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Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning [Mīkstie vāki]

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(Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin)
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 224 pages, height x width x depth: 214x141x13 mm, weight: 256 g
  • Izdošanas datums: 25-Jun-2020
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198865821
  • ISBN-13: 9780198865827
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Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical ReasoningPalielināt
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 224 pages, height x width x depth: 214x141x13 mm, weight: 256 g
  • Izdošanas datums: 25-Jun-2020
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198865821
  • ISBN-13: 9780198865827
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9780198865827.html
Keywords:
Everyone allows that we can reason to a new belief from beliefs that we already have. Aristotle thought that we could also reason from beliefs to action. Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning establishes this possibility of reasoning to action, in a way that allows also for reasoning to intention, hope, fear, and doubt. While many philosophers have found little sense in Aristotle's claim, Dancy offers a general theory of reasoning that is sensitive to current debates but still Aristotelian in spirit. The text clearly sets out the similarities between reasoning to action and reasoning to belief, which are far more striking than any dissimilarities. Its detailed account of practical reasoning, a topic inadequately covered in current literature, is presented in such a way as to be intelligible to a variety of readers, making it an ideal resource for students of philosophy but also of interest to academics in related disciplines.

Recenzijas

...Practical Shape is as stimulating a book of philosophy as one could hope for. It will be an invaluable resource to those interested in the nature of reasoning, both practical and theoretical, for years to come. * Laura Tomlinson, Journal of Moral Philosophy * Review from previous edition 'Dancy's book offers an attractive outline of his conception of practical reasoning . . . engagingly personal in style, and full of thoughtful and interesting material' * John Hyman, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * 'an important contribution . . . the first sustained defence of a highly natural and attractive view, on which reasoning is essentially a matter of responding to reasons. . . . Above all, it is consistently stimulating: full of observations, suggestions, and arguments which are well worth pausing over.' * Jonathan Way, Ethics * 'He writes with a lucidity and economy that illuminate rather than complicate. . . . His book is at once reminiscent and prescient, and the reflective reader, unexhausted by its 185 pages, is well placed to owe it yet more than what he has read out of it. . . . this is a book with a future.' * Anthony Price, Mind *

Acknowledgements xiii
Introduction 1(9)
0.1 Practical Reasoning
1(1)
0.2 The Title of This Book
2(2)
0.3 The Primacy of the Practical
4(1)
0.4 Minimalism and Focalism
5(2)
0.5 The Structure of This Book
7(3)
1 What Is the (Supposed) Problem about Practical Reasoning?
10(16)
1.1 Acting in the Light of Reasoning vs Acting for a Reason
10(1)
1.2 Two Lines of Attack
11(1)
1.3 Aristotle's Picture
12(1)
1.4 Can the Conclusion Be an Action?
13(2)
1.5 Building Grids
15(3)
1.6 Finding a Place for Action
18(2)
1.7 Drawing the Conclusion
20(1)
1.8 Belief and Action
20(3)
1.9 Inference, Premise, and Conclusion
23(1)
1.10 The Grids
24(2)
2 How Practical Reasoning Is Possible
26(16)
2.1 A Telling Question
26(2)
2.2 An Easy Answer
28(2)
2.3 What Is Favoured: The Prichard Point
30(3)
2.4 Preliminary Conclusion
33(2)
2.5 The Favouring Relation: Structure
35(2)
2.6 What Does the Favouring?
37(3)
2.7 Arguments from Error
40(2)
3 The Material Theory of Practical Reasoning
42(20)
3.1 Mapping Reasoning
42(3)
3.2 Different Forms of Relevance
45(1)
3.3 Beyond Favouring (1): Toulmin
46(3)
3.4 Beyond Favouring (2): Raz and Exclusionary Reasons
49(1)
3.5 Beyond Favouring (3): Enabling/Disabling and Intensifying/Attenuating
50(2)
3.6 Pulling These Strands Together
52(2)
3.7 Mapping Reasoning (the Material Theory)
54(4)
3.8 Building a Practical Shape
58(1)
3.9 The Importance of the Order
59(3)
4 From the Practical to the Theoretical
62(19)
4.1 Formally Valid Deductive Reasoning
62(4)
4.2 Non-Formal Theoretical Reasoning
66(2)
4.3 Belief and Credence
68(2)
4.4 Credence-Changing
70(1)
4.5 Beyond Favouring Again
71(2)
4.6 Respecting the Distinction between Intensification and Favouring
73(2)
4.7 Respecting Complexity
75(3)
Appendix: Harman's Change in View
78(3)
5 Moral Reasoning and the Primacy of the Practical
81(16)
5.1 Different Conceptions of Moral Reasoning
81(2)
5.2 Reasoning to Moral Belief
83(2)
5.3 Explaining Practical (Including Moral) Favouring
85(2)
5.4 Explicitly Moral Reasoning to Action
87(1)
5.5 The Primacy of the Practical (1)
88(1)
5.6 The Primacy of the Practical (2)
89(1)
5.7 Reasons as Evidence
90(4)
5.8 Three Relations
94(3)
6 Taking Stock
97(12)
6.1 Overview
97(1)
6.2 Is Truth a Value?
98(2)
6.3 Is Probability a Value?
100(1)
6.4 Raz on Appropriateness
101(2)
6.5 Focalism
103(6)
7 Instrumental and Other Forms of Reasoning
109(21)
7.1 Is All Practical Reasoning Instrumental?
109(1)
7.2 Harman on Practical Reasoning
110(1)
7.3 Is There a Logic of Practical Reasoning?
111(3)
7.4 A Better Approach
114(2)
7.5 A Difficulty
116(3)
7.6 Another Difficulty about Autobiographical Premises
119(3)
7.7 The Relevance of the Autobiographical
122(2)
7.8 Extending the Anscombe-Muller Point
124(2)
7.9 Doubting and Hoping
126(4)
8 Reasoning to Normative Belief
130(15)
8.1 Three Views
130(1)
8.2 Raz's First Argument: Failure to Act and Rational Fault
131(3)
8.3 Acting for Simple, and for Complex, Reasons
134(1)
8.4 Raz's More Recent Argument, against the Simple Account
135(2)
8.5 Equipollence
137(3)
8.6 Raz's Third Argument: The `That's it' Clause
140(2)
8.7 First-Person and Third-Person Reasoning
142(1)
8.8 Counter-Attack
143(1)
8.9 Is Belief Action?
144(1)
9 Reasoning to Intention
145(25)
9.1 Broome's Account of Theoretical Reasoning
146(1)
9.2 Broome's Account of Practical Reasoning
147(5)
9.3 Broome on Reasoning to a Sufficient Means
152(1)
9.4 Some Comments
153(3)
9.5 A Different Approach
156(2)
9.6 Correct, Sound, and Strong
158(1)
9.7 How a Weaker View Can Be Stronger
159(2)
9.8 The Content of an Intention
161(2)
9.9 Intending and Intending-True
163(3)
9.10 Prior Intention and Tntention-in-Action'
166(2)
9.11 Broome's Argument against an Aristotelian Account
168(2)
10 Loose Ends
170(9)
10.1 Humeanism
170(1)
10.2 My Position vis-a-vis the Pragmatist Tradition
171(1)
10.3 My Relation to Anscombe
172(2)
10.4 The Primacy of Practical Reason
174(1)
10.5 Propositions
175(1)
10.6 My Full View
176(3)
References 179(4)
Index 183
Jonathan Dancy has worked at the University of Texas at Austin since 2005. He previously taught at the University of Keele for 25 years and then at the University of Reading before retiring in the UK in 2011. His books include Practical Reality (2000) and Ethics Without Principles (2004).