Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives will be of great interest to researchers in political philosophy, applied and social epistemology, ethics and feminist philosophy, as well as those working in politics, and sociology.
Polarisation, intransigence and dogmatism in political and moral debate have in recent years threatened to overwhelm many Western-style democracies, where for centuries reasoned argument has been a hallmark feature of tackling disagreement. For many people, this marks a worrying deterioration in the moral and political climate, threatening to create a divisive environment of "us" versus "them".
In this superb collection a team of international contributors examine these pressing issues from a philosophical perspective. Topics explored include: the problem of "deep disagreements"; martial conceptions of argumentation and the motivation to argue to win; epistemic egocentrism; intellectual trust; bullshit and dogmatism; intellectual humility and the internet; epistemic and "tribal" arrogance and authoritarianism; empathy and polarisation; and epistemic rights violations.
Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives
will be of great interest to researchers in political philosophy, applied and social epistemology, ethics and feminist philosophy, as well as those working in politics and sociology.
Introduction Alessandra Tanesini and Michael P. Lynch Part I:
Argumentation, bias and arrogance
1. Reassessing different conceptions of
argumentation Catarina Dutilh Novaes
2. Martial metaphors and argumentative
virtues and vices Ian James Kidd
3. Arrogance and deep disagreement Andrew
Aberdein
4. Closed-mindedness and arrogance Heather Battaly Part II: Trust,
dogmatism and arrogance in social contexts
5. Intellectual trust and the
marketplace of ideas Allan Hazlett
6. Is searching the internet making us
intellectually arrogant? J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon
7. Intellectual
humility and the curse of knowledge Michael Hannon
8. Bullshit and dogmatism:
A discourse analytical perspective Chris Heffer Part III: Polarisation
9.
Polarisation and the problem of spreading arrogance Michael P. Lynch
10.
Arrogance, polarisation and arguing to win Alessandra Tanesini
11.
Partisanship, humility, and epistemic polarisation Thomas Nadelhoffer, Rose
Graves, Gus Skorburg, Mark Leary, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
12. Science
denial, polarisation, and arrogance Lee McIntyre
13. The polarisation toolkit
Quassim Cassam
14. Epistemic rights in a polarised world: the right to know
and the abortion debate Lani Watson. Index
Alessandra Tanesini is Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University, UK.
Michael P. Lynch is Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, USA.
