Table of Cases |
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ix | |
Introduction |
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xi | |
Acknowledgments |
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xvii | |
Chapter I A Short History of Plea Bargaining in the United States |
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3 | (4) |
Chapter II Punishment for Exercising the Right to Trial |
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7 | (34) |
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A Differential Sentencing Is Prevalent in Our Criminal Justice System |
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9 | (4) |
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B Justifications for Differential Sentencing |
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13 | (20) |
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1 It is a benefit but not a punishment |
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14 | (8) |
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2 Guilty plea is the first step on the road to rehabilitation |
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22 | (3) |
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3 The sentencing judge learns significantly more about the defendant and the crime after trial than she knew during plea bargaining |
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25 | (6) |
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4 Enhanced sentences for those defendants convicted after trial is an essential and inevitable part of the negotiation process that is plea bargaining |
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31 | (2) |
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C That Plea Bargaining Punishes the Exercise of the Constitutional Right to Trial Does Not Make It Unconstitutional - The Government May Place a Price on the Constitutional Right to Trial If the Societal Need It Serves Is Significant |
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33 | (8) |
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1 Examples of legally placing a price on the exercise of a constitutional right |
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33 | (2) |
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2 Can the system place a price on the constitutional right to trial? |
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35 | (2) |
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3 Balancing the positive and negative aspects of plea bargaining should help to determine its constitutionality |
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37 | (4) |
Chapter III Role of the Prosecutor |
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41 | (22) |
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A Motivations for the Prosecutor to Bargain |
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42 | (4) |
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42 | (1) |
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42 | (2) |
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3 Cooperation of the defendant |
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44 | (1) |
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4 Respecting the view of the victim |
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45 | (1) |
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46 | (4) |
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1 The Double Jeopardy limitation |
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46 | (2) |
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2 Prosecutorial overcharging |
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48 | (2) |
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C Factors Governing What Plea to Offer |
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50 | (9) |
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1 The seriousness of the case |
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52 | (1) |
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2 The strength of the case |
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53 | (2) |
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3 The background of the defendant |
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55 | (1) |
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4 The wishes of the crime victim |
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56 | (3) |
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D Issues Related to the Timing of the Plea Offer |
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59 | (2) |
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61 | (2) |
Chapter IV Role of the Defense Attorney |
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63 | (38) |
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A Motivations for the Attorney to Bargain |
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64 | (5) |
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1 Get the best outcome for the client |
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64 | (1) |
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2 Caseload management and financial issues |
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64 | (2) |
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3 Psychological and emotional factors |
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66 | (1) |
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4 Attorney's relationship to the prosecutor and the judge |
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67 | (2) |
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B Constitutional Standard of Competent Representation |
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69 | (11) |
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69 | (3) |
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2 The difficulty facing the defendant in trying to show the attorney's conduct during the plea bargaining process fell below the Sixth Amendment's requirement for competent representation |
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72 | (3) |
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3 Examples of attorney incompetence |
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75 | (5) |
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a Failure to inform client of plea offer |
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75 | (1) |
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b Giving incorrect advice regarding fundamental matters related to the plea bargain itself |
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76 | (3) |
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c Failure to advise the client about "collateral" consequences of plea |
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79 | (1) |
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C Advising the Client Whether to Accept the Plea Offered |
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80 | (21) |
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1 Preparation for counseling the client about the plea offer |
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81 | (1) |
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2 Issues related to time and timing |
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82 | (1) |
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3 Getting to know the client |
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83 | (1) |
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4 Methods for the attorney to counsel the client about the plea offer |
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84 | (9) |
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5 The special problem created by the client's claim of innocence |
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93 | (8) |
Chapter V Role of the Judge |
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101 | (30) |
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A Motivations for the Judge to Bargain |
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101 | (4) |
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101 | (2) |
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2 Plea bargaining reduces the stress surrounding sentencing |
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103 | (1) |
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3 Minimizing the likelihood of an appeal |
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104 | (1) |
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B Judicial Involvement in Plea Negotiations |
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105 | (18) |
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1 Can the judge become involved? |
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105 | (1) |
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2 When does judicial advocacy become judicial coercion? |
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106 | (5) |
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3 Comments by the judge during the bargaining regarding the likely sentence if the defendant rejects the plea and is convicted at trial |
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111 | (9) |
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4 Comments by the judge at sentencing |
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120 | (2) |
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5 Other arguments against judicial participation |
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122 | (1) |
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C The Role of the Judge in Accepting the Plea (the Allocution) |
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123 | (8) |
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1 The history of dishonesty during the allocution |
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124 | (2) |
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2 The judge must ensure the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary |
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126 | (3) |
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3 The judge's options in accepting the plea |
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129 | (2) |
Chapter VI Impact of the Law of Contracts on Plea Bargaining |
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131 | (20) |
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A The Formation of the Plea Agreement |
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134 | (4) |
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1 Similarities of plea bargains to civil contracts |
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134 | (1) |
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2 Differences between plea bargains and civil contracts |
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134 | (1) |
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3 One example of the impact of the differences between contract and plea bargaining law regarding the formation of the agreement |
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135 | (3) |
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B When the Prosecutor Violates the Terms of the Plea Agreement |
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138 | (3) |
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1 What constitutes a breach of a plea bargain by the prosecutor? |
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138 | (2) |
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2 What is the remedy for a breach by the prosecutor? |
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140 | (1) |
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C When the Defendant Violates the Terms of the Plea Agreement |
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141 | (2) |
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1 What constitutes a breach of the plea bargain by the defendant? |
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141 | (1) |
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2 What is the remedy for a breach by the defendant? |
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142 | (1) |
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D When the Judge Violates the Terms of the Plea Agreement |
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143 | (8) |
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1 What constitutes a breach of the plea bargain by the judge? |
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143 | (2) |
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2 What is the remedy for a breach by the judge? |
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145 | (6) |
Chapter VII Types of Pleas Other than Standard Guilty Pleas |
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151 | (14) |
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151 | (3) |
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1 What is a plea of no lo contendere? |
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151 | (1) |
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2 The reasons for the plea |
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152 | (2) |
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154 | (7) |
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1 What is an Alford plea? |
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154 | (1) |
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2 The reason for the plea |
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155 | (1) |
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3 Should the criminal justice system allow Alford pleas? |
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156 | (5) |
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C Fictitious Guilty Pleas |
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161 | (1) |
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162 | (3) |
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1 Pleas to crimes that are logical impossibilities |
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162 | (1) |
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2 Pleas to crimes that are factual impossibilities |
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163 | (2) |
Chapter VIII The Impact of Racial Disparity in Plea Bargaining |
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165 | (8) |
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165 | (1) |
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B Racial Disparity in the Overall Criminal Justice System |
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166 | (2) |
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C Racial Disparity in Plea Bargaining |
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168 | (5) |
Chapter IX Reforming Plea Bargaining |
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173 | (20) |
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A Suggestions for Prosecutors |
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174 | (6) |
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174 | (2) |
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2 Provide discovery materials more quickly and make them more complete |
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176 | (1) |
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3 Avoid a vindictive response to a plea offer that is rejected |
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177 | (2) |
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4 Be careful about off-the-record and vague comments, promises, and recommendations |
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179 | (1) |
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B Suggestions for Defense Attorneys |
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180 | (4) |
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1 Do more preparation for plea negotiations and do it early |
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180 | (1) |
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2 When counseling about the plea, include a discussion of the collateral and other significant consequences of a guilty plea that go beyond the agreement itself |
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181 | (2) |
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3 Be careful about how you advise the client whether to accept the plea offer |
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183 | (1) |
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C Suggestions for the Conduct of Judges |
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184 | (4) |
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1 Allow judicial participation in the negotiation process |
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184 | (2) |
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2 Permit judges to comment on likely post-trial sentence during plea negotiations if requested to do so by the defense |
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186 | (2) |
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188 | (3) |
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1 Should plea bargaining be abolished? |
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188 | (2) |
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2 Eliminate laws that establish mandatory minimum sentences |
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190 | (1) |
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E Increase Education about Plea Bargaining |
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191 | (2) |
Conclusion |
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193 | |