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Open MIND: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century, 2-vol. set [Hardback]

Contributions by (Western University), Contributions by , Edited by (Monash University), Contributions by , Contributions by , Contributions by , Contributions by (Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics), Contributions by , Contributions by , Edited by (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)
  • Formāts: Hardback, 1864 pages, height x width: 276x216 mm
  • Sērija : The MIT Press
  • Izdošanas datums: 20-May-2016
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • ISBN-10: 0262034603
  • ISBN-13: 9780262034609
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  • Formāts: Hardback, 1864 pages, height x width: 276x216 mm
  • Sērija : The MIT Press
  • Izdošanas datums: 20-May-2016
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • ISBN-10: 0262034603
  • ISBN-13: 9780262034609
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
A unique interdisciplinary collection of papers and commentaries by leading researchers and rising scholars, representing the latest research on consciousness, mind, and brain.
Volume 1
Preface: About this Collection
1(4)
Thomas Metzinger
What Does It Mean to Have an Open Mind?
5(28)
Thomas Metzinger
Jennifer M. Windt
Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain: Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints
33(26)
Michael L. Anderson
Carving the Brain at Its Joints - A Commentary on Michael L. Anderson
47(8)
Axel Kohler
Functional Attributions and Functional Architecture - A Reply to Axel Kohler
55(4)
Michael L. Anderson
What a Theory of Knowledge-How Should Explain: A Framework for Practical Knowledge beyond Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism
59(36)
Andreas Bartels
Mark May
The Semantic Reading of Propositionality and Its Relation to Cognitive-Representational Explanations - A Commentary on Andreas Bartels & Mark May
79(12)
Ramiro Glauer
Preparing the Ground for an Empirical Theory of Knowing-How - A Reply to Ramiro Glauer
91(4)
Andreas Bartels
Mark May
Introspective Insecurity
95(30)
Tim Bayne
"I just knew that!": Intuitions as Scaffolded or Freestanding Judgements - A Commentary on Tim Bayne
113(8)
Maximilian H. Engel
Introspection and Intuition - A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel
121(4)
Tim Bayne
Meaning, Context, and Background
125(36)
Christian Beyer
Grasping Meaning - A Commentary on Christian Beyer
143(10)
Anita Pacholik-Zuromska
Self-Identification, Intersubjectivity, and the Background of Intentionality - A Reply to Anita Pacholik-Zuromska
153(8)
Christian Beyer
The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision
161(76)
Ned Block
Phenomenal Precision and Some Possible Pitfalls - A Commentary on Ned Block
213(14)
Sascha Benjamin Fink
Solely Generic Phenomenology - A Reply to Sascha B. Fink
227(10)
Ned Block
Rules: The Basis of Morality...?
237(26)
Paul M. Churchland
Applied Metascience of Neuroethics - A Commentary on Paul M. Churchland
251(10)
Hannes Boelsen
A Skeptical Note on Bibliometrics - A Reply to Hannes Boelsen
261(2)
Paul M. Churchland
Embodied Prediction
263(42)
Andy Clark
Extending the Explanandum for Predictive Processing - A Commentary on Andy Clark
285(12)
Michael Madary
Predicting Peace: The End of the Representation Wars - A Reply to Michael Madary
297(8)
Andy Clark
Levels
305(44)
Carl F. Craver
Mechanistic Emergence: Different Properties, Different Levels, Same Thing! - A Commentary on Carl F. Craver
331(12)
Denis C. Martin
Mechanisms and Emergence - A Reply to Denis C. Martin
343(6)
Carl F. Craver
Mental States as Emergent Properties: From Walking to Consciousness
349(52)
Holk Cruse
Malte Schilling
The "Bottom-Up" Approach to Mental Life - A Commentary on Hoik Cruse & Malte Schilling
387(10)
Aaron Gutknecht
The Bottom-Up Approach: Benefits and Limits - A Reply to Aaron Gutknecht
397(4)
Holk Cruse
Malte Schilling
Why and How Does Consciousness Seem the Way It Seems?
401(30)
Daniel C. Dennett
Qualia Explained Away - A Commentary on Daniel Dennett
413(12)
David H. Bafiler
How Our Belief in Qualia Evolved, and Why We Care So Much - A Reply to David H. Bafiler
425(6)
Daniel C. Dennett
The Heterogeneity of Experiential Imagination
431(36)
Jerome Dokic
Margherita Arcangeli
Imagination and Experience - A Commentary on Jerome Dokic and Margherita Arcangeli
451(10)
Anne-Sophie Bruggen
The Importance of Being Neutral: More on the Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Imagination - A Reply to Anne-Sophie Briiggen
461(6)
Jerome Dokic
Margherita Arcangeli
On the Eve of Artificial Minds
467(30)
Chris Eliasmith
Future Games - A Commentary on Chris Eliasmith
485(8)
Daniela Hill
Mind Games - A Reply to Daniela Hill
493(4)
Chris Eliasmith
Can We Be Epigenetically Proactive?
497(40)
Kathinka Evers
Should We Be Epigenetically Proactive? - A Commentary on Kathinka Evers
519(14)
Stephan Schleim
Understanding Epigenetic Proaction - A Reply to Stephan Schleim
533(4)
Kathinka Evers
The Paradigmatic Body: Embodied Simulation, Intersubjectivity, the Bodily Self, and Language
537(42)
Vittorio Gallese
Valentina Cuccio
Multisensory Spatial Mechanisms of the Bodily Self and Social Cognition - A Commentary on Vittorio Gallese and Valentina Cuccio
559(14)
Christian Pfeiffer
Embodied Simulation: A Paradigm for the Constitution of Self and Others - A Reply to Christian Pfeiffer
573(6)
Vittorio Gallese
Valentina Cuccio
All the Self We Need
579(38)
Philip Gerrans
Memory for Prediction Error Minimization: From Depersonalization to the Delusion of Non-Existence - A Commentary on Philip Gerrans
599(14)
Ying-Tung Lin
Metamisery and Bodily Inexistence - A Reply to Ying-Tung Lin
613(4)
Philip Gerrans
Visual Adaptation to a Remapped Spectrum: Lessons for Enactive Theories of Color Perception and Constancy, the Effect of Color on Aesthetic Judgments, and the Memory Color Effect
617(38)
Rick Grush
Liberty Jaswal
Justin Knoepfler
Amanda Brovold
What Can Sensorimotor Enactivism Learn from Studies on Phenomenal Adaptation in Atypical Perceptual Conditions? - A Commentary on Rick Grush and Colleagues
633(18)
Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz
Phenomenology, Methodology, and Advancing the Debate - A Reply to Aleksandra Mroczko-Wqsowicz
651(4)
Rick Grush
An Information-Based Approach to Consciousness: Mental State Decoding
655(34)
John-Dylan Haynes
What's up with Prefrontal Cortex? - A Commentary on John-Dylan Haynes
675(8)
Caspar M. Schwiedrzik
Can Synchronization Explain Representational Content? - A Reply to Caspar M. Schwiedrzik
683(6)
John-Dylan Haynes
Beyond Illusions: On the Limitations of Perceiving Relational Properties
689(40)
Helko Hecht
The Illusion of the Given and Its Role in Vision Research - A Commentary on Heiko Hecht
715(10)
Axel Kohler
Manifest Illusions - A Reply to Axel Kohler
725(4)
Helko Hecht
The Neural Organ Explains the Mind
729(38)
Jakob Hohwy
From Explanatory Ambition to Explanatory Power - A Commentary on Jakob Hohwy
751(10)
Dominic L. Harkness
The Diversity of Bayesian Explanation - A Reply to Dominic L. Harkness
761(6)
Jakob Hohwy
Millikan's Teleosemantics and Communicative Agency
767(40)
Pierre Jacob
Communicative Agency and Ad Hominem Arguments in Social Epistemology - A Commentary on Pierre Jacob
789(14)
Marius F. Jung
Assessing a Speaker's Reliability Falls Short of Providing an Argument - A Reply to Marius F. Jung
803(4)
Pierre Jacob
Wild Systems Theory as a 21st Century Coherence Framework for Cognitive Science
807(40)
J. Scott Jordan
Brian Day
Thickening Descriptions with Views from Pragmatism and Anthropology - A Commentary on Scott Jordan and Brian Day
829(12)
Saskia K. Nagel
After Naturalism: Wild Systems Theory and the Turn to Holism - A Reply to Saskia K. Nagel
841(6)
J. Scott Jordan
Brian Day
Index to Volumes 1 and 2
Volume 2
The Crack of Dawn: Perceptual Functions and Neural Mechanisms that Mark the Transition from Unconscious Processing to Conscious Vision
847(52)
Victor Lamme
Consciousness as Inference in Time - A Commentary on Victor Lamme
881(14)
Lucia Melloni
Predictive Coding Is Unconscious, so That Consciousness Happens Now - A Reply to Lucia Melloni
895(4)
Victor Lamme
Vestibular Contributions to the Sense of Body, Self, and Others
899(58)
Bigna Lenggenhager
Christophe Lopez
Perspectival Structure and Vestibular Processing - A Commentary on Bigna Lenggenhager & Christophe Lopez
937(10)
Adrian Alsmith
Vestibular Sense and Perspectival Experience - A Reply to Adrian Alsmith
947(10)
Bigna Lenggenhager
Christophe Lopez
Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership
957(40)
Caleb Liang
Are There Counterexamples to the Immunity Principle? Some Restrictions and Clarifications - A Commentary on Caleb Liang
977(14)
Oliver Haug
Marius F. Jung
Can Experiential Ownership Violate the Immunity Principle? - A Reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung
991(6)
Caleb Liang
Mathematical Cognition: A Case of Enculturation
997(52)
Richard Menary
Enriching the Notion of Enculturation: Cognitive Integration, Predictive Processing, and the Case of Reading Acquisition - A Commentary on Richard Menary
1017(24)
Regina E. Fabry
What? Now. Predictive Coding and Enculturation - A Reply to Regina E. Fabry
1041(8)
Richard Menary
Understanding Others: The Person Model Theory
1049(54)
Albert Newen
Multiplicity Needs Coherence - Towards a Unifying Framework for Social Understanding - A Commentary on Albert Newen
1077(18)
Lisa Quadt
A Multiplicity View for Social Cognition: Defending a Coherent Framework - A Reply to Lisa Quadt
1095(8)
Albert Newen
Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence
1103(34)
Alva Noe
The Fragile Nature of the Social Mind - A Commentary on Alva Noe
1119(12)
Miriam Kyselo
Beyond Agency - A Reply to Miriam Kyselo
1131(6)
Alva Noe
How Does Mind Matter?: Solving the Content Causation Problem
1137(28)
Gerard O'Brien
Does Resemblance Really Matter? - A Commentary on Gerard O'Brien
1151(10)
Anne-Kathrin Koch
Rehabilitating Resemblance Redux - A Reply to Anne-Kathrin Koch
1161(4)
Gerard O'Brien
Conscious Intentions: The Social Creation Myth
1165(40)
Elisabeth Pacherie
Conscious Intentions: Do We Need a Creation Myth? - A Commentary on Elisabeth Pacherie
1185(12)
Andrea R. Drefung
The Causal Role(s) of Intentions - A Reply to Andrea Drefiing
1197(8)
Elisabeth Pacherie
Naturalizing Metaethics
1205(44)
Jesse Prinz
Conceptualizing Metaethics - A Commentary on Prinz
1233(10)
Yann Wilhelm
Should Metaethical Naturalists Abandon De Dicto Internalism and Cognitivism? - A Reply to Yann Wilhelm
1243(6)
Jesse Prinz
The Representational Structure of Feelings
1249(46)
Joelle Proust
The Extension of the Indicator-Function of Feelings - A Commentary on Joelle Proust
1275(12)
Iulua Pliushch
Feelings as Evaluative Indicators - A Reply to Iulua Pliushch
1287(8)
Joelle Proust
The Avatars in the Machine: Dreaming as a Simulation of Social Reality
1295(54)
Antti Revonsuo
Jarno Tuominen
Katja Valli
The Multifunctionality of Dreaming and the Oblivious Avatar - A Commentary on Revonsuo & Colleagues
1323(18)
Martin Dresler
The Simulation Theories of Dreaming: How to Make Theoretical Progress in Dream Science - A Reply to Martin Dresler
1341(8)
Antti Revonsuo
Jarno Tuominen
Katja Valli
Davidson on Believers: Can Non-Linguistic Creatures Have Propositional Attitudes?
1349(32)
Adina Roskies
Crediting Animals with the Ability to Think: On the Role of Language in Cognition - A Commentary on Adina Roskies
1365(10)
Ulrike Pompe-Alama
Thought, Language, and Inner Speech - A Reply to Ulrike Pompe-Alama
1375(6)
Adina Roskies
Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide: Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience
1381(70)
Jonathan Schooler
Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler
1421(22)
Verena Gottschling
Stepping Back and Adding Perspective - A Reply to Verena Gottschling
1443(8)
Jonathan Schooler
The Cybernetic Bayesian Brain: From Interoceptive Inference to Sensorimotor Contingencies
1451(52)
Anil K. Seth
Perceptual Presence in the Kuhnian-Popperian Bayesian Brain - A Commentary on Anil K. Seth
1475(20)
Wanja Wiese
Inference to the Best Prediction - A Reply to Wanja Wiese
1495(8)
Anil K. Seth
The Ongoing Search for the Neuronal Correlate of Consciousness
1503(48)
Wolf Singer
It's Not Just About the Contents: Searching for a Neural Correlate of a State of Consciousness - A Commentary on Wolf Singer
1533(12)
Valdas Noreika
State or Content of Consciousness? - A Reply to Valdas Noreika
1545(6)
Wolf Singer
Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness: The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to Cognitive Science
1551(58)
Evan Thompson
Just in Time--Dreamless Sleep Experience as Pure Subjective Temporality--A Commentary on Evan Thompson
1571(34)
Jennifer M. Windt
Steps Toward a Neurophenomenology of Consciousness in Sleep - A Reply to Jennifer M. Windt
1605(4)
Evan Thompson
What is the State-of-the-Art on Lucid Dreaming?: Recent Advances and Questions for Future Research
1609(40)
Ursula Voss
Allan Hobson
Insight: What Is It, Exactly? - A Commentary on Ursula Voss and Allan Hobson
1629(14)
Lana Kuhle
Reflections on Insight - A Reply to Lana Kuhle
1643(6)
Ursula Voss
Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance
1649
Kenneth Williford
Explaining Subjective Character: Representation, Reflexivity, or Integration? - A Commentary on Kenneth Williford
1677(12)
Tobias Schlicht
Individuation, Integration, and the Phenomenological Subject - A Reply to Tobias Schlicht
1689
Kenneth Williford
Index to Volumes 1 and 2