Atjaunināt sīkdatņu piekrišanu

E-grāmata: Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities

  • Formāts: 264 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 15-Apr-2005
  • Izdevniecība: National Academies Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780309548892
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
  • Formāts - PDF+DRM
  • Cena: 53,22 €*
  • * ši ir gala cena, t.i., netiek piemērotas nekādas papildus atlaides
  • Ielikt grozā
  • Pievienot vēlmju sarakstam
  • Šī e-grāmata paredzēta tikai personīgai lietošanai. E-grāmatas nav iespējams atgriezt un nauda par iegādātajām e-grāmatām netiek atmaksāta.
  • Formāts: 264 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 15-Apr-2005
  • Izdevniecība: National Academies Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780309548892
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

DRM restrictions

  • Kopēšana (kopēt/ievietot):

    nav atļauts

  • Drukāšana:

    nav atļauts

  • Lietošana:

    Digitālo tiesību pārvaldība (Digital Rights Management (DRM))
    Izdevējs ir piegādājis šo grāmatu šifrētā veidā, kas nozīmē, ka jums ir jāinstalē bezmaksas programmatūra, lai to atbloķētu un lasītu. Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu, jums ir jāizveido Adobe ID. Vairāk informācijas šeit. E-grāmatu var lasīt un lejupielādēt līdz 6 ierīcēm (vienam lietotājam ar vienu un to pašu Adobe ID).

    Nepieciešamā programmatūra
    Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu mobilajā ierīcē (tālrunī vai planšetdatorā), jums būs jāinstalē šī bezmaksas lietotne: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Lai lejupielādētu un lasītu šo e-grāmatu datorā vai Mac datorā, jums ir nepieciešamid Adobe Digital Editions (šī ir bezmaksas lietotne, kas īpaši izstrādāta e-grāmatām. Tā nav tas pats, kas Adobe Reader, kas, iespējams, jau ir jūsu datorā.)

    Jūs nevarat lasīt šo e-grāmatu, izmantojot Amazon Kindle.

In this study, CISAC tackles the technical dimensions of a longstanding controversy: To what extent could existing and plausibly attainable measures for transparency and monitoring make possible the verification of all nuclear weaponsstrategic and nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployedplus the nuclear-explosive components and materials that are their essential ingredients? The committee's assessment of the technical and organizational possibilities suggests a more optimistic conclusion than most of those concerned with these issues might have expected.Table of Contents



Front Matter Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 Nuclear Weapons 3 Nuclear-Explosive Materials 4 Clandestine Stocks and Production of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear- Explosive Materials 5 General Conclusions Appendix A Physics and Technology of Nuclear-Explosive Materials Appendix B Acronyms Appendix C Biographical Sketches of Committee Members
Executive Summary 1(14)
1 introduction 15(30)
The Scope of the Study,
15(2)
Context,
17(3)
Historical Perspective,
20(17)
Limiting Existing Nuclear Arsenals,
21(6)
Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
27(3)
Limiting Nuclear Tests,
30(3)
Securing Nuclear Weapons and NEM,
33(4)
Approaches to Implementing Transparency and Monitoring Measures,
37(2)
The Study,
39(6)
2 Nuclear Weapons 45(64)
Declarations of Nuclear Weapons Stocks,
47(13)
Proposals for U.S.-Russian Declarations,
48(4)
Levels of Detail in Stockpile Declarations,
52(4)
Secure Declarations,
56(3)
Frequency and Confidentiality of Declarations,
59(1)
Confirming Weapon Declarations,
60(9)
Operationally Deployed Weapons on Missiles,
61(4)
Stored Nuclear Weapons,
65(4)
Continuous Monitoring of Weapon Stocks,
69(4)
Confirming Weapon Elimination,
73(4)
Confirming Weapon Remanufacture and Assembly,
77(4)
Transparency Measures for NEM Components,
81(4)
Conclusions,
85(24)
3 Nuclear-Explosive Materials 109(74)
Definition, Characteristics, and Production of NEM,
110(8)
Types of NEM,
111(3)
Key Characteristics of NEM,
114(1)
Pathways to Obtain NEM,
114(4)
Stocks and Flows of NEM in the Military and Civil Sectors,
118(4)
World Military and Civilian NEM Stockpiles,
118(2)
Flows of NEM,
120(2)
NEM Transparency and Monitoring: General Issues,
122(8)
Comparing the Transparency Challenges of NEM and Nuclear Weapons,
123(7)
Transparency and Monitoring for NEM: History, Status, and the Road Ahead,
130(19)
U.S.-Russian Transparency and Monitoring Efforts for Military NEM,
131(7)
International Monitoring of Excess Military NEM,
138(4)
Transparency and Monitoring for Civil NEM,
142(7)
Reducing NEM Stocks, Flows, and Sites,
149(31)
Conversion of Research Reactors from HEU,
150(4)
Minimizing NEM Stocks, Flows, and Sites in Civil Nuclear Energy Generation,
154(9)
Other Actions to Consolidate NEM at Fewer Sites,
163(3)
Cutoff of Production of NEM for Weapons,
166(5)
Final Disposition of NEM,
171(9)
Conclusions,
180(3)
4 Clandestine Stocks and Production of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials 183(34)
Detecting Undeclared Stocks of Weapons and NEM,
185(13)
National Technical Means, 185 Human Sources,
186(2)
Audits of Records,
188(2)
Physical Evidence,
190(2)
South Africa: Verifying the Completeness of Declarations,
192(2)
Uncertainties in Weapon and NEM Stockpiles,
194(4)
Detecting Undeclared Production of Weapons and NEM,
198(17)
National Technical Means,
200(2)
Human Sources,
202(1)
Environmental Sampling and Monitoring,
202(4)
On-site Inspections,
206(2)
Detection of Nuclear Weapon Programs by U.S. Intelligence,
208(7)
Conclusions,
215(2)
5 General Conclusions 217(4)
Appendices
A Physics and Technology of Nuclear-Explosive Material,
221(24)
NEM and Fissile Materials,
221(1)
Reactivity, Critical Mass, and Explosive Yield,
222(4)
Production Technologies for NEM,
226(5)
Denaturing Plutonium,
231(1)
History of Military Production of NEM,
232(1)
NEM in the Civilian Sector,
233(12)
B Acronyms,
245(2)
C Biographical Sketches of Committee Membres,
247


Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Research Council