Series Editors' Preface |
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xv | |
Acknowledgements |
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xvii | |
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xix | |
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Table of EU Secondary Law |
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xxii | |
Other Institutional Sources |
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xxiii | |
Introduction |
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1 | (29) |
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Main Objective: Deconstructing Private Personhood |
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4 | (3) |
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An Outline of EU Privacy Rights |
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7 | (2) |
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9 | (2) |
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The ECJ's Interpretation Practices |
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11 | (4) |
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Two Examples: Wirtschaftsakademie and Jehovan Todistajat |
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15 | (2) |
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Personal Data on Facebook Fan Pages |
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17 | (5) |
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Jehovan Todistajat: Religious Communities Are Not Exempt from Data Protection Regulation |
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22 | (5) |
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Courts, the Law and the Impossibility of Neutrality |
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27 | (3) |
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1 Private Persons Are Made |
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30 | (14) |
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What Is a Person, According to the Law? |
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30 | (3) |
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33 | (4) |
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What Do Privacy Rights Produce? |
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37 | (7) |
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44 | (25) |
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47 | (4) |
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Individualisation As an Index of Late Modernity |
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51 | (3) |
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Individualism in Legal Theories of Privacy |
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54 | (2) |
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Personal Data Is Always Data about an Individual |
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56 | (4) |
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Alternative Perspectives from the ECtHR |
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60 | (3) |
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Privacy Clashes with the Individual: the Buivids Case |
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63 | (3) |
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Even Relational Privacy Can Be Individualistic |
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66 | (3) |
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69 | (21) |
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Privacy Rights Protect Personhood |
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71 | (3) |
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Privacy Rights Focus on Protecting Autonomy |
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74 | (2) |
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Personal Data Law Protects Vulnerable Persons |
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76 | (1) |
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Fashion ID: the Activity of the Person Is Irrelevant |
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77 | (3) |
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Deconstructing the Autonomous Legal Person |
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80 | (2) |
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Subjective Conceptions of Privacy |
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82 | (4) |
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Persons Are Formed by Ideology |
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86 | (4) |
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90 | (19) |
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Privacy As Immunity: An Obstacle to an Open Society? |
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91 | (5) |
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Immunisation: Means for Withdrawal |
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96 | (2) |
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Openness and Closure: the Right to Be Forgotten |
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98 | (4) |
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Later Approaches to the Right to Be Forgotten |
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102 | (2) |
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Searching for Possibilities of Re-thinking: Impersonal Law |
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104 | (2) |
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Justice through the Impersonal? |
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106 | (3) |
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109 | (22) |
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Durkheim's Impersonal Individualism |
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112 | (5) |
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The Person As an Economic Agent in the EU |
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117 | (4) |
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Deutsche Post: Functioning Administration Overrides |
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121 | (6) |
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Surveillance Capitalism and Related Individualisation |
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127 | (4) |
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131 | (17) |
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Equality As a Presupposition |
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135 | (2) |
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137 | (2) |
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139 | (2) |
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Schrems I As a Political Act |
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141 | (4) |
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Equality and the Digital Poorhouse |
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145 | (3) |
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7 The Person In The Community |
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148 | (23) |
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Nancy: Singular Plurality |
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149 | (3) |
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Community, Not Common Essence |
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152 | (2) |
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Community Is Grounded in Freedom |
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154 | (4) |
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Can There Be a European Community? |
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158 | (3) |
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The Benefits of Thinking in the Singular-Plural |
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161 | (1) |
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162 | (4) |
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Returning to the Productions of Law |
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166 | (1) |
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167 | (4) |
Conclusions |
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171 | (5) |
Bibliography |
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176 | (9) |
Index |
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185 | |