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Plea Bargaining Made Real [Other book format]

  • Formāts: Other book format, 212 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 01-Jun-2021
  • Izdevniecība: Carolina Academic Press
  • ISBN-10: 1531019919
  • ISBN-13: 9781531019914
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  • Other book format
  • Cena: 34,20 €
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  • Formāts: Other book format, 212 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 01-Jun-2021
  • Izdevniecība: Carolina Academic Press
  • ISBN-10: 1531019919
  • ISBN-13: 9781531019914
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
"By looking at the motivations of the three critical parties to any plea bargain-the prosecutor, defense attorney/defendant, and the judge-Plea Bargaining Made Real explains why in the words of former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, "criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials." By looking at the impact these motivations play in the conduct and decisions of these parties, the book offers a clearer and more realistic understanding of the process. Through comparing plea-bargaining court decisions with the actual ways in which guilty pleas come about, the book illustrates not just the dishonesty of the judicial approach to issues arising from plea bargaining, but also the damage that such dishonesty causes. The book discusses other important and controversial aspects of plea bargaining such as types of guilty pleas, the impact of systemic racism in plea bargaining and the applicability of contract law principles to plea agreements. The negotiation of a disposition in a criminal case is a most human process. This book examines the law of plea bargaining without ever losing sight of this critical perspective. It offers suggestions for how prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and the criminal justice system itself can make the plea bargaining system fairer and more transparent"--

This text/reference uses plain language to examine the law of plea bargaining, with special focus on the roles of three parties in a plea bargain: the prosecutor, the defense attorney/defendant, and the judge. Controversial aspects are discussed, such as the dishonesty of the judicial approach arising from plea bargaining, and the impact of systemic racism in plea bargaining. Other subjects covered are types of guilty pleas and the application of contract law principles to plea agreements. The final chapter offers suggestions for reforming plea bargaining, encompassing systemic reforms as well as suggestions for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Annotation ©2021 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)

"By looking at the motivations of the three critical parties to any plea bargain-the prosecutor, defense attorney/defendant, and the judge-Plea Bargaining Made Real explains why, in the words of former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, ""criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials."" Looking at the impact these motivations play in the conduct and decisions of these parties, the book offers a clearer and more realistic understanding of the process. Through comparing plea-bargaining court decisions with the actual ways in which guilty pleas come about, the book illustrates not just the dishonesty of the judicial approach to issues arising from plea bargaining, but also the damage that such dishonesty causes. Grossman also discusses other important and controversial aspects of plea bargaining such as types of guilty pleas, the impact of systemic racism in plea bargaining, and the applicability of contract law principles to plea agreements. The negotiation of a disposition in a criminal case is a very human process. This book examines the law of plea bargaining without ever losing sight of this critical perspective. It offers suggestions for how prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and the criminal justice system itself can make the plea bargaining system fairer and more transparent."



By looking at the motivations of the three critical parties to any plea bargain—the prosecutor, defense attorney/defendant, and the judge—Plea Bargaining Made Real explains why, in the words of former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, "criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials." Looking at the impact these motivations play in the conduct and decisions of these parties, the book offers a clearer and more realistic understanding of the process.

Through comparing plea-bargaining court decisions with the actual ways in which guilty pleas come about, the book illustrates not just the dishonesty of the judicial approach to issues arising from plea bargaining, but also the damage that such dishonesty causes. Grossman also discusses other important and controversial aspects of plea bargaining such as types of guilty pleas, the impact of systemic racism in plea bargaining, and the applicability of contract law principles to plea agreements.

The negotiation of a disposition in a criminal case is a very human process. This book examines the law of plea bargaining without ever losing sight of this critical perspective. It offers suggestions for how prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and the criminal justice system itself can make the plea bargaining system fairer and more transparent.

Table of Cases ix
Introduction xi
Acknowledgments xvii
Chapter I A Short History of Plea Bargaining in the United States 3(4)
Chapter II Punishment for Exercising the Right to Trial 7(34)
A Differential Sentencing Is Prevalent in Our Criminal Justice System
9(4)
B Justifications for Differential Sentencing
13(20)
1 It is a benefit but not a punishment
14(8)
2 Guilty plea is the first step on the road to rehabilitation
22(3)
3 The sentencing judge learns significantly more about the defendant and the crime after trial than she knew during plea bargaining
25(6)
4 Enhanced sentences for those defendants convicted after trial is an essential and inevitable part of the negotiation process that is plea bargaining
31(2)
C That Plea Bargaining Punishes the Exercise of the Constitutional Right to Trial Does Not Make It Unconstitutional - The Government May Place a Price on the Constitutional Right to Trial If the Societal Need It Serves Is Significant
33(8)
1 Examples of legally placing a price on the exercise of a constitutional right
33(2)
2 Can the system place a price on the constitutional right to trial?
35(2)
3 Balancing the positive and negative aspects of plea bargaining should help to determine its constitutionality
37(4)
Chapter III Role of the Prosecutor 41(22)
A Motivations for the Prosecutor to Bargain
42(4)
1 Caseload management
42(1)
2 Doing justice
42(2)
3 Cooperation of the defendant
44(1)
4 Respecting the view of the victim
45(1)
B The Charging Function
46(4)
1 The Double Jeopardy limitation
46(2)
2 Prosecutorial overcharging
48(2)
C Factors Governing What Plea to Offer
50(9)
1 The seriousness of the case
52(1)
2 The strength of the case
53(2)
3 The background of the defendant
55(1)
4 The wishes of the crime victim
56(3)
D Issues Related to the Timing of the Plea Offer
59(2)
E Dealing with the Judge
61(2)
Chapter IV Role of the Defense Attorney 63(38)
A Motivations for the Attorney to Bargain
64(5)
1 Get the best outcome for the client
64(1)
2 Caseload management and financial issues
64(2)
3 Psychological and emotional factors
66(1)
4 Attorney's relationship to the prosecutor and the judge
67(2)
B Constitutional Standard of Competent Representation
69(11)
1 What is the standard?
69(3)
2 The difficulty facing the defendant in trying to show the attorney's conduct during the plea bargaining process fell below the Sixth Amendment's requirement for competent representation
72(3)
3 Examples of attorney incompetence
75(5)
a Failure to inform client of plea offer
75(1)
b Giving incorrect advice regarding fundamental matters related to the plea bargain itself
76(3)
c Failure to advise the client about "collateral" consequences of plea
79(1)
C Advising the Client Whether to Accept the Plea Offered
80(21)
1 Preparation for counseling the client about the plea offer
81(1)
2 Issues related to time and timing
82(1)
3 Getting to know the client
83(1)
4 Methods for the attorney to counsel the client about the plea offer
84(9)
5 The special problem created by the client's claim of innocence
93(8)
Chapter V Role of the Judge 101(30)
A Motivations for the Judge to Bargain
101(4)
1 Pressures on the judge
101(2)
2 Plea bargaining reduces the stress surrounding sentencing
103(1)
3 Minimizing the likelihood of an appeal
104(1)
B Judicial Involvement in Plea Negotiations
105(18)
1 Can the judge become involved?
105(1)
2 When does judicial advocacy become judicial coercion?
106(5)
3 Comments by the judge during the bargaining regarding the likely sentence if the defendant rejects the plea and is convicted at trial
111(9)
4 Comments by the judge at sentencing
120(2)
5 Other arguments against judicial participation
122(1)
C The Role of the Judge in Accepting the Plea (the Allocution)
123(8)
1 The history of dishonesty during the allocution
124(2)
2 The judge must ensure the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary
126(3)
3 The judge's options in accepting the plea
129(2)
Chapter VI Impact of the Law of Contracts on Plea Bargaining 131(20)
A The Formation of the Plea Agreement
134(4)
1 Similarities of plea bargains to civil contracts
134(1)
2 Differences between plea bargains and civil contracts
134(1)
3 One example of the impact of the differences between contract and plea bargaining law regarding the formation of the agreement
135(3)
B When the Prosecutor Violates the Terms of the Plea Agreement
138(3)
1 What constitutes a breach of a plea bargain by the prosecutor?
138(2)
2 What is the remedy for a breach by the prosecutor?
140(1)
C When the Defendant Violates the Terms of the Plea Agreement
141(2)
1 What constitutes a breach of the plea bargain by the defendant?
141(1)
2 What is the remedy for a breach by the defendant?
142(1)
D When the Judge Violates the Terms of the Plea Agreement
143(8)
1 What constitutes a breach of the plea bargain by the judge?
143(2)
2 What is the remedy for a breach by the judge?
145(6)
Chapter VII Types of Pleas Other than Standard Guilty Pleas 151(14)
A No Lo Contendere Pleas
151(3)
1 What is a plea of no lo contendere?
151(1)
2 The reasons for the plea
152(2)
B Alford Pleas
154(7)
1 What is an Alford plea?
154(1)
2 The reason for the plea
155(1)
3 Should the criminal justice system allow Alford pleas?
156(5)
C Fictitious Guilty Pleas
161(1)
D Impossible Pleas
162(3)
1 Pleas to crimes that are logical impossibilities
162(1)
2 Pleas to crimes that are factual impossibilities
163(2)
Chapter VIII The Impact of Racial Disparity in Plea Bargaining 165(8)
A Introduction
165(1)
B Racial Disparity in the Overall Criminal Justice System
166(2)
C Racial Disparity in Plea Bargaining
168(5)
Chapter IX Reforming Plea Bargaining 173(20)
A Suggestions for Prosecutors
174(6)
1 Avoid overcharging
174(2)
2 Provide discovery materials more quickly and make them more complete
176(1)
3 Avoid a vindictive response to a plea offer that is rejected
177(2)
4 Be careful about off-the-record and vague comments, promises, and recommendations
179(1)
B Suggestions for Defense Attorneys
180(4)
1 Do more preparation for plea negotiations and do it early
180(1)
2 When counseling about the plea, include a discussion of the collateral and other significant consequences of a guilty plea that go beyond the agreement itself
181(2)
3 Be careful about how you advise the client whether to accept the plea offer
183(1)
C Suggestions for the Conduct of Judges
184(4)
1 Allow judicial participation in the negotiation process
184(2)
2 Permit judges to comment on likely post-trial sentence during plea negotiations if requested to do so by the defense
186(2)
D Systemic Reforms
188(3)
1 Should plea bargaining be abolished?
188(2)
2 Eliminate laws that establish mandatory minimum sentences
190(1)
E Increase Education about Plea Bargaining
191(2)
Conclusion 193