|
|
viii | |
|
|
ix | |
Preface |
|
xi | |
|
1 Surveillance and Self-Realization |
|
|
1 | (21) |
|
The Self and Self-Realization |
|
|
3 | (1) |
|
Current Critiques of Surveillance |
|
|
4 | (2) |
|
An Overview of the Argument |
|
|
6 | (7) |
|
Knowing What Others Will Do |
|
|
13 | (3) |
|
Why Privacy in Public Is Essential to Self-Realization |
|
|
16 | (1) |
|
|
17 | (1) |
|
|
18 | (1) |
|
|
19 | (2) |
|
The Test Case of Artificial Intelligence |
|
|
21 | (1) |
|
2 Artificial Intelligence-Enhanced Surveillance |
|
|
22 | (21) |
|
|
25 | (1) |
|
|
26 | (2) |
|
|
28 | (2) |
|
|
30 | (5) |
|
Explainability and Transparency |
|
|
35 | (5) |
|
|
40 | (1) |
|
|
41 | (1) |
|
Meeting the Threat of AI-Enhanced Surveillance |
|
|
42 | (1) |
|
3 Social Roles, Common Knowledge, and Coordination |
|
|
43 | (35) |
|
Social Roles As a Source of Common Knowledge |
|
|
45 | (1) |
|
|
46 | (4) |
|
Social Roles As Common Knowledge Generators |
|
|
50 | (3) |
|
Why Proper Performance of Social Roles Involves Coordination Problems |
|
|
53 | (3) |
|
Common Knowledge of the Four-Part Pattern |
|
|
56 | (3) |
|
|
59 | (11) |
|
Completing the "Surveillance Ignored" View |
|
|
70 | (1) |
|
|
71 | (1) |
|
|
71 | (4) |
|
|
75 | (1) |
|
|
75 | (1) |
|
The Common Knowledge Solution |
|
|
76 | (2) |
|
|
78 | (25) |
|
|
79 | (3) |
|
|
82 | (3) |
|
|
85 | (4) |
|
|
89 | (1) |
|
A World without Informational Norms |
|
|
90 | (7) |
|
|
97 | (2) |
|
Appendix: Informational Privacy As a Common Pool Resource |
|
|
99 | (1) |
|
Natural Resource Common Pool Resources |
|
|
99 | (1) |
|
|
100 | (1) |
|
|
101 | (1) |
|
|
102 | (1) |
|
|
102 | (1) |
|
5 Notice and Choice: The Allure and the Illusion |
|
|
103 | (14) |
|
Free and Informed Consent through Informational Norms |
|
|
104 | (5) |
|
The Failure of Notice and Choice |
|
|
109 | (6) |
|
The Need for Collective Control |
|
|
115 | (2) |
|
6 The Threat of Collapse, The Prospects of Resistance |
|
|
117 | (22) |
|
|
118 | (7) |
|
The Stasi As a Reference Point |
|
|
125 | (2) |
|
Making Surveillance Difficult |
|
|
127 | (1) |
|
Cases in Which a Party to the Informational Norm Conducts Surveillance |
|
|
128 | (3) |
|
Cases in Which a Non-Party to the Norm Conducts Surveillance |
|
|
131 | (5) |
|
Resistance Where Relevant Norms Do Not Exist |
|
|
136 | (2) |
|
Resistance, Acquiescence, Acceptance |
|
|
138 | (1) |
|
|
139 | (21) |
|
Vaclav Havel's Greengrocer |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
Acquiescence in "Party to the Norm" Cases |
|
|
140 | (8) |
|
|
148 | (1) |
|
Acquiescence in "Not a Party to the Norm" Cases |
|
|
149 | (10) |
|
Acquiescence Where Relevant Informational Norms Do Not Exist |
|
|
159 | (1) |
|
How Common Is Acquiescence? |
|
|
159 | (1) |
|
8 Accept or Take Control? |
|
|
160 | (21) |
|
A Process of Acculturation |
|
|
160 | (3) |
|
|
163 | (6) |
|
|
169 | (2) |
|
|
171 | (1) |
|
|
172 | (1) |
|
|
173 | (3) |
|
|
176 | (4) |
|
|
180 | (1) |
|
9 Regulating Artificial Intelligence |
|
|
181 | (23) |
|
|
182 | (5) |
|
Level Playing Field Fairness |
|
|
187 | (10) |
|
|
197 | (2) |
|
A Role for the Federal Trade Commission |
|
|
199 | (2) |
|
Creating an Informational Norm |
|
|
201 | (3) |
Conclusion |
|
204 | (1) |
Index |
|
205 | |