Foreword |
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v | |
Acknowledgements |
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vii | |
Contributors |
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xvii | |
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List of Tables and Figures |
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xix | |
Introduction |
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1 | (6) |
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1 Privilege, Exclusive Cognisance and the Law |
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7 | (30) |
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7 | (2) |
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8 | (1) |
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B The source of Privilege: Constitutional Function or Necessary Protection? |
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8 | (1) |
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II Privilege in a Changing Constitution |
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9 | (1) |
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III The conflict Over Privilege: Who Decides? |
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10 | (3) |
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13 | (1) |
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A Privilege and Representation |
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13 | (1) |
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14 | (3) |
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A Legislation and Parliament |
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15 | (1) |
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B Exclusive Cognisance, Civil Liability and Criminal Law |
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16 | (1) |
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17 | (2) |
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A The Courts and Freedom of Speech: Sub Judice and Non-Liability |
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18 | (1) |
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VII Wider Implications of Article 9 |
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19 | (2) |
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A Individual Waiver in Defamation Proceedings |
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19 | (1) |
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20 | (1) |
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VIII Use of Parliamentary Material by the Courts |
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21 | (4) |
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A Previous Restrictions on the Use of Parliamentary Material in the Courts |
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22 | (1) |
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B Government Accountability - Accountability to Whom |
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22 | (3) |
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IX Parliamentary Reactions to Court Uses of Proceedings |
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25 | (2) |
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25 | (1) |
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26 | (1) |
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27 | (2) |
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XI Parliament, the Courts and the Prerogative |
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29 | (4) |
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29 | (1) |
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B Prorogation: Miller (No 2) |
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30 | (3) |
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33 | (4) |
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2 The Law and the Conduct of Members of Parliament |
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37 | (20) |
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37 | (2) |
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II Declaration and Registration of Members' Interests |
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39 | (2) |
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III Conduct in the House of Commons |
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41 | (6) |
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A The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Code of Conduct |
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41 | (1) |
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B The Independent Complaints and Grievance Scheme |
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42 | (3) |
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45 | (2) |
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IV Conduct in the House of Lords |
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47 | (4) |
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A The Code of Conduct and Lords Commissioner for Standards |
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47 | (1) |
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48 | (1) |
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C Lord Lester of Heme Hill |
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49 | (2) |
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51 | (2) |
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51 | (1) |
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51 | (1) |
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52 | (1) |
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53 | (1) |
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54 | (1) |
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54 | (3) |
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57 | (30) |
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57 | (1) |
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58 | (5) |
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A Administrative Autonomy and its Limits, 1790-1970 |
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58 | (5) |
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III The House of Commons (Administration) Act 1978 |
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63 | (5) |
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IV Key Developments in Both Houses Since 1979 |
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68 | (1) |
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69 | (10) |
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69 | (2) |
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71 | (5) |
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76 | (3) |
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VI The Cost of Parliament |
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79 | (3) |
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VII Parliamentarians and the Challenges of Scrutinising Parliament's Budget |
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82 | (2) |
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84 | (3) |
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4 Restoration and Renewal of the Palace of Westminster: A Parliamentary Governance Challenge |
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87 | (26) |
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87 | (2) |
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II The Governance of Parliamentary Building Works |
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89 | (5) |
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A Case Study 1: Portcullis House |
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92 | (2) |
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III Restoration and Renewal |
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94 | (4) |
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A Case Study 2: Elizabeth Tower |
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97 | (1) |
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98 | (5) |
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A Pre-legislative Scrutiny and the Passage of the Bill |
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100 | (2) |
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102 | (1) |
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V The Impact of the Legislation on Parliamentary Governance |
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103 | (5) |
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103 | (2) |
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105 | (1) |
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C Speaking for the Palace of Westminster |
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106 | (2) |
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108 | (5) |
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Part 2 HOLDING THE GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT |
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5 Parliament and Legislative Scrutiny: Lessons from Brexit and COVID-19 |
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113 | (20) |
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113 | (2) |
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II Parliament as Legislator |
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115 | (1) |
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IIII The Importance of Legislative Scrutiny on the Floor of the House |
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115 | (2) |
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IV Working with Time Limitations |
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117 | (3) |
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V Short-Term Cross Party Legislative Consensus |
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120 | (3) |
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VI The Need for More Effective Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation |
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123 | (3) |
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VII Questions for the Future of Legislative Scrutiny |
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126 | (5) |
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126 | (4) |
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B The Public Image of Scrutiny in Parliament |
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130 | (1) |
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131 | (2) |
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6 Select Committees: Powers and Functions |
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133 | (26) |
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133 | (1) |
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133 | (3) |
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III Developments in the Late 20th Century |
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136 | (2) |
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IV The Main Types of Committee |
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138 | (4) |
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138 | (2) |
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B Investigative Committees |
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140 | (1) |
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140 | (1) |
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D Domestic and Statutory Committees |
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141 | (1) |
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V The Functions of Committees |
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142 | (4) |
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142 | (1) |
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B Holding the Government to Account |
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143 | (2) |
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C Promoting Public and Parliamentary Debate |
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145 | (1) |
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D Limitations to Committee Work: The Sub Judice Rule |
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145 | (1) |
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146 | (5) |
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A Power to Appoint Sub-Committees |
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146 | (1) |
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147 | (1) |
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C Power to Send for Persons, Papers and Records |
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147 | (2) |
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D Power to Take and Publish Evidence |
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149 | (1) |
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149 | (1) |
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F Power to Appoint Specialist Advisers |
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150 | (1) |
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G Powers of Joint Committees |
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150 | (1) |
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151 | (7) |
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158 | (1) |
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7 Parliament's Engagement with Treaties |
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159 | (30) |
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159 | (1) |
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II Why Treaties Should Matter to Parliament |
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159 | (5) |
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A Government Treaty Dominance |
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160 | (1) |
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B Challenges to Government Treaty Dominance |
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161 | (3) |
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III From the Ponsonby Rule to CRAG |
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164 | (3) |
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IV The Treaty Power Since the Brexit Referendum |
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167 | (11) |
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168 | (1) |
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B From Negotiating to Implementing the Withdrawal Agreement |
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169 | (2) |
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C The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement |
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171 | (2) |
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D Brexit Related Agreements, Other Treaties and the International Agreements Committee |
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173 | (5) |
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178 | (9) |
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A A Treaty Scrutiny Framework |
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178 | (2) |
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B Transparency and Inclusion |
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180 | (2) |
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182 | (2) |
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184 | (1) |
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185 | (1) |
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186 | (1) |
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187 | (2) |
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8 Votes of Confidence and the Fixed Term Parliaments Act |
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189 | (22) |
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189 | (1) |
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II The Confidence Convention |
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189 | (7) |
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III The Fixed Term Parliaments Act |
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196 | (7) |
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A Limiting the Convention |
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199 | (1) |
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B Finding an Alternative Government |
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200 | (1) |
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C Empowering the Opposition |
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201 | (1) |
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D Circumventing the Purpose of the Act |
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202 | (1) |
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IV Restoring the Status Quo Ante? |
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203 | (8) |
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PART 3 PARLIAMENT AND BREXIT |
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9 Brexit, Parliament, and the Courts - Towards a New Relationship? |
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211 | (28) |
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I Brexit Drama or Business as Usual? |
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211 | (3) |
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II Enhancing Parliamentary Scrutiny |
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214 | (4) |
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A Bolstering the Role of Parliament |
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214 | (3) |
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B Bolstering the Scrutiny of MPs on a Specific Issue |
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217 | (1) |
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III Determining Devolution Disputes |
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218 | (7) |
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IV When Being an MP Makes a Difference |
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225 | (2) |
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V A Move in the Right Direction? |
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227 | (7) |
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VI Taking (Back) Control? |
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234 | (3) |
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237 | (2) |
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10 Parliament and Brexit: Scrutiny under Pressure |
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239 | (30) |
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239 | (1) |
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II Triggering Article 50 - Parliament's Role |
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240 | (12) |
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A The Establishment of the Exiting the European Union Committee |
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242 | (1) |
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B The Supreme Courts Judgment in Miller |
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242 | (1) |
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C The Introduction of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill |
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243 | (2) |
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III The Passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 |
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245 | (1) |
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246 | (4) |
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B Analysis of the scrutiny of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 |
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250 | (2) |
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IV The Meaningful Vote(s) |
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252 | (5) |
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A The Passage of the Cooper-Letwin Bill and the Benn Bill |
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255 | (1) |
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B The End of the May Administration |
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256 | (1) |
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V The Johnson Administration |
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257 | (6) |
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A An Early General Election |
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257 | (1) |
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B The Fast-Track Passage of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 |
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257 | (1) |
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C The United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 |
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258 | (5) |
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D The European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020 |
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263 | (1) |
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263 | (6) |
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PART 4 PARLIAMENT, RIGHTS, AND DEVOLUTION |
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11 Parliament and Human Rights |
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269 | (30) |
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269 | (2) |
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A The International Standards for Parliaments and Human Rights |
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270 | (1) |
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II What Do the International Standards Require? |
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271 | (7) |
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A Pre-requisites for Parliaments to Function in a Way that Respects Human Rights |
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271 | (1) |
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B Ways that Parliamentarians Can Take Action to Protect and Promote Human Rights |
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272 | (1) |
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273 | (1) |
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D Engagement with International Human Rights Standards |
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273 | (2) |
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E Ensuring National Implementation of Human Rights Obligations |
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275 | (1) |
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F Supporting an Institutional Infrastructure for Respecting Human Rights |
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276 | (1) |
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G Ideal Competence of a Parliamentary Human Rights Committee |
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277 | (1) |
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III Does JCHR Comply with the Principles? |
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278 | (17) |
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278 | (1) |
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B Responsibilities and Functions |
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279 | (16) |
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IV Composition and Working Methods |
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295 | (1) |
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296 | (3) |
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12 Ten Myths about Parliamentary Sovereignty |
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299 | (24) |
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299 | (1) |
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II The Law of Parliamentary Sovereignty |
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299 | (2) |
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III Myth # 1: Parliamentary Sovereignty Sums Up the Whole of the Constitution |
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301 | (2) |
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IV Myth #2: Parliamentary Sovereignty is a 19th century (English) Invention |
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303 | (2) |
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V Myth #3: Parliamentary Sovereignty was Made by the Judges and can be Remade by them |
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305 | (3) |
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VI Myth #4: Parliamentary Sovereignty has been Overtaken by Events |
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308 | (2) |
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VII Myth #5: Parliamentary Sovereignty Requires Constitutionally Important Decisions to be Made by Statute |
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310 | (2) |
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VIII Myth #6: Parliamentary Sovereignty Entails that Parliament is Morally Free to Defy the People |
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312 | (1) |
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IX Myth #7: Parliamentary Sovereignty is Breached if Parliament does not have the Practical Opportunity to Legislate |
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313 | (2) |
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X Myth #8: Parliamentary Sovereignty is Incompatible with, and Subject to, the Rule of Law |
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315 | (2) |
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XI Myth #9: Parliamentary Sovereignty does not Authorise Parliament to Limit (oust) Judicial Review |
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317 | (2) |
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XII Myth #10: Parliamentary Sovereignty is in Fact Executive Sovereignty |
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319 | (1) |
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320 | (3) |
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13 Accountability to Parliament for the Administration of Justice |
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323 | (26) |
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I The Constitutional Territory of Accountability |
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323 | (1) |
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II A Fast-Changing Landscape |
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324 | (4) |
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A The Separation of Powers - The Theory and the Reality |
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326 | (2) |
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III A Negative Tradition of Accountability - The View from the Lord Chancellor's Window |
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328 | (4) |
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A Non-accountability in the 1980s |
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330 | (1) |
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B Enter Lord Mackay - The Green Paper Furore |
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331 | (1) |
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IV New Public Management and the Administration of Justice |
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332 | (3) |
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V The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 - Redrawing the Boundaries |
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335 | (5) |
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A Some Implications for Accountability to Parliament |
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337 | (3) |
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VI The Ministry of Justice and Parliament |
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340 | (6) |
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A The Role of Select Committees |
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342 | (1) |
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B A Tale of Two Committees |
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343 | (3) |
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346 | (3) |
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14 The Forward March of Devolution Halted? |
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349 | (26) |
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349 | (3) |
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A Historical Context for UK Devolution |
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349 | (1) |
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B The UK's Current Devolution Arrangements |
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350 | (2) |
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352 | (6) |
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A Implementation of the Scotland Act 2016 |
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353 | (1) |
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B Scottish Devolution and the UK Supreme Court |
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354 | (1) |
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C The Scottish Continuity Bill Reference 2018 |
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355 | (1) |
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D The UNCRC and ECLSG References 2021 |
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356 | (1) |
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356 | (1) |
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F A Second Independence Referendum? |
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357 | (1) |
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358 | (4) |
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A Brexit, Legislative Consent and Wales |
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361 | (1) |
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B Challenging the UK Internal Market Act 2020 |
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361 | (1) |
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362 | (6) |
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A Governing without an Executive |
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363 | (2) |
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B Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) Act 2018 |
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365 | (2) |
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C Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019 |
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367 | (1) |
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368 | (4) |
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A The Combined Authority Mayoral devolution'? |
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369 | (1) |
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370 | (1) |
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371 | (1) |
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VI Intergovernmental Relations |
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372 | (1) |
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373 | (2) |
Index |
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375 | |