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E-grāmata: Open World, Hackbacks and Global Justice

  • Formāts: EPUB+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 13-Jan-2023
  • Izdevniecība: Palgrave Macmillan
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9789811981326
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  • Formāts: EPUB+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 13-Jan-2023
  • Izdevniecība: Palgrave Macmillan
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9789811981326

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This book explores the current impasse that global regulators face in the digital sphere. Computer technology has advanced human civilization tenfold, but the freedom to interact with others in cyberspace has made individuals, discrete communities, organizations and governments more vulnerable to abuse.  In consequence, political decision-makers are seriously considering granting limited legal immunity to victims who decide to ‘hack- back.’ Many victims frustrated by the slow pace of law enforcement in cyberspace have chosen to ‘take the law into their own hands,’ retaliating against those who have stolen valuable data and damaged network operations. Political deliberations about limited immunity for hackbacks usually ignore global justice and moral justifications for ‘active defense’ policies. Typically, cyber security policies balance deterrence against two different understandings of morality and the ‘good life’ : fairness or welfare.  This book proposes a third moral rationale for cyber security policies : capability theory, developed principally by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Properly formulated, a capability-based defense of retaliatory hackbacks can minimize attribution and cyber-escalation risks, deter bad behavior by casual computer users, disingenuous security experts, big tech companies, criminals and rogue governments, and satisfy calls for more retributive and distributive justice in the ‘open world’. This book will appeal to legal theorists, political philosophers, social activists, investors, international relations scholars and businesspeople in the tech community.

1 Introduction
1(14)
References
10(5)
Part I Open World Skepticism and Attainable Ends
2 The Open World Ethos
15(22)
1 Structure of the Open World
15(1)
2 Open World Governance
16(12)
2.1 The Global Commons
16(3)
2.2 Access to Educational Facilities and Research
19(1)
2.3 Free Trade
20(2)
2.4 Internet Access and Cyber Sovereignty
22(4)
2.5 International Migration
26(2)
3 Threshold Considerations
28(9)
References
30(7)
3 Skepticism, Self-Defense/Help and Global Justice
37(46)
1 Open World Skepticism and Self-Defense
38(7)
1.1 Ancient and Classical Skepticism
38(2)
1.2 Modern and Contemporary Skepticism
40(2)
1.3 Intuitions, Observations and Open World Skepticism
42(3)
2 justice v. Utility
45(15)
2.1 Deontological justice
46(6)
2.2 The Utilitarian Legacy
52(8)
3 Self-Defense vs. Self-Help
60(14)
3.1 Self-Defense
60(9)
3.2 Self-Help
69(3)
3.3 Rights-Based Defenses of Self-Defense and Self-Help
72(1)
3.4 Utilitarian Defenses of Self-Defense
73(1)
4 Force and Meaningful Freedom
74(9)
References
77(6)
4 Capabilities, Entitlements and VRN
83(38)
1 Capabilities Theory
83(10)
1.1 Needs and Functionings
83(3)
1.2 Defining Tastes and Preferences
86(2)
1.3 Responsibility
88(2)
1.4 Equalizing Opportunities
90(3)
2 The Limits of Sen and Nussbaum
93(14)
2.1 Lists, Temporality and Choice
93(2)
2.2 The Means-Ends Problem
95(2)
2.3 The Overlap Problem
97(10)
3 Reconceptualizing the Melamed/Calabresi Matrix
107(9)
3.1 Entitlements
108(3)
3.2 Property Rules, Liability Rules and Other Rules
111(1)
3.3 Efficiency, Distributional Concerns and `Other Justice Reasons'
112(2)
3.4 Rules and Zones
114(2)
4 VRN: Synthesis
116(5)
References
117(4)
5 Aggravating Factors, Freedom and Retaliation
121(34)
1 Constraints on Self-Help/Defense
122(13)
2.2 Necessity
122(4)
1.2 Proportionality
126(7)
1.3 Due Diligence, Attribution and Distinction
133(2)
2 Enhanced Penalties and Retaliation Costs
135(11)
2.1 Neutralization Strategies
136(3)
2.2 Repeat Offenders
139(3)
2.3 Rule of Law Violations Caused by Political Failure
142(2)
2.4 Critical Infrastructure or Public Safety
144(2)
3 The Logic of Deterrence and Non-Escalation
146(9)
References
148(7)
Part II Domestic and International Hack-Backs
6 Surveillance and Disruption
155(56)
1 Global Justice in Cyberspace
155(9)
1.1 Familiar Guideposts
155(2)
1.2 Digital Capabilities
157(3)
1.3 The Political Tilt of Capability Theory and VRN
160(4)
2 Empirical and Legal Overview
164(11)
2.1 The Mechanics of Cyber Attacks and Hackbacks
164(4)
2.2 Domestic Statutory Response
168(2)
2.3 International Standards
170(5)
3 Cyber-Espionage, Squatting and Surveillance
175(15)
3.1 Cyber-Enabled Trade Secret Theft
176(3)
3.2 Provocation, Capability and the Presumptive Rule
179(1)
3.3 Opportunities Available to Victims of IP Theft
180(2)
3.4 The Continuing Appeal of Retaliatory Hackbacks in Trademark Secret Law
182(3)
3.5 The Efficiency of IP Theft Hackbacks
185(5)
4 Ransomware, Botnets and Disruption
190(21)
4.1 Preventing Disruptions
190(3)
4.2 The Victim's Revenge
193(2)
4.3 Capability Challenges in Ransomware Cases
195(2)
4.4 The Classic Zone 1 Scenario
197(3)
4.5 The Efficiency of Anti-Ransomware Hackbacks
200(3)
References
203(8)
7 Exceeding Authorized Access Under the CFAA
211(52)
1 A Perplexing Asymmetry
211(2)
2 Competing Formulations of Access Under the CFAA
213(4)
3 `Broadening'v. `Narrowing' the CFAA
217(11)
3.1 Insiders and Outsiders
218(2)
3.2 Purpose and Motive
220(3)
3.3 Vagueness, Notice and Lenity
223(1)
3.4 The `Public-Ness' of Data
224(4)
4 Intermediate Platforms and Bad Faith Determinations
228(6)
4.1 Prosecutorial Discretion
228(2)
4.2 Post-Citrin Agency Formulations
230(3)
4.3 Data Protection Imperatives
233(1)
5 The Van Buren Decision
234(3)
6 Department of Justice Guidelines After Van Buren
237(5)
7 Weak `Zone 2' Hackbacks
242(2)
8 The Security Research Debate
244(6)
8.1 The Perils of Bad Faith Research
244(3)
8.2 The Prevalence of Good Faith Research
247(1)
8.3 Research on a Spectrum
248(2)
9 Strong `Zone 2' Hackbacks
250(2)
10 The Efficiency of Weak and Strong Zone 2 Hackbacks
252(11)
References
258(5)
8 Amplifying American Power in Cyberspace
263(20)
1 The International Order
263(4)
1.1 Gradual Decline of the Liberal International Order
263(1)
1.2 Realism and Its Critics
264(2)
1.3 Primacy vs. Restraint
266(1)
2 Strategic Responses to Cyber Infiltrations
267(16)
2.1 The Authoritarian Advantage in Cyberspace
267(5)
2.2 Democratic Guarantees, Human Rights and the Open World
272(3)
2.3 Capabilities and Strategic Discourse
275(2)
2.4 State Power and VRN
277(3)
References
280(3)
9 Capabilities, Populism and Presidential Leadership
283(38)
1 Morality and The Critique of Neoliberalism
283(5)
2 Cyberspace Challenges to Presidential Leadership
288(2)
3 Economic Espionage vs. Armed Conflict
290(3)
4 Trump's `Right-Populism'
293(8)
4.1 America-First' Realism
293(3)
4.2 Cyber-Brinkmanship
296(3)
4.3 Overmatch and Under-Target
299(2)
5 Biden's New Internationalism
301(14)
5.1 Realism, Progressive Idealism and Neo-Populism
301(2)
5.2 Constraints and Cyberspace
303(2)
5.3 Permissibility Thresholds
305(3)
5.4 Acknowledgement, Vulnerability and Credibility
308(3)
References
311(4)
10 Conclusion
315(6)
References
319(2)
References 321(30)
Index 351
A. Jean Thomas is a lawyer and former programmer who has taught at two law schools. She has a BA from Swarthmore College, JD from University of Connecticut Law School and LL.M and S.J.D. from Harvard Law School.