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E-grāmata: Philosophical Logic: A Contemporary Introduction

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Introductory logic is generally taught as a straightforward technical discipline. In this book, John MacFarlane helps the reader think about the limitations of, presuppositions of, and alternatives to classical first-order predicate logic, making this an ideal introduction to philosophical logic for any student who already has completed an introductory logic course.

The book explores the following questions. Are there quantificational idioms that cannot be expressed with the familiar universal and existential quantifiers? How can logic be extended to capture modal notions like necessity and obligation? Does the material conditional adequately capture the meaning of 'if'and if not, what are the alternatives? Should logical consequence be understood in terms of models or in terms of proofs? Can one intelligibly question the validity of basic logical principles like Modus Ponens or Double Negation Elimination? Is the fact that classical logic validates the inference from a contradiction to anything a flaw, and if so, how can logic be modified to repair it? How, exactly, is logic related to reasoning? Must classical logic be revised in order to be applied to vague language, and if so how? Each chapter is organized around suggested readings and includes exercises designed to deepen the reader's understanding.

Key Features:





An integrated treatment of the technical and philosophical issues comprising philosophical logic Designed to serve students taking only one course in logic beyond the introductory level Provides tools and concepts necessary to understand work in many areas of analytic philosophy Includes exercises, suggested readings, and suggestions for further exploration in each chapter

Recenzijas

This is the perfect book for coverage of classic debates in mainstream philosophy of logic. Its also the perfect source for exceptionally clear reviews of standard logical machinery (e.g., standard modal machinery, quantifier machinery, higher-order machinery, etc.). Very user-friendly, clear, and accurate on all of the topics that it covers, this is my new required text for classic debates in the philosophy of logic. Jc Beall, University of Notre Dame

John MacFarlane displays his usual lively and engaging writing style, and is neutral on controversial issues, giving the arguments employed by both sides. It is an excellent overview of some key topics in the field. Stewart Shapiro, Ohio State University

List of Exercises
xii
Preface xv
Acknowledgements xix
1 Fundamentals
1(34)
1.1 Propositional logic
1(14)
1.1.1 Grammar
1(1)
1.1.2 Semantics
2(4)
1.1.3 Proofs
6(7)
1.1.4 Proof strategy
13(1)
1.1.5 The relation of semantics and proofs
14(1)
1.2 Predicate logic
15(11)
1.2.1 Grammar
16(1)
1.2.2 Scope
17(1)
1.2.3 Semantics
17(4)
1.2.4 Proofs
21(5)
1.3 Identity
26(3)
1.3.1 Grammar
28(1)
1.3.2 Semantics
28(1)
1.3.3 Proofs
28(1)
1.4 Use and mention
29(6)
2 Quantifiers
35(32)
2.1 Beyond and
35(4)
2.1.1 What is a quantifier?
35(2)
2.1.2 Semantics of binary quantifiers
37(1)
2.1.3 Most: an essentially binary quantifier
37(1)
2.1.4 Unary quantifiers beyond and
38(1)
2.1.5 Generalized quantifiers
39(1)
2.2 Definite descriptions
39(5)
2.2.1 Terms or quantifiers?
39(2)
2.2.2 Definite descriptions and scope
41(1)
2.2.3 Russell's theory of descriptions
41(2)
2.2.4 Proofs
43(1)
2.3 Second-order quantifiers
44(13)
2.3.1 Standard semantics for monadic second-order logic
46(1)
2.3.2 Expressive limitations of first-order logic
47(3)
2.3.3 Set theory in sheep's clothing?
50(2)
2.3.4 Boolos's plural interpretation
52(2)
2.3.5 Beyond monadic second-order logic
54(3)
2.4 Substitutional quantifiers
57(10)
2.4.1 Objectual and substitutional quantification
57(1)
2.4.2 Nonexistent objects
58(1)
2.4.3 Quantifying into attitude reports
59(1)
2.4.4 Sentence quantifiers
60(1)
2.4.5 Quantifying into quotes
61(1)
2.4.6 Defining truth
61(1)
2.4.7 Quantifying into quotes and paradox
62(2)
2.4.8 The circularity worry
64(3)
3 Modal Logic
67(30)
3.1 Modal propositional logic
67(13)
3.1.1 Grammar
67(1)
3.1.2 Semantics
68(2)
3.1.3 Modal logics from K to S5
70(4)
3.1.4 Proofs
74(6)
3.2 Modal predicate logic
80(5)
3.2.1 Opaque contexts
80(1)
3.2.2 Opaque contexts and quantification
81(1)
3.2.3 The number of planets argument
82(1)
3.2.4 Smullyan's reply
83(2)
3.3 The slingshot argument
85(5)
3.3.1 Applications of slingshot arguments
87(1)
3.3.2 The Godel slingshot
87(1)
3.3.3 Critique of the slingshot
88(2)
3.4 Kripke's defense of de re modality
90(7)
3.4.1 Kripke's strategy
90(1)
3.4.2 The contingent a priori
91(2)
3.4.3 The necessary a posteriori
93(1)
3.4.4 Epistemic and alethic modals
94(3)
4 Conditionals
97(26)
4.1 The material conditional
97(4)
4.1.1 Indicative vs. counter-factual
97(2)
4.1.2 Entailments between indicatives and material conditionals
99(1)
4.1.3 Thomson against the "received opinion"
100(1)
4.2 No truth conditions?
101(8)
4.2.1 Arguments for the material conditional analysis
102(1)
4.2.2 Arguments against the material conditional analysis
102(2)
4.2.3 Rejecting Or-to-if
104(1)
4.2.4 Edgington's positive view
105(2)
4.2.5 Against truth conditions
107(2)
4.3 Stalnaker's semantics and pragmatics
109(6)
4.3.1 Propositions, assertion, and the common ground
109(1)
4.3.2 Semantics
110(1)
4.3.3 Reasonable but invalid inferences
111(2)
4.3.4 Contraposition and Hypothetical Syllogism
113(1)
4.3.5 The argument for fatalism
114(1)
4.4 Is Modus Ponens valid?
115(8)
4.4.1 The intuitive counterexamples
116(1)
4.4.2 McGee's counterexamples as seen by Edgington
117(2)
4.4.3 McGee's counterexamples as seen by Stalnaker
119(1)
4.4.4 Modus Ponens vs. Exportation
120(3)
5 Logical Consequence via Models
123(22)
5.1 Informal characterizations of consequence
123(9)
5.1.1 In terms of necessity
123(3)
5.1.2 In terms of proof
126(2)
5.1.3 In terms of counterexamples
128(4)
5.2 Tarski's account of logical consequence
132(8)
5.2.1 Tarski's aim
132(1)
5.2.2 Why proof-based approaches won't work
132(3)
5.2.3 Criteria of adequacy
135(1)
5.2.4 The insufficiency of (F)
136(1)
5.2.5 The semantic definition
137(1)
5.2.6 Satisfying the criteria of adequacy
138(1)
5.2.7 Logical constants
139(1)
5.3 Interpretational and representational semantics
140(5)
6 Logical Consequence via Proofs
145(24)
6.1 Introduction rules as self-justifying
145(6)
6.1.1 Carnap's Copernican turn
146(1)
6.1.2 Prior's article
146(1)
6.1.3 Stevenson's response
147(1)
6.1.4 Belnap's Response
148(2)
6.1.5 Prawitz's Response
150(1)
6.2 Prawitz's proof-theoretic account of consequence
151(5)
6.2.1 Arguments
152(1)
6.2.2 Validity
152(1)
6.2.3 Intro and Elim
153(1)
6.2.4 Intro and Elim
154(1)
6.2.5 Philosophical reflections
155(1)
6.3 Intuitionistic logic
156(3)
6.4 Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic
159(3)
6.5 Fundamental logical disagreement
162(7)
6.5.1 Changing the subject?
163(1)
6.5.2 Interpreting classical logic in intuitionistic logic
164(2)
6.5.3 Interpreting intuitionistic logic in classical logic
166(1)
6.5.4 Logical pluralism
167(2)
7 Relevance, Logic, and Reasoning
169(22)
7.1 Motivations for relevance logic
170(1)
7.2 The Lewis Argument
171(5)
7.2.1 Rejecting Disjunctive Weakening
172(1)
7.2.2 Rejecting transitivity
173(2)
7.2.3 Rejecting Disjunctive Syllogism
175(1)
7.3 First-degree entailment
176(5)
7.3.1 A syntactic procedure
176(4)
7.3.2 The four-valued truth tables
180(1)
7.4 Logic and reasoning
181(4)
7.5 Uses for relevance logic
185(6)
7.5.1 Dialetheism
186(1)
7.5.2 The moderate approach
187(1)
7.5.3 Truth in a corpus
188(3)
8 Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox
191(24)
8.1 What is vagueness?
191(3)
8.2 Three-valued logics
194(4)
8.2.1 Semantics for connectives
194(2)
8.2.2 Defining validity in multivalued logics
196(1)
8.2.3 Application to the sorites
196(2)
8.3 Fuzzy logics
198(5)
8.3.1 Semantics
199(1)
8.3.2 Application to the sorites
199(1)
8.3.3 Can we make sense of degrees of truth?
200(2)
8.3.4 Troubles with degree-functionality
202(1)
8.4 Super-valuations
203(6)
8.4.1 Application to sorites
206(1)
8.4.2 Higher-order vagueness
207(1)
8.4.3 The logic of definiteness
208(1)
8.5 Vagueness in the world?
209(6)
8.5.1 Evans on vague identity
210(2)
8.5.2 Evans and Quine
212(3)
Appendix A Greek Letters 215(2)
Appendix B Set-Theoretic Notation 217(2)
Appendix C Proving Unrepresentability 219(4)
References 223(8)
Index 231
John MacFarlane is Professor of Philosophy and a member of the Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications (2014).