper width and depth. A number of experts have combined forces in order to create a comparative view of the different frameworks for strategic reasoning in social interactions that have been developed in game theory, computer science, logic, linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive and social sciences. The chapters are organized in three topic-based sections, namely reasoning about games; formal frameworks for strategies; and strategies in social situations. The book concludes with a discussion on the future of logical studies of strategies.
Reasoning about games.- Dynamic models of rational deliberation in games.- Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games.- Finite reasoning procedures for dynamic games.- Formal frameworks for strategies.- Logics for reasoning about strategic abilities in multi-player games.- Using STIT theory to talk about strategies.- Automata and compositional strategies in extensive form games.- Languages for imperfect information.-Strategies in social situations.- Strategies of persuasion, manipulation and propaganda: Psychological and social aspects.- Strategies in social software.- Future perspective.- Logic of strategies: What and how?
