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1 Introduction: Partnerships for Innovation |
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1 | (32) |
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A Characterization of Innovation |
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2 | (2) |
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4 | (3) |
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7 | (2) |
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Exploration Without Innovation |
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9 | (5) |
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NASA's Attempts to Innovate |
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14 | (5) |
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19 | (4) |
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23 | (10) |
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2 The Origins and Flagship Project of NASA's International Program: The Ariel Case Study |
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33 | (24) |
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Introduction: Coordinating Among Emerging Centers of Space Science and Technology |
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33 | (3) |
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The IGT Satellite Tears: Coordinating Resources for Space Science |
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36 | (3) |
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NASA Formation: Research Coordination Sustainable Within the US Political Economy |
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39 | (2) |
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Ariel Tears, 1959-1981: The Collective Learning Process Sustained |
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41 | (9) |
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Concluding Thoughts: Mutually Beneficial Coordination with the World's Lean Space Powers |
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50 | (7) |
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3 Global Instantaneous Telecommunications and the Development of Satellite Technology |
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57 | (32) |
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John R. Pierce and the Bell Laboratories Satellite Telecommunications Initiative |
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59 | (2) |
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Hughes Aircraft Company Enters the Satellite Communications Competition |
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61 | (1) |
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T. Keith Glennan and the Pursuit of Satellite Telecommunications Policy |
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62 | (6) |
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Kennedy and the Redefinition of Policy |
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68 | (2) |
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The Telstar Publicity Harvest |
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70 | (2) |
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The Satellite Communications Act of 1962 and the Communications Satellite Corporation |
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72 | (5) |
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NASA and the Continued Advance of Communications Satellites |
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77 | (3) |
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80 | (9) |
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4 The Other Side of Moore's Law: The Apollo Guidance Computer, the Integrated Circuit, and the Microelectronics Revolution, 1962-1975 |
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89 | (40) |
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The Launch Vehicle Digital Computer: The First of the Five Apollo Computers |
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92 | (3) |
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The Apollo Guidance Computers on the Command and Lunar Modules: The Second and Third Computers |
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95 | (4) |
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The Planar Process and the Invention of the Integrated Circuit |
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99 | (7) |
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106 | (13) |
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Conclusion: Did the NASA Contract Jump Start the Microelectronics Revolution? |
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119 | (10) |
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5 NASA's Mission Control Center: The Space Program's Capitol as Innovative Capital |
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129 | (26) |
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130 | (5) |
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Building the Mission Control Center |
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135 | (7) |
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142 | (4) |
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146 | (9) |
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6 Lessons of Landsat: From Experimental Program to Commercial Land Imaging, 1969-1989 |
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155 | (30) |
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Early Landsat Years, 1966-1978 |
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157 | (4) |
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Commercialization and the Failure of Innovation |
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161 | (1) |
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The Reagan Administration's Vision for Landsat |
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162 | (1) |
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NOAA's Call for Contractors in 1983 |
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163 | (3) |
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Congress Votes for Commercialization: Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 |
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166 | (3) |
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Commercialization to Contract: NOAA takes Landsat to Market, 1984-1985 |
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169 | (1) |
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Commercialization Collapses, 1986-1989 |
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170 | (3) |
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173 | (3) |
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176 | (9) |
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7 Selling the Space Shuttle: Early Developments |
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185 | (30) |
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Pricing the Space Shuttle |
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187 | (4) |
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Revising the Initial Pricing Policy |
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191 | (3) |
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Cultivating New Shuttle Users |
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194 | (3) |
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Joint Endeavor Agreements |
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197 | (4) |
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Marketing the Space Shuttle |
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201 | (3) |
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Offering a Ride into Space |
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204 | (2) |
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A Private-Sector Alternative? |
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206 | (1) |
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207 | (8) |
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8 Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Repurposing NASA's Spacecraft |
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215 | (22) |
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Bricolage in NASA Spaceflight Programs |
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216 | (2) |
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218 | (5) |
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Rescue Technologies for Skylab |
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223 | (2) |
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From Apollo-Soyuz to International Skylab |
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225 | (2) |
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Skylab in the Shuttle Era |
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227 | (3) |
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Assessing NASA's Bricolage |
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230 | (2) |
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232 | (5) |
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9 Encouraging New Space Firms |
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237 | (30) |
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240 | (3) |
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The Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) |
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243 | (7) |
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250 | (1) |
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250 | (5) |
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Pegasus' First Flight---and Another Orbital "Survival Crisis" |
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255 | (5) |
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260 | (7) |
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10 The Discovery Program: Competition, Innovation, and Risk in Planetary Exploration |
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267 | (24) |
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Program Origins, 1989-1993 |
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268 | (3) |
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Discovery in the Heyday of Faster, Better, Cheaper," 1993-2001 |
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271 | (5) |
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Discovery's Time of Troubles, 2002-2005 |
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276 | (4) |
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Discovery 2.0, 2005-Present |
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280 | (3) |
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Discovery and Innovation at NASA |
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283 | (8) |
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11 Partnerships for Innovation: The X-33/VentureStar |
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291 | (30) |
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292 | (3) |
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295 | (3) |
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298 | (2) |
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300 | (1) |
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A Partnership for the X-34 |
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301 | (4) |
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A Partnership for the X-33 |
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305 | (3) |
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308 | (3) |
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311 | (10) |
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12 Microgravity, Macro Investment: Overcoming International Space Station Utilization Challenges Through Managerial Innovation |
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321 | (28) |
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Dreaming of a Laboratory in Space |
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323 | (2) |
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Realities of Research in Orbit |
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325 | (4) |
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From Dreams to Discontent |
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329 | (4) |
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333 | (9) |
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342 | (7) |
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13 NASA, Industry, and the Commercial Crew Development Program: The Politics of Partnership |
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349 | (30) |
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351 | (2) |
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353 | (1) |
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354 | (2) |
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356 | (1) |
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357 | (2) |
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359 | (2) |
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Formulating Policy for Crew |
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361 | (1) |
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362 | (2) |
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364 | (5) |
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Later Implementation: CCDev3 |
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369 | (1) |
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369 | (2) |
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CCDev4 Begins and COTS Ends |
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371 | (1) |
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Toward Cargo Institutionalization |
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372 | (1) |
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372 | (7) |
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14 Conclusion: What Matters? |
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379 | (18) |
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381 | (9) |
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Lessons from the Case Studies |
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390 | (7) |
Index |
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397 | |