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E-grāmata: Offshore Risk Assessment vol 2.: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies

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Offshore Risk Assessment was the first book to deal with quantified risk assessment (QRA) as applied specifically to offshore installations and operations. Risk assessment techniques have been used for more than three decades in the offshore oil and gas industry, and their use is set to expand increasingly as the industry moves into new areas and faces new challenges in older regions.

This updated and expanded third edition has been informed by a major R&D program on offshore risk assessment in Norway and summarizes research from 2006 to the present day. Rooted with a thorough discussion of risk metrics and risk analysis methodology, subsequent chapters are devoted to analytical approaches to escalation, escape, evacuation and rescue analysis of safety and emergency systems.

Separate chapters analyze the main hazards of offshore structures: fire, explosion, collision, and falling objects as well as structural and marine hazards. Risk mitigation and control are discussed, as well as an illustration of how the results from quantitative risk assessment studies should be presented. The third second edition has a stronger focus on the use of risk assessment techniques in the operation of offshore installations. Also decommissioning of installations is covered.

Not only does Offshore Risk Assessment describe the state of the art of QRA, it also identifies weaknesses and areas that need further development. This new edition also illustrates applications or quantitative risk analysis methodology to offshore petroleum applications.

A comprehensive reference for academics and students of marine/offshore risk assessment and management, the book should also be owned by professionals in the industry, contractors, suppliers, consultants and regulatory authorities.



This book gives a detailed overview of all aspects of quantified risk assessment (QRA) as applied specifically to offshore installations and operations. It also identifies weaknesses and areas that need further development.

Part I Background and Risk Assessment Process
1 Introduction
3(20)
1.1 About QRA
3(2)
1.2 QRA in Relation to Other Analysis Methods
5(1)
1.3 Objectives
6(1)
1.4 Relevant Regulations and Standards
7(1)
1.5 Norwegian Regulations
8(6)
1.5.1 Framework Regulations
8(1)
1.5.2 HES Management Regulations
9(3)
1.5.3 Facilities Regulations
12(1)
1.5.4 Activities Regulations
13(1)
1.5.5 NMD Risk Analysis Regulations
13(1)
1.6 UK Regulations
14(2)
1.6.1 Safety Case Regulations
14(1)
1.6.2 PFEER Regulations
15(1)
1.6.3 Management and Administration Regulations
16(1)
1.6.4 Design and Construction Regulations
16(1)
1.7 National and International Standards
16(1)
1.8 Activity Levels
17(1)
1.9 Limitations
17(4)
1.9.1 Risk Management
18(1)
1.9.2 Emergency Response
18(1)
1.9.3 Subsea Production
19(1)
1.9.4 Production Regularity
19(1)
1.9.5 Resilience
19(1)
1.9.6 High Reliability Organisations
20(1)
1.9.7 STAMP
20(1)
1.9.8 Inherently Safe
21(1)
References
21(2)
2 Risk Picture: Definitions and Characteristics
23(48)
2.1 Definition of Risk
23(15)
2.1.1 Risk Elements
23(2)
2.1.2 Basic Expressions of Risk
25(1)
2.1.3 Dimensions of Risk
26(1)
2.1.4 Fatality Risk
27(8)
2.1.5 Frequency of Impairment
35(1)
2.1.6 Environment Risk
36(1)
2.1.7 Asset Risk
37(1)
2.2 Risk Picture, North Sea
38(7)
2.2.1 Overview of Fatal Accidents
38(1)
2.2.2 Overview of Accidents to Personnel
39(2)
2.2.3 Fatal Accident Rates
41(1)
2.2.4 Trends in Fatality Rates
41(3)
2.2.5 Comparison Offshore: Onshore Activity
44(1)
2.3 Risk Presentation
45(14)
2.3.1 Fatality Risk
46(6)
2.3.2 Group Risk
52(3)
2.3.3 Impairment Risk
55(1)
2.3.4 Risk to Environment
55(1)
2.3.5 Asset Risk
56(2)
2.3.6 Load Distribution Functions
58(1)
2.4 Uncertainties
59(4)
2.4.1 Basis for Uncertainty Consideration
59(1)
2.4.2 Influence of Uncertainty
60(1)
2.4.3 Calculation Based on Observations
61(2)
2.5 Basic Risk Modelling Concepts
63(5)
2.5.1 Defence in Depth
64(1)
2.5.2 Barriers
65(2)
2.5.3 Root Causes
67(1)
2.5.4 Risk Influencing Factors
68(1)
References
68(3)
3 Risk Assessment Process and Main Elements
71(24)
3.1 Selection of Risk Assessment Approach
71(1)
3.2 Quantitative or Qualitative Risk Assessment?
71(2)
3.3 Risk Assessment Approach
73(1)
3.4 Establishing the Context
74(1)
3.5 Hazard Identification
75(1)
3.6 Risk Analysis
76(1)
3.7 Risk Evaluation
77(1)
3.8 Risk Treatment
78(1)
3.9 Monitoring and Review
78(1)
3.10 Communication and Consultation
79(1)
3.11 Who Are These Requirements Applicable For?
79(1)
3.12 Ethics in Risk Assessment
80(9)
3.12.1 Case Study
80(2)
3.12.2 Overview of Risk Studies and Risk-Informed Decision-Making
82(1)
3.12.3 Choice Between Alternative Locations
82(1)
3.12.4 Risk Analysis in Tolerability Evaluations
83(1)
3.12.5 Risk Communication with the Public
84(1)
3.12.6 Use of Risk Analysis in the Design Process
85(2)
3.12.7 Cause of Deficiencies
87(1)
3.12.8 Main Ethical Challenges
88(1)
3.13 Misuse of Risk Analysis
89(1)
3.14 Risk Reduction Priorities
90(1)
3.15 Norwegian and UK Approaches Suitable as Models?
91(1)
References
92(3)
4 Lessons from Major Accidents
95(70)
4.1 Overview
95(2)
4.2 Ekofisk B Blowout
97(2)
4.2.1 Event Sequence
97(1)
4.2.2 Barrier Performance
98(1)
4.2.3 Lessons Learned for Design
99(1)
4.2.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
99(1)
4.3 Ixtoc Blowout
99(3)
4.3.1 Event Sequence
99(2)
4.3.2 Barrier Performance
101(1)
4.3.3 Lessons Learned
102(1)
4.4 Enchova Blowout
102(1)
4.4.1 Event Sequence
102(1)
4.4.2 Barrier Performance
102(1)
4.4.3 Lessons Learned for Design
103(1)
4.4.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
103(1)
4.5 West Vanguard Gas Blowout
103(3)
4.5.1 Event Sequence
103(2)
4.5.2 Barrier Performance
105(1)
4.5.3 Lessons Learned for Design
105(1)
4.5.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
105(1)
4.6 Ocean Odyssey Burning Blowout
106(2)
4.6.1 Event Sequence
106(1)
4.6.2 Barrier Performance
107(1)
4.6.3 Lessons Learned for Design
108(1)
4.6.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
108(1)
4.7 Treasure Saga 2/4-14 Underground Blowout
108(3)
4.7.1 Event Sequence
109(1)
4.7.2 Barrier Performance
110(1)
4.7.3 Lessons Learned for Well Operations
110(1)
4.8 Temsah Burning Blowout III
4.9 Snorre Alpha Subsea Gas Blowout
111(4)
4.9.1 Event Sequence
111(2)
4.9.2 Barrier Performance
113(1)
4.9.3 Lessons Learned for Well Operations
114(1)
4.10 Usumacinta Blowout
115(3)
4.10.1 Event Sequence
115(1)
4.10.2 Barrier Performance
116(1)
4.10.3 Lessons Learned for Design
117(1)
4.10.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
117(1)
4.11 Montara Blowout
118(2)
4.11.1 Event Sequence
118(1)
4.11.2 Barrier Performance
119(1)
4.11.3 Lessons Learned for Well Drilling
120(1)
4.12 Gullfaks C Well Incident
120(2)
4.12.1 Event Sequence
121(1)
4.12.2 Barrier Performance
121(1)
4.12.3 Lessons Learned for Well Operations
122(1)
4.13 Frade Underground Blowout
122(2)
4.13.1 Event Sequence
123(1)
4.13.2 Barrier Performance
123(1)
4.13.3 Lessons Learned for Well Operations
124(1)
4.14 Brent A Explosion
124(3)
4.14.1 Event Sequence
125(1)
4.14.2 Barrier Performance
125(1)
4.14.3 Lessons Learned for Design
126(1)
4.14.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
126(1)
4.15 Piper A Explosion and Fire
127(3)
4.15.1 Event Sequence
127(1)
4.15.2 Barrier Performance
127(2)
4.15.3 Lessons Learned for Design
129(1)
4.15.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
129(1)
4.16 Ekofisk A Riser Rupture
130(2)
4.16.1 Event Sequence
130(1)
4.16.2 Barrier Performance
131(1)
4.16.3 Lessons Learned for Design
131(1)
4.16.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
132(1)
4.17 Jotun Pipeline Rupture
132(2)
4.17.1 Event Sequence
132(1)
4.17.2 Barrier Performance
133(1)
4.17.3 Lessons Learned for Design
134(1)
4.17.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
134(1)
4.18 Mumbai High North Riser Rupture
134(3)
4.18.1 Event Sequence
134(1)
4.18.2 Barrier Performance
135(1)
4.18.3 Lessons Learned for Design
136(1)
4.18.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
136(1)
4.19 Deep Sea Driller Capsize
137(2)
4.19.1 Event Sequence
137(1)
4.19.2 Barrier Performance
137(1)
4.19.3 Lessons Learned for Design
138(1)
4.19.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
139(1)
4.20 Alexander L. Kielland Capsize
139(2)
4.20.1 Event Sequence
139(1)
4.20.2 Barrier Performance
140(1)
4.20.3 Lessons Learned for Design
140(1)
4.20.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
141(1)
4.21 Ocean Ranger Capsize
141(2)
4.21.1 Event Sequence
141(1)
4.21.2 Barrier Failures
142(1)
4.21.3 Lessons Learned for Design
142(1)
4.21.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
142(1)
4.22 Glomar Java Sea Capsize
143(2)
4.22.1 Event Sequence
143(1)
4.22.2 Barrier Failures
144(1)
4.22.3 Lessons Learned for Design
144(1)
4.22.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
144(1)
4.23 Seacrest Capsize
145(1)
4.23.1 Event Sequence
145(1)
4.24 West Gamma Capsize
145(2)
4.24.1 Event Sequence
145(1)
4.24.2 Barrier Performance
146(1)
4.24.3 Lessons Learned for Design
147(1)
4.24.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
147(1)
4.25 Norne Shuttle Tanker Collision
147(2)
4.25.1 Event Sequence
147(1)
4.25.2 Barrier Performance
148(1)
4.25.3 Lessons Learned for Design
149(1)
4.25.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
149(1)
4.26 P-36 Capsize
149(3)
4.26.1 Event Sequence
149(2)
4.26.2 Barrier Performance
151(1)
4.26.3 Lessons Learned for Design
152(1)
4.26.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
152(1)
4.27 P-34 Listing
152(1)
4.27.1 Event Sequence
152(1)
4.28 Ocean Vanguard Anchor Line Failure
153(3)
4.28.1 Event Sequence
153(1)
4.28.2 Barrier Performance
154(1)
4.28.3 Lessons Learned for Design
155(1)
4.28.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
155(1)
4.29 Gryphon Alpha FPSO Multiple Anchor Line Failure
156(3)
4.29.1 Event Sequence
156(1)
4.29.2 Barrier Performance
157(1)
4.29.3 Lessons Learned for Design
157(1)
4.29.4 Lessons Learned for Operation
158(1)
4.30 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
159(2)
4.30.1 Event Sequence
159(1)
4.30.2 Barrier Failures
160(1)
4.31 Summary of Barrier Performance
161(1)
References
162(3)
5 Lessons from Macondo Accident
165(16)
5.1 The Deepwater Horizon and Macondo Well
165(2)
5.2 Organisations Involved
167(1)
5.3 Sequence of Events
168(1)
5.4 Investigations
169(4)
5.4.1 Technical Aspects
170(1)
5.4.2 Organisational Aspects
171(2)
5.5 Findings
173(1)
5.6 Lessons Learned
174(3)
5.6.1 Lessons Learned for Risk Management in Association with Well Drilling
174(1)
5.6.2 Lessons Learned for Emergency Management
175(2)
5.7 Similarity Between Offshore and Nuclear Accidents
177(1)
References
177(4)
Part II Analysis of Main Offshore Hazards
6 The Occurrence of Hydrocarbon Leaks: Process Systems
181(44)
6.1 Statistical Sources
181(1)
6.2 Statistics from the UK Sector
181(3)
6.2.1 Classification of Releases
181(1)
6.2.2 Statistical Overview
182(2)
6.3 Statistics from the Norwegian Sector
184(7)
6.3.1 Classification of Releases
184(1)
6.3.2 Statistical Overview
185(1)
6.3.3 Comparison of Installation Types
186(1)
6.3.4 Installations with the Highest Leak Frequency per Installation Years
187(1)
6.3.5 Installations with the Highest Leak Frequency per Number of Leak Sources
188(1)
6.3.6 Installations with the Highest Leak Frequency per Number of Operations
188(1)
6.3.7 Installations with Highest Leak Frequency with Combined Parameters
189(1)
6.3.8 Comparison of Different Normalizations
190(1)
6.4 Comparison of the UK and Norwegian Sectors
191(4)
6.4.1 Comparison of Unignited Leaks
191(1)
6.4.2 Detailed Comparison
192(2)
6.4.3 Comparison of Ignited Leaks
194(1)
6.5 Comparison on a Worldwide Basis
195(3)
6.6 Analysis of the Circumstances and Causes of HC Leaks
198(11)
6.6.1 MTO Perspective on Leaks
198(1)
6.6.2 Work Process Modelling
199(1)
6.6.3 Initiating Events Which May Cause Leaks
200(2)
6.6.4 Initiating Event Categories
202(1)
6.6.5 Activity Types Involved in Leaks
202(2)
6.6.6 Time When Leaks Occur
204(1)
6.6.7 Work Process Phases and Shift Distribution
205(1)
6.6.8 Design Weaknesses and Technical Degradation
206(1)
6.6.9 Major Hazard Risk Potential
207(2)
6.7 HC Leaks Due to Technical Degradation
209(1)
6.7.1 Age of Installation with Degradation Failure
209(1)
6.8 HC Leaks Due to Human Intervention
210(4)
6.8.1 Overview of Work Flow Phases
210(1)
6.8.2 Classification of Leaks During Work Process Phases
210(1)
6.8.3 Personnel Groups Involved in Leaks
211(1)
6.8.4 Planning
211(1)
6.8.5 Isolation
212(2)
6.8.6 Execution of Intervention
214(1)
6.8.7 Reinstatement
214(1)
6.8.8 Phase when Leaks Occur
214(1)
6.9 Causal Factors
214(6)
6.9.1 Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) from Investigations
215(3)
6.9.2 Management and Supervision
218(1)
6.9.3 Lack of Compliance with Steering Documentation
219(1)
6.10 HC Leaks Due to Design Errors
220(1)
6.11 HC Leaks Due to External Impact
220(1)
6.12 DNV Leak Frequency Model
220(2)
6.12.1 Model Overview
220(2)
6.12.2 Challenges with the Model
222(1)
References
222(3)
7 Fire Risk Modelling
225(38)
7.1 Overview
225(3)
7.1.1 Cases with Opposite Results
225(1)
7.1.2 Types of Fire Loads
226(1)
7.1.3 Structural Fire Impact
226(1)
7.1.4 Fire and Explosion Loads on People
227(1)
7.2 Topside Fire Consequence Analysis
228(7)
7.2.1 Mechanisms of Fire
228(3)
7.2.2 Fire Balls
231(1)
7.2.3 Gas Fires
231(1)
7.2.4 Air Consumption in Fire
232(1)
7.2.5 Choice of Calculation Models
232(1)
7.2.6 Analysis of Topside Fire Events
233(1)
7.2.7 Fire Simulations
233(2)
7.3 Fire on Sea
235(8)
7.3.1 Delayed Ignition of an Instantaneous Release
236(1)
7.3.2 Ignition Probability of an Instantaneous Release
237(1)
7.3.3 What Determines the Likelihood of Fire on Sea?
237(3)
7.3.4 Loads from Sea Level Fire
240(3)
7.4 Analysis of Smoke Effects
243(3)
7.4.1 Methods for Prediction of Smoke Behaviour
243(2)
7.4.2 Smoke Flow and Dispersion
245(1)
7.5 Structural Response to Fire
246(4)
7.5.1 Manual Methods
246(1)
7.5.2 Uninsulated Steel
246(1)
7.5.3 Insulated Steel
247(3)
7.6 Risk Reducing Measures
250(1)
7.6.1 Overview
250(1)
7.6.2 Recent R&D Experience
251(1)
7.7 Dimensioning of Structural Fire Protection
251(10)
7.7.1 Case Illustration
251(1)
7.7.2 Dimensioning Fire
252(1)
7.7.3 Fire Duration Distribution
253(2)
7.7.4 Definition of Dimensioning Fire
255(1)
7.7.5 USFOS® Modelling
255(2)
7.7.6 QRA Modelling
257(3)
7.7.7 QRA Results
260(1)
7.7.8 Observations
261(1)
7.8 Blast and Fire Design Guidance
261(1)
References
262(1)
8 Explosion Risk Modelling
263(50)
8.1 Overview
263(1)
8.1.1 Introduction
263(1)
8.1.2 Explosion Loads on Structure
263(1)
8.1.3 Explosion Loads on People
264(1)
8.2 Explosion Frequency
264(5)
8.2.1 Event Tree Analysis
264(1)
8.2.2 Historical Frequencies
264(5)
8.3 Explosion Consequence Analysis
269(11)
8.3.1 Types of Explosion Loads
269(1)
8.3.2 Gas Explosion
270(1)
8.3.3 Blast Wave
271(1)
8.3.4 Pressure
272(1)
8.3.5 Formation of Explosive Cloud
273(2)
8.3.6 Deflagration
275(2)
8.3.7 Confined/Semi-confined Explosion
277(1)
8.3.8 Calculation of Explosion Loads
278(1)
8.3.9 Explosion Design of Facilities
279(1)
8.4 Probabilistic Approach to Explosion Load Assessment
280(9)
8.4.1 Basis
280(1)
8.4.2 Approach to Probabilistic Evaluation
280(2)
8.4.3 Probabilistic Evaluation
282(5)
8.4.4 Example
287(1)
8.4.5 Use of Load Function
287(1)
8.4.6 Structural Response Calculations
288(1)
8.4.7 Is a Probabilistic Approach the Best Way Forward?
289(1)
8.5 Explosion Risk Reduction
289(7)
8.5.1 Establishing Basis for Design
289(1)
8.5.2 BFETS R&D Experience
290(2)
8.5.3 Main Experience, Mitigation
292(1)
8.5.4 Risk Reduction Possibilities
292(4)
8.6 Example, Dimensioning Against Blast Load
296(8)
8.6.1 Introduction
296(3)
8.6.2 Basis for Dimensioning
299(1)
8.6.3 Design Capability
299(1)
8.6.4 Load Distributions
299(2)
8.6.5 Gas Explosion Frequency
301(1)
8.6.6 Reinforcement Costs
301(2)
8.6.7 Optimisation
303(1)
8.7 Case Study; Reduction of Blast Load
304(8)
8.7.1 Layout and Geometry
305(1)
8.7.2 Cases and Configurations Analysed
306(1)
8.7.3 Ventilation Results
306(1)
8.7.4 Explosion Studies
307(1)
8.7.5 FLACS Results
308(1)
8.7.6 Demonstration of Parameter Sensitivities
308(2)
8.7.7 Implications for QRA Modelling
310(1)
8.7.8 QRA Sensitivity Results
310(1)
8.7.9 Discussion and Evaluation
311(1)
References
312(1)
9 Collision Risk Modelling
313(56)
9.1 Historical Collision Risk
313(6)
9.1.1 Significant Collisions
313(1)
9.1.2 Norwegian Platform Collisions
314(3)
9.1.3 Attendant Vessel Collisions
317(2)
9.2 Modelling Overview
319(4)
9.2.1 Introduction
319(1)
9.2.2 Merchant Vessels
320(1)
9.2.3 Naval Traffic
320(1)
9.2.4 Fishing Vessels
321(1)
9.2.5 Offshore Traffic
321(2)
9.2.6 Floating Units
323(1)
9.3 Passing Traffic
323(20)
9.3.1 Introduction
323(1)
9.3.2 Powered Passing Vessel Collisions: Model Overview
324(3)
9.3.3 Traffic Pattern and Volume
327(1)
9.3.4 Probability of Collision Course
328(6)
9.3.5 Probability of Failure of Ship Initiated Recovery
334(3)
9.3.6 Probability of Failure of Platform Initiated Recovery
337(1)
9.3.7 Example Results
338(1)
9.3.8 Coast
338(3)
9.3.9 Traffic Monitoring in the Norwegian Sector
341(1)
9.3.10 Model Validation
342(1)
9.4 Collision Energy
343(3)
9.4.1 Impact Energy and Platform Energy Absorption Capacity
343(1)
9.4.2 Mass of Colliding Vessels
344(1)
9.4.3 Impact Velocity of Colliding Vessel
344(1)
9.4.4 Critical Collisions
344(2)
9.5 Collision Consequences
346(2)
9.5.1 Failure Criteria
346(1)
9.5.2 Collision Geometry
347(1)
9.5.3 Local Collision Damage
347(1)
9.5.4 Global Damage
348(1)
9.6 Risk Reducing Measures
348(8)
9.6.1 Overview of Risk Reducing Measures
348(1)
9.6.2 Passing Vessels
349(1)
9.6.3 Effect of Risk Reducing Measures
350(4)
9.6.4 Experience with Collision Avoidance
354(1)
9.6.5 Illustration of Effect of Risk Reduction
355(1)
9.7 Collision Risk Case Study
356(10)
9.7.1 Installation
356(1)
9.7.2 Routes
356(3)
9.7.3 Results
359(1)
9.7.4 Energy Distributions
360(2)
9.7.5 Intervention Options
362(1)
9.7.6 Collision Geometry
363(3)
References
366(3)
10 Marine Systems Risk Modelling
369(44)
10.1 Ballast System Failure
369(12)
10.1.1 Background
369(1)
10.1.2 Regulatory Requirements
369(1)
10.1.3 Relevant Hazards
370(1)
10.1.4 Previous Studies
371(1)
10.1.5 Stability Incidents and Accidents
372(1)
10.1.6 Observations from Incidents and Accidents
373(1)
10.1.7 Evaluation of Typical QRA Studies
374(1)
10.1.8 Proposed Approach to Analysis of Stability Hazards
375(5)
10.1.9 Comparison of QRA Results with Experienced Events
380(1)
10.1.10 Observations
381(1)
10.2 Anchoring System Failure
381(6)
10.2.1 Incidents Involving More than One Anchor Line
382(1)
10.2.2 Release of Chains in Winches
383(1)
10.2.3 Failures in Anchor Lines
383(2)
10.2.4 Dragging of Anchors
385(1)
10.2.5 Other Risks with Anchoring Systems
385(1)
10.2.6 Risk Analysis of Anchoring Systems on MODUs on the NCS
385(1)
10.2.7 Use of Fault Trees in QRA of Anchoring Systems
386(1)
10.2.8 Summary
386(1)
10.3 Failure of Drilling DP Systems
387(4)
10.3.1 Barrier Function 1: Prevent Loss of Position
389(1)
10.3.2 Barrier Function 2: Arrest Vessel Movement
390(1)
10.3.3 Barrier Function 3: Prevent Loss of Well Integrity
390(1)
10.4 Shuttle Tanker Collision Risk
391(17)
10.4.1 Background
391(2)
10.4.2 Tandem Off-Loading Configurations
393(1)
10.4.3 Overview of Current Field Configurations
394(1)
10.4.4 Characterisation of Shuttle Tanker Collision Hazard
395(2)
10.4.5 Barrier Modelling
397(1)
10.4.6 Analysis of Risk Aspects
397(3)
10.4.7 Trends in Occurrence Frequencies
400(1)
10.4.8 Collision Energy and Consequences
401(1)
10.4.9 Accidents and Incidents for Taut Hawser Configurations
401(1)
10.4.10 Main Contributors to Collision Frequency, in Drive-Off
402(1)
10.4.11 Experience Data
403(2)
10.4.12 Accident Frequencies: 1996-2003
405(3)
10.4.13 Accident Frequencies: 1996-2011
408(1)
10.5 Loss of Buoyancy Due to Gas Plume
408(1)
10.6 Accidental Weight Condition
409(1)
10.7 Tow-Out and Installation Risk
410(1)
References
410(3)
11 Risk Due to Miscellaneous Hazards
413(20)
11.1 Crane Accidents
413(11)
11.1.1 Modelling of Dropped Object Impact
414(1)
11.1.2 Physical Aspects of Falling Loads
415(2)
11.1.3 Probability of Dropped Loads
417(1)
11.1.4 Probability of Hitting Objects
418(1)
11.1.5 Consequences of Impact
419(2)
11.1.6 Impact Energy Distributions
421(3)
11.2 Accidents During Tow
424(1)
11.3 Man-Overboard Accidents
424(3)
11.3.1 Frequency of MOB Accidents
425(2)
11.3.2 Scenarios Involving MOB Accidents
427(1)
11.4 Structural Failure
427(2)
11.5 Subsea Gas Release
429(2)
References
431(2)
12 Fatality Risk Assessment
433(50)
12.1 Overview of Approaches
433(6)
12.1.1 Why Fatality Risk?
433(1)
12.1.2 Statistical Analysis
434(1)
12.1.3 Phenomena Based Analysis
434(3)
12.1.4 Averaging of FAR Values
437(1)
12.1.5 Variations Between Installations
438(1)
12.2 Occupational Fatality Risk
439(3)
12.3 Immediate Fatality Risk
442(10)
12.3.1 Overview
442(1)
12.3.2 Subjective Modelling
442(2)
12.3.3 Modelling Based on Physical Effects
444(3)
12.3.4 Is There a Need for Benchmarking?
447(5)
12.4 Analysis of Escape Risk
452(8)
12.4.1 Overview
452(2)
12.4.2 Escape Time Analysis
454(1)
12.4.3 Impairment Analysis
455(3)
12.4.4 Escape Fatality Analysis
458(2)
12.5 Analysis of Evacuation Risk
460(8)
12.5.1 Overview of Evacuation Means
460(6)
12.5.2 Impairment Analysis
466(1)
12.5.3 Evacuation Fatality Analysis
467(1)
12.6 Analysis of Risk Associated with Rescue Operations
468(11)
12.6.1 Rescue Time Analysis
470(4)
12.6.2 Rescue Capacity
474(3)
12.6.3 Rescue Fatality Analysis
477(2)
12.7 Diving Fatality Risk
479(1)
12.8 Fatality Risk During Cessation Work
480(1)
References
481(2)
13 Helicopter Transportation Fatality Risk Assessment
483(22)
13.1 Overview
483(1)
13.2 Accidents and Incidents-Offshore Northwest Europe
484(4)
13.3 Risk Modelling
488(3)
13.3.1 Assumptions and Premises
488(1)
13.3.2 Risk Model
489(2)
13.4 Previous Predictions
491(1)
13.5 Combined Prediction of Risk Levels: UK and Norwegian Sectors
492(2)
13.6 Prediction of Risk Levels: UK Sector
494(1)
13.7 Prediction of Risk Levels: Norwegian Sector
495(3)
13.8 Other Risk Parameters
498(2)
13.8.1 Fatality Distribution
498(1)
13.8.2 Comparison of Risk Associated with Shuttling
498(2)
13.9 Prediction of Risk Levels for an Individual Installation
500(1)
References
500(5)
Part III Risk Analysis, Presentation and Evaluation Process
14 Methodology for Quantified Risk Assessment
505(50)
14.1 Analytical Steps and Elements
505(9)
14.1.1 Analytical Elements
505(2)
14.1.2 Identification of Initiating Events
507(1)
14.1.3 Cause Analysis
507(2)
14.1.4 Modelling of Accident Sequences
509(1)
14.1.5 Consequence Analysis
510(2)
14.1.6 Risk Calculation, Analysis and Assessment
512(2)
14.2 Analysis Steps
514(2)
14.2.1 Requirements for Analytical Approach
515(1)
14.3 Hazard Modelling and Cause Analysis
516(6)
14.3.1 Blowout Hazard Study
516(1)
14.3.2 Process Hazard Study
517(1)
14.3.3 Riser/Pipeline Hazard Study
518(1)
14.3.4 Fire Load and Smoke Assessment
519(1)
14.3.5 Explosion Load Assessment
520(1)
14.3.6 Collision Hazard Study
520(1)
14.3.7 Dropped Object Hazard Study
521(1)
14.3.8 Structural Failure Study
521(1)
14.4 Analysis of Critical Risks
522(3)
14.4.1 Barrier Study
522(1)
14.4.2 Assessment of Safety Critical Systems
523(1)
14.4.3 Detailed Probability Study
523(1)
14.4.4 HOF Integration
524(1)
14.4.5 Detailed Consequence Study
524(1)
14.4.6 Revised Event Tree Study
525(1)
14.5 Analysis of Different Risk Dimensions
525(1)
14.5.1 Impairment Analysis
525(1)
14.5.2 Fatality Risk Analysis
525(1)
14.5.3 Analysis of Environmental Spill Risk
525(1)
14.5.4 Analysis of Asset Risk
526(1)
14.6 Sensitivity Analysis
526(1)
14.7 Limitations of Risk Analysis
527(1)
14.8 Use of Software
528(1)
14.9 Data Sources
529(7)
14.9.1 Types of Data Sources
529(1)
14.9.2 Blowout Frequency
529(1)
14.9.3 Process System Leak Frequency
530(1)
14.9.4 Riser/Pipeline Leak Frequency
531(1)
14.9.5 Vessel Collision
531(2)
14.9.6 Falling Objects
533(1)
14.9.7 Marine Accidents
533(1)
14.9.8 Utility Area Accidents
533(1)
14.9.9 Helicopter Accidents
534(1)
14.9.10 Occupational and Diving Accidents
534(1)
14.9.11 Ignition Probability
534(1)
14.9.12 Safety System Reliability
535(1)
14.9.13 Data Sources for Reliability Analysis
535(1)
14.9.14 Data for Fatality Modelling
535(1)
14.10 Use of Installation Specific Data
536(7)
14.10.1 Generic versus Installation Specific Data
536(1)
14.10.2 Installation Specific Data from RNNP
536(1)
14.10.3 Combination of Specific and Generic Data
537(2)
14.10.4 Example, Combination of Data
539(2)
14.10.5 Data Sources for Installation Specific Data
541(2)
14.11 Use of Risk Analysis Studies in Life Cycle Phases
543(1)
14.11.1 Analyses During Concept Development
543(1)
14.11.2 Analyses in Operations
543(1)
14.12 Execution of Quantified Risk Analysis
544(5)
14.12.1 Quality Aspects
544(3)
14.12.2 Documentation of Assumptions and Premises
547(1)
14.12.3 Typical Study Definitions
547(2)
14.13 Challenges Experienced with QRA Studies
549(3)
14.13.1 Ethical Failures
549(1)
14.13.2 Hazard Identification
549(1)
14.13.3 Analysis of Risk
549(2)
14.13.4 Presentation of Analysis Results
551(1)
14.13.5 Identification of Risk Reduction Measures
551(1)
14.13.6 Use of Study Results in Risk Management
551(1)
References
552(3)
15 Analysis Techniques
555(84)
15.1 Hazard Identification
555(6)
15.1.1 HAZOP
557(1)
15.1.2 PHA
558(1)
15.1.3 SAFOP
559(1)
15.1.4 Bow-Tie
560(1)
15.2 Cause, Probability and Frequency Analysis
561(3)
15.2.1 Fault Tree Analysis
561(3)
15.2.2 Event Tree Analysis
564(1)
15.2.3 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
564(1)
15.2.4 Statistical Simulation Analysis
564(1)
15.2.5 Analytical Methods
564(1)
15.3 Operational Risk Analysis
564(9)
15.3.1 BORA Methodology
565(3)
15.3.2 Bayesian Belief Network
568(1)
15.3.3 Risk_OMT Project
569(4)
15.4 Event Tree Analysis
573(22)
15.4.1 Basics of Event Tree
573(6)
15.4.2 Major Hazard Scenarios
579(1)
15.4.3 Initiating Event Frequency
579(4)
15.4.4 Nodes in Event Trees
583(1)
15.4.5 End Event Frequency
584(2)
15.4.6 Gas Leak in Process Area
586(3)
15.4.7 Blowout Event Tree
589(3)
15.4.8 Gas Leak from Riser/Pipeline
592(3)
15.5 Analysis of Barriers
595(3)
15.5.1 Cause Analysis
595(1)
15.5.2 Analysis of Dependencies Between Barriers
595(1)
15.5.3 Analysis of SIL
596(2)
15.6 Event Sequence Analysis
598(6)
15.6.1 Time Dependency
598(1)
15.6.2 Node Sequence in Event Tree Modelling
599(1)
15.6.3 Directional Modelling
599(1)
15.6.4 MTO
600(2)
15.6.5 Integration of Investigation and QRA
602(1)
15.6.6 Survey of the Extent of HOFs in QRA
602(2)
15.7 HC Leak Modelling
604(4)
15.7.1 Leak Statistics
606(1)
15.7.2 Calculation of Leak Rates from Experience Data
607(1)
15.7.3 Modelling of Leaks
608(1)
15.8 Ignition Probability Modelling
608(12)
15.8.1 Experience Data
609(1)
15.8.2 Why is it Difficult to Develop an Ignition Model?
610(1)
15.8.3 Cox Model
610(1)
15.8.4 Platform Specific Modelling
610(2)
15.8.5 Model Overview Time Dependent Modelling (TDIIM)
612(6)
15.8.6 Revised JIP Model
618(2)
15.9 Escalation Modelling
620(2)
15.9.1 Functionality
620(1)
15.9.2 Availability and Reliability
620(2)
15.9.3 Survivability
622(1)
15.9.4 Node Probability
622(1)
15.10 Escalation Analysis
622(13)
15.10.1 Modelling of Fire Escalation
623(2)
15.10.2 Modelling of Explosion Escalation
625(1)
15.10.3 Damage Limitation
626(1)
15.10.4 Response of Equipment to Fire and Explosion
627(3)
15.10.5 Tolerability Criteria for Personnel
630(1)
15.10.6 Impairment Criteria for Safety Functions
631(2)
15.10.7 Required Intactness Times for Safety Functions
633(2)
References
635(4)
16 Presentation of Risk Results from QRA Studies
639(20)
16.1 Requirements for Risk Presentation
639(3)
16.1.1 Regulatory Requirements
639(1)
16.1.2 NORSOK Requirements
639(2)
16.1.3 Risk Result Presentation and Risk Tolerance Criteria
641(1)
16.1.4 Proposed Presentation Format
641(1)
16.2 Presentation of Risk According to Application Area
642(1)
16.2.1 Life Cycle Phases
642(1)
16.2.2 ALARP Evaluations
642(1)
16.2.3 Risk Presentation for Different User Groups
642(1)
16.2.4 Framework for Risk Presentations
643(1)
16.3 Presentation of Overall Risk
643(3)
16.3.1 Main Results
643(1)
16.3.2 References for Risk Results
644(2)
16.4 Presentation of Risk Contributions
646(5)
16.4.1 FAR Contributions
646(2)
16.4.2 Contributions for Leak Frequencies
648(2)
16.4.3 Fire and Explosion Characteristics
650(1)
16.5 Presentation of Significant Improvements
651(1)
16.6 Presentation of Sensitivity Studies
652(3)
16.6.1 Risk Reducing Measures
652(3)
16.6.2 Risk Model Parameter Variations
655(1)
16.7 Evaluation of Uncertainty
655(2)
16.8 Presentation Format for Easy Understanding
657(1)
References
657(2)
17 Evaluation of Personnel Risk Levels
659(34)
17.1 Current Fatality Risk Levels
659(8)
17.1.1 FAR in Norwegian Offshore Operations
659(7)
17.1.2 FAR in Worldwide Offshore Operations
666(1)
17.2 Prediction of Future Fatalities: Norwegian Sector
667(6)
17.2.1 Important Assumptions and Evaluations
669(1)
17.2.2 Occupational Accidents
670(1)
17.2.3 Major Accidents on Installations
670(1)
17.2.4 Helicopter Transportation Accidents
671(1)
17.2.5 Summary of Predicted Fatalities
671(2)
17.3 Major Accident and Evacuation Frequencies
673(5)
17.3.1 Life Boat Evacuations on the NCS
673(2)
17.3.2 Experience Data from Freefall Lifeboat Tests
675(1)
17.3.3 Major Accident Frequency: Norwegian Sector
675(1)
17.3.4 Major Accidents Worldwide
676(1)
17.3.5 Major Accident Probability: Norwegian Sector
677(1)
17.4 Risk Tolerance Criteria
678(5)
17.4.1 Definition
678(1)
17.4.2 Philosophical Dilemma
678(1)
17.4.3 Norwegian Regulatory Requirements
679(1)
17.4.4 Risk Tolerance Criteria Requirements According to UK Regulations
680(2)
17.4.5 General Requirements
682(1)
17.5 Criteria Used for Personnel Risk by the Petroleum Industry
683(2)
17.5.1 Group Average Risk
684(1)
17.5.2 Risk Distribution
684(1)
17.5.3 Potential Loss of Life
685(1)
17.6 Use of Risk Tolerance Criteria in Personnel Risk Evaluation
685(2)
17.7 Risk Tolerance Criteria for Environmental Spill Risk
687(3)
17.7.1 Initial Approach
687(1)
17.7.2 Current Approach
688(2)
17.8 Risk of Material Damage/Production Delay
690(1)
17.9 Risk Tolerance Criteria for Temporary Phases
690(1)
References
691(2)
18 Environmental Risk Analysis
693(24)
18.1 Overview of Environmental Risk-Norway
693(7)
18.1.1 Acute Spill Statistics for the Offshore Industry
693(1)
18.1.2 RNNP Presentation of Environmental Risk in Norway
693(7)
18.2 Regulatory Requirements Etc.
700(2)
18.2.1 Norway
700(1)
18.2.2 OGP Oil Spill Risk Assessment Standard
701(1)
18.3 Modelling of Environmental Risk Analysis
702(2)
18.3.1 General Aspects Relating to Environmental Risk Analysis
702(1)
18.3.2 Event Trees
703(1)
18.4 Overview of the MIRA Approach
704(5)
18.4.1 General Principles
704(4)
18.4.2 Environmental Damage Distribution
708(1)
18.5 Presentation of MIRA Results
709(1)
18.6 Discussion of the Current Practice
710(3)
18.7 New Approach to Environmental Risk Analysis
713(1)
18.8 Need for Alternative Ways to Assess and Communicate Risk
714(2)
References
716(1)
19 Approach to Risk Based Design
717(28)
19.1 Overview
717(4)
19.1.1 About the Need for Risk Based Design
717(1)
19.1.2 Scope for Risk Based Design
718(1)
19.1.3 Challenges for Design
719(2)
19.2 Authority Regulations and Requirements
721(2)
19.2.1 Norwegian Installations
721(2)
19.2.2 UK Regulations
723(1)
19.3 Relationship with Risk Analysis
723(8)
19.3.1 Suitable Risk Analysis
724(2)
19.3.2 Use of Event Trees
726(2)
19.3.3 Use of Consequence Models
728(1)
19.3.4 Sensitivity to Changes in Active Safety Systems
729(2)
19.4 Approach to Risk Based Design of Topside Systems
731(4)
19.4.1 Basis for Approach
731(1)
19.4.2 Fundamentals of Proposed Approach
732(1)
19.4.3 Overview of Sensitivities
733(1)
19.4.4 What Should be the Target Protection Level
733(2)
19.5 Risk Based Design of Structural and Passive Safety Systems
735(1)
19.6 Practical Considerations
735(9)
19.6.1 Design Against Fire Loads
735(6)
19.6.2 Design Against Explosion Loads
741(1)
19.6.3 Design Against Collision Impacts
742(1)
19.6.4 Design Against Dropped Load Impact
743(1)
19.7 Safety Integrity Levels
744(1)
References
744(1)
20 Risk Based Emergency Response Planning
745(14)
20.1 Philosophy of Emergency Response
745(1)
20.2 Risk Based Emergency Response Times and Capacity
746(1)
20.3 Risk-Based Rescue Capacity After Evacuation
746(7)
20.3.1 Assumptions in QRA Studies
747(1)
20.3.2 Escape and Evacuation Robustness
748(2)
20.3.3 Principles for Probabilistic Pick-Up Calculations
750(1)
20.3.4 Probability Limit for Determining Dimensioning Scenarios
751(1)
20.3.5 Simplified Rules for Dimensioning Pick-Up Capacity
752(1)
20.4 Risk Based External Fire Fighting
753(1)
20.5 Rescue of Personnel in Helicopter Accidents
753(1)
20.6 External Medical Assistance to Injured and Ill Persons
754(1)
20.7 Area Based Emergency Response Planning: Results
754(1)
20.8 External Emergency Response Planning in Arctic Conditions
755(1)
References
756(3)
Part IV Risk Assessment and Monitoring in Operations Phase
21 Use of Risk Analysis During the Operations Phase
759(32)
21.1 Study Updating
759(2)
21.1.1 Overview
759(1)
21.1.2 Scope of Updating
760(1)
21.1.3 Frequency of Updating
760(1)
21.2 Risk Analysis of Operational Improvement
761(3)
21.2.1 Overview of BORA Case Studies
761(2)
21.2.2 Risk_OMT Case Studies
763(1)
21.2.3 HRA in QRA
763(1)
21.3 Risk Analysis in Operational Decision-Making
764(1)
21.4 Living Risk Analysis (Risk Monitors) in Operational Phase
765(1)
21.5 Use of Sensitivity Studies for Safety Systems Improvement
766(5)
21.5.1 Risk Management Objectives
767(1)
21.5.2 Case Study: Effect of Improved Blowdown
768(3)
21.6 Acceptable Internal Leak Rates of, Isolation Valves
771(2)
21.7 Case Study: Cost Benefit Analysis
773(10)
21.7.1 Field Data
773(1)
21.7.2 Definition of Risk Reducing Measure
774(1)
21.7.3 Risk Reducing Potentials
774(1)
21.7.4 Overall Approach to Comparison of Costs and Benefits
775(1)
21.7.5 Modelling of Benefits
776(2)
21.7.6 Modelling of Costs
778(1)
21.7.7 Results
778(2)
21.7.8 Sensitivity Study
780(1)
21.7.9 Discussion and Evaluation
781(1)
21.7.10 Conclusions
782(1)
21.8 Analysis of Maintenance Activities
783(1)
21.9 Investigation of Precursor Events
783(3)
21.9.1 Authority Requirements
783(1)
21.9.2 Authority Investigations in the Norwegian Petroleum Sector
784(1)
21.9.3 Company Investigation Practices
785(1)
21.9.4 Improvements in Investigation Practices Relating to Hydrocarbon Leaks
786(1)
21.10 Overall Analysis of Modifications
786(3)
21.10.1 Overview
786(1)
21.10.2 Modification Risk in a Life Cycle Perspective
787(2)
21.11 Tie-in of New Facilities
789(1)
References
790(1)
22 Use of Risk Indicators for Major Hazard Risk
791(50)
22.1 Background
791(4)
22.1.1 Historical Development
791(1)
22.1.2 The PFEER Approach to Risk Monitoring
792(2)
22.1.3 Objectives
794(1)
22.2 Need for Specific Indicators for Major Hazard Risk
795(5)
22.2.1 Indicator Concepts and Definitions
796(2)
22.2.2 Criteria for the Assessment of Major Hazard Risk Indicators
798(2)
22.3 Major Hazard Risk Indicators at a National Level
800(8)
22.3.1 Objectives, Scope of the Work and Stakeholders
800(1)
22.3.2 Scope of the Work
801(1)
22.3.3 Stakeholder Interest
801(1)
22.3.4 Basic Concepts and Overall Approach
802(1)
22.3.5 Major Hazard Risk
803(1)
22.3.6 Other Indicators
803(1)
22.3.7 Data Sources
804(2)
22.3.8 Precursor-Based Indicators for Major Hazard Risk
806(2)
22.4 Barrier Indicators for Major Hazard Risk in RNNP
808(4)
22.4.1 Barrier Concepts and Performance
808(1)
22.4.2 Barrier Indicators in RNNP
809(1)
22.4.3 Availability Data for Individual Barrier Elements
810(1)
22.4.4 Causal Factors
811(1)
22.5 Lessons Learned from RNNP
812(3)
22.5.1 Approach to Risk Projection
812(1)
22.5.2 Relevance of Precursor Indicators
813(1)
22.5.3 Suitability of Barrier Indicators
813(1)
22.5.4 Normalisation of Precursor-Based Indicators
814(1)
22.5.5 Ability to Distinguish Between Companies and Installations
814(1)
22.6 Precursor Events as Major Hazard Indicators
815(5)
22.6.1 Proposed Approach to the Selection of Individual Indicators
815(5)
22.6.2 Weights for Individual Indicators
820(1)
22.7 Barrier Indicators for Major Hazard Risk
820(5)
22.7.1 Suitability of Leading Barrier Indicators
820(4)
22.7.2 Suitability of Barrier Indicators
824(1)
22.7.3 Extended Suitability of Indicators
824(1)
22.8 Barrier Indicators at an Installations Level
825(7)
22.8.1 Technical Systems
825(3)
22.8.2 Indicators: HOFs
828(4)
22.9 Proposed Major Hazard Indicators for Companies
832(5)
22.9.1 Precursor Based Indicators
833(1)
22.9.2 Barrier Indicators
834(1)
22.9.3 Proposal: Barrier Indicators
834(3)
22.9.4 Proposal: Precursor-Based Indicators
837(1)
References
837(4)
23 Barrier Management for Major Hazard Risk
841
23.1 Background
841(1)
23.2 Regulatory Requirements
842(1)
23.3 Barrier Concepts
843(1)
23.4 Barrier Management in Life Cycle Phases
844(8)
23.4.1 Planning Phases
844(1)
23.4.2 Establishing Barrier Strategy
844(2)
23.4.3 Overview of Barrier Functions and Systems
846(1)
23.4.4 Structure of Barrier Functions
847(2)
23.4.5 Establishing PRs
849(3)
23.5 Barrier Management in Operations Phase
852(1)
23.6 Challenges for Implementation
852(2)
References
854(1)
Appendix A: Overview of Software 855(34)
Appendix B: Overview of Fatalities in Norwegian Sector 889(8)
Appendix C: Network Resources 897(4)
Glossary 901(10)
Index 911
9781597523790
List of Abbreviations xi
Transliteration Tables xv
Preface xvii
Part I: Biblical Anthropology: An Introduction To Biblical Anthropology
Chapter 1 Biblical Anthropology: The Terminology OF IT
7(32)
Old Testament Terminology
7(11)
Words for "man"
7(3)
Aspects of man
10(8)
New Testament Terminology
18(21)
Words for "man"
18(1)
Aspects of man
19(20)
Chapter 2 Biblical Anthropology: The Theology OF IT
39(8)
Synthesis: The Norm
39(2)
Separation: The Exception
41(6)
Part II: Biblical Hamartiology: An Introduction To Biblical Hamartiology
Chapter 3 Biblical Hamartiology: The Terminology Of It
47(36)
Old Testament Terminology
47(15)
New Testament Terminology
62(21)
Chapter 4 Biblical Hamartiology: The Theology Of It
83(16)
The Fall and Original Sin
84(9)
Total Depravity and Total Inability
93(6)
Part III: Biblical Soteriology: An Introduction To Biblical Soteriology
Preliminary Terminological Studies
99(8)
Preliminary Theological Syntheses
107(4)
Chapter 5 Biblical Soteriology
111(92)
The Divine Motive
111(7)
The Divine Grounds
118(25)
The Divine Plan and Process
143(60)
Chapter 6 Biblical Sanctification:
203(38)
The Basic Terminology of Sanctification
203(5)
A Basic Theology of Sanctification
208(1)
A Brief Survey of the Phases or Stages of Sanctification
209(2)
Some Specific Topics and/or Tensions Pertaining to Sanctification
211
Appendices
Appendix A An Excursus on the Inviolability of the "One-flesh" Relationship of Marriage
241(6)
Appendix B A Table of the Old Testament Terms for "Image" and "Likeness"
247(2)
Appendix C Traducianism or Creationism: What Model Aligns Best with the Biblical Data?
249(2)
Appendix D Dichotomy, Trichotomy, or What?
251(4)
Appendix E Some Selected Dirges on Sin in the Old Testament
255(4)
Appendix F Some Selected Dirges on Sin in the New Testament
259(8)
Appendix G A Brief Introduction to a Theological Discussion Pertaining to the Divine Decree(s)
267(4)
Appendix H Narrowing Specifications of God's Soteriological Provision
271(2)
Appendix I The Intricate Outworkings: A Biblical Ordo Salutis
273(2)
Appendix J Theologically Significant Occurrences of Members of the epsilonkappaλepsilonγomicronμαι (eklegomai) Word Group in the New Testament
275(2)
Appendix K The Indicative/Imperative Motif: Romans 6:1-14
277
Jan Erik Vinnem is Professor II of Risk Analysis at University of Stavanger, Norway. He is also a specialist advisor and CEO of Preventor AS, a consultancy to the Norwegian offshore industry. His professional career includes experience in the petroleum industry (Statoil and Total), and work as a private consultant (as the founder of Safetec Nordic AS and Preventor AS), in addition to his time in research and education. His research interests include decision support tools, risk management, risk acceptance, risk analysis methods, and risk assessments reflecting human and organizational factors
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām
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