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Origins of Fairness: How Evolution Explains Our Moral Nature [Hardback]

(Research Scientist, Ecole Normale Supirieure)
  • Formāts: Hardback, 270 pages, height x width x depth: 236x157x31 mm, weight: 499 g
  • Sērija : Foundations of Human Interaction
  • Izdošanas datums: 14-Apr-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0190210222
  • ISBN-13: 9780190210229
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  • Formāts: Hardback, 270 pages, height x width x depth: 236x157x31 mm, weight: 499 g
  • Sērija : Foundations of Human Interaction
  • Izdošanas datums: 14-Apr-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0190210222
  • ISBN-13: 9780190210229
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
In order to describe the logic of morality, "contractualist" philosophers have studied how individuals behave when they choose to follow their moral intuitions. These individuals, contractualists note, often act as if they have bargained and thus reached an agreement with others about how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mutual cooperation. Using this observation, such philosophers argue that the purpose of morality is to maximize the benefits of human interaction. The resulting "contract" analogy is both insightful and puzzling. On one hand, it captures the pattern of moral intuitions, thus answering questions about human cooperation: why do humans cooperate? Why should the distribution of benefits be proportionate to each person's contribution? Why should the punishment be proportionate to the crime? Why should the rights be proportionate to the duties? On the other hand, the analogy provides a mere as-if explanation for human cooperation, saying that cooperation is "as if" people have passed a contract-but since they didn't, why should it be so?
To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing contract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the missing "designer" of life-forms, a puzzle that Darwin's theory of natural selection essentially resolved. Evolutionary and contractualist theory originally intersected at the work of philosophers John Rawls and David Gauthier, who argued that moral judgments are based on a sense of fairness that has been naturally selected.
In this book, Nicolas Baumard further explores the theory that morality was originally an adaptation to the biological market of cooperation, an arena in which individuals competed to be selected for cooperative interactions. In this environment, Baumard suggests, the best strategy was to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation in a fair way, so that those who offered less than others were left out of cooperation while those who offered more were exploited by their partners. It is with this evolutionary approach that Baumard ultimately accounts for the specific structure of human morality.

Recenzijas

This book offers a compelling account of the origins of morality. It makes an important contribution to the growing body of literature in the field of evolutionary ethics ... and will be of interest to anyone in the fields of evolutionary ethics and contractualism, as well as to students of ethics broadly construed. * Jeff O'Connell, The Quarterly Review of Biology. * readers interested in contractualist normative theory might benefit from his exposition of the theory in the light of evolutionary theory. Baumard writes without using many technicalities and so the book should be accessible for the non-specialist reader, too. * Michael Klenk, Metapsychology Online Reviews *

Foreword by the Series Editor ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction: Reconciling Morality with the Natural Sciences 1(16)
Naturalism: The Moral Sense
2(2)
Contractualism: The Social Contract
4(3)
A Naturalistic and Contractualist Theory of Morality
7(10)
PART ONE The Moral Sense
1 A Mental Organ
17(29)
1.1 An Autonomous Disposition
19(3)
1.1.1 Moral Judgments and Moral Intuitions
19(2)
1.1.2 Moral Intuitions and Moral Ideas
21(1)
1.2 A Domain-Specific Disposition
22(4)
1.2.1 Morality, a Passion among Others
22(2)
1.2.2 The Sense of Honor
24(2)
1.3 A Universal Disposition
26(6)
1.3.1 Variability as a Product of the Diversity of Situations and Beliefs
27(1)
1.3.2 Observed Diversity and Real Diversity
28(4)
1.4 An Innate Disposition
32(4)
1.5 Nonintuitive Moral Judgments
36(10)
2 Functional Disposition
46(15)
2.1 The Competing Passions
46(3)
2.2 The Moral Sense and Nonnaturalistic Theories
49(4)
2.2.1 The Domain Specificity of Moral Judgments
50(2)
2.2.2 The Innateness of Moral Judgments
52(1)
2.3 The Moral Sense as Adaptation
53(8)
2.3.1 Functionality and Modularity
53(2)
2.3.2 Efficient Causes and Final Causes
55(6)
PART TWO Morality as Fairness
3 From Cooperation to Morality
61(27)
3.1 A Naturalistic Contractualism
61(1)
3.2 From the Cooperation Market to the Sense of Fairness
61(11)
3.2.1 The Cooperation Market
61(2)
3.2.2 Cooperation Market Theory versus Other Mutualistic Theories
63(2)
3.2.3 Manipulation on the Cooperation Market
65(4)
3.2.4 The Cooperation Market in the Ancestral Environment
69(3)
3.3 The Sense of Fairness
72(16)
3.3.1 The Example of Reciprocity and Justice
72(2)
3.3.2 Moral Rectitude, or Fairness in General
74(3)
3.3.3 Fairness and Power Relationships
77(2)
3.3.4 Framing Effects
79(9)
4 Moral Principles and the Sense of Fairness
88(17)
4.1 Getting Past Principles
89(3)
4.2 The Mutualistic Logic of Moral Dilemmas
92(9)
4.2.1 Actions and Omissions
93(1)
4.2.2 The Trolley Dilemma
94(1)
4.2.3 A Mutualistic Analysis of the Trolley Problem
95(5)
4.2.4 Utilitarian Interpretations of the Trolley Problem
100(1)
4.3 Principles and Justice
101(4)
5 A Cognitive Approach to the Moral Sense
105(30)
5.1 A Contract without Negotiations: Morality and Theory of Mind
105(6)
5.1.1 The Importance of Others: Mental States versus Interests
106(1)
5.1.2 Consent Has No Moral Value
107(2)
5.1.3 A Mutualistic Approach to Responsibility
109(2)
5.2 The Evaluation of Individual Interests
111(11)
5.2.1 Intuitive Axiology and the Moral Sense
111(4)
5.2.2 Victimless Crimes
115(2)
5.2.3 Roles and Statuses
117(2)
5.2.4 Moral Differences between the Sexes
119(3)
5.3 The Limits of the Moral Community
122(3)
5.3.1 The Proper and Actual Domains of the Moral Sense
122(1)
5.3.2 The Variability of the Actual Domain
123(2)
5.4 Disposition and Microdispositions
125(10)
PART THREE Morality as Sacrifice
6 Mutualistic Morality and Utilitarian Morality
135(29)
6.1 Utilitarian Morality and Group Selection
136(3)
6.2 Utilitarian Societies?
139(8)
6.2.1 Observed Utilitarianism and Real Utilitarianism
140(2)
6.2.2 Collectivism and Utilitarianism
142(3)
6.2.3 Social Institutions and Moral Interactions
145(2)
6.3 Utilitarian Judgments?
147(8)
6.3.1 Distributive Justice
149(2)
6.3.2 Retributive Justice
151(1)
6.3.3 Supererogatory Actions
152(2)
6.3.4 Moral Dilemmas
154(1)
6.4 Economic Games
155(9)
6.4.1 The Ecological Validity of Economic Games
156(1)
6.4.2 Economic Games: Moral Situations
157(2)
6.4.3 A Mutualistic Analysis of Economic Games
159(5)
7 Punishment or Just Deserts?
164(13)
7.1 A Marginal Practice in Nonstate Societies
164(2)
7.2 Revenge, Ostracism, and Self-Defense: Punishments?
166(3)
7.3 A Simple Question of Duty
169(2)
7.3.1 A Mutualistic Analysis of Apparently Punitive Actions
169(1)
7.3.2 Punishment in Economic Games
170(1)
7.4 Retributive Justice and Penal Systems
171(6)
PART FOUR Morality as Excellence
8 Mutualistic Morality and Virtue Morality
177(16)
8.1 Sympathy
178(5)
8.1.1 The Three Faces of Adam Smith
178(3)
8.1.2 Of Sympathy and the Other Social Sentiments
181(2)
8.2 The Parental Instinct
183(1)
8.3 Disgust
184(4)
8.4 The Virtues
188(5)
9 On the "State of Nature"
193(19)
9.1 Morality in Animals
195(6)
9.1.1 Morality: One Disposition among Many
195(2)
9.1.2 Primate Morality: Reality or Anthropomorphism?
197(4)
9.2 Morality and Social Cognition
201(11)
9.2.1 Understanding Others to Communicate
203(3)
9.2.2 Communicating to Cooperate
206(6)
Conclusion
212(15)
The Steps in the Argument
212(5)
The Scientific Implications of a Mutualistic Theory
217(5)
The Practical Implications of Mutualistic Theory
222(5)
References 227(26)
Index 253
Nicolas Baumard is Research Scholar in the Department of Cognitive Sciences at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris.