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Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics 2012 ed. [Mīkstie vāki]

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  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 348 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, weight: 557 g, XVI, 348 p., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sērija : Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 23
  • Izdošanas datums: 27-Nov-2013
  • Izdevniecība: Springer
  • ISBN-10: 9400737831
  • ISBN-13: 9789400737839
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  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 348 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, weight: 557 g, XVI, 348 p., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sērija : Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 23
  • Izdošanas datums: 27-Nov-2013
  • Izdevniecība: Springer
  • ISBN-10: 9400737831
  • ISBN-13: 9789400737839
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The relation between logic and knowledge has been at the heart of a lively debate since the 1960s. On the one hand, the epistemic approaches based their formal arguments in the mathematics of Brouwer and intuitionistic logic. Following Michael Dummett, they started to call themselves `antirealists'. Others persisted with the formal background of the Frege-Tarski tradition, where Cantorian set theory is linked via model theory to classical logic. Jaakko Hintikka tried to unify both traditions by means of what is now known as `explicit epistemic logic'. Under this view, epistemic contents are introduced into the object language as operators yielding propositions from propositions, rather than as metalogical constraints on the notion of inference.

The Realism-Antirealism debate has thus had three players: classical logicians, intuitionists and explicit epistemic logicians. The editors of the present volume believe that in the age of Alternative Logics, where manifold developments in logic happen at a breathtaking pace, this debate should be revisited. Contributors to this volume happily took on this challenge and responded with new approaches to the debate from both the explicit and the implicit epistemic point of view.



The relation between logic and knowledge has provoked a heated debate since the 1960s. This book presents the first work on the Realism-Antirealism debate in the Age of Alternative Logics, and shows the most recent developments in philosophical logic.

Recenzijas

From the reviews:

The collection is composed of 18 chapters, covering a wide variety of topics. the volume offers a panorama of research work done in the first decade of the twenty first century, concerning the ongoing debate about realism vs anti-realism and is, therefore, necessary reading for anyone interested in the central questions in this debate. (Costas Dimitracopoulos, Metascience, February, 2013)

Preface.- Acknowledgements.- List of Contributors.- Contents.- On When a
Disjunction is Informative; Patrick Allo.-
1. Pluralism about Consequence and
Content.-
2. Situated and Worldly Content.-
3. Factual and Constraining
Content.-
4. Modelling Content.-
5. Three Objections Revisited.- References.-
My own truth; Alexandre Billon.-
1. Introduction.-
2. The Truth-Teller is
context-sensitive.-
3. The Truth-Teller is relative.-
4. Other pathologies of
self-reference.- 4.1 The Liar.- 4.2 Other semantic pathologies.- 4.3 Immunity
to revenge problems.-
5. Dissolutions, cassations and resolutions.-
References.- Which Logic for the Radical Anti-Realist?; Denis Bonnay; Mikail
Cozic.-
1. Introduction.-
2. From anti-realism to substructural logic.-
3.
Life without structural rules.- 4.The anti-realist justification of
substructural logic.-
5. A way out for radical anti-realism?.-
6.
Conclusion.- References.- Moores Paradox as an argument against
anti-realism; Jon Cogburn.-
1. Introduction.-
2. Moorean validity and proof
theoretic semantics.-
3. On the inadvisability of biting the bullet.-
4. A
new restriction strategy.-
5. Is antirealism a Moorean Validity? Reflections
on Fitchs proof and Dummetts program.-
6. Further reflections on Fitchs
proof.-
7. Berkeley and Davidsons use of Moorean validities.-References.-
The Neutrality of Truth in the debate Realism vs. Anti-Realism; Maria J.
Frapolli.-
1. Introduction.-
2. Truth.-
3. Realism and Antirealism.-
4. The
prosentential view.-
5. The syntactic function of the truth predicate.- 6.The
pragmatic function of the truth predicate.-
7. Epistemology and metaphysics.-
References.- Modalities without worlds; Reinhard Kahle.-
1. Modal logic.-
2.
Possible Worlds Semantics.-
3. The role of semantics.-
4. Criticism of modal
logic .-
5. An alternative analysis of modalities: Possibility.- 5.1
Possibility as independence.- 5.2 Epistemic possibility.- 5.3 The future.-
5.4 Ontological modesty.- 5.5 A cross check.-
6. An alternative analysis of
modalities: Necessity.- 6.1 Necessity as binary relation.- 6.2 Variety of
alternatives.- 6.3 Unary necessity.- 6.4 The normative nature of unary
necessity.-
7. The temporal aspect.- 7.1 The dynamics of the axiom system.-
7.2 Nested modalities.-
8. Conclusion.- References.-  Antirealism, meaning
and truth-conditional semantics; Neil Kennedy.-
1. Introduction.-
2.
Dummetts antirealism.-
3. Harmony and classical logic.-
4. Antirealist
meaning and holism.-
5. The disputed class.-
6. The obtaining of Truth
conditions.-
7. By way of conclusion.- References.- Game Semantics and the
Manifestation Thesis; Mathieu Marion.-
1. Rethinking the Anti-Realist
Challenge.-
2. Towards a Renewal.-
3. The the Manifestation Argument and the
Manifestation Thesis.-
4. Concluding Remarks.- References.- Conservativeness
and Eliminability for Anti-Realistic Definitions; Francesca Poggiolesi.-
1.
Realistic Conservativeness and Eliminability.-
2. Anti-Realistic Definitions
and Sequent Calculus.-
3. Anti-realistic Conservativeness.-
4. Anti-Realistic
Eliminability.-
5. Logical Variant of the Sequent Calculus.-
6. The Modal
Case.-
7. Anti-realistic definitions in past attempts..- References.-
Realism, Antirealism, and Paraconsistency; Graham Priest.-
1. Introduction.-
2. Classical vs Intuitionist Logic.-
3. The Logic of Constructible Negation.-
4.Paraconsistency.-
5. Quantified Intuitionist Logic.-
6. Quantified Logics
of Constructible Negation.-
7. Conclusion.-  References.- Type-theoretical
Dynamics; Giuseppe Primiero.-
1. Introduction.-
2. Conditions for
type-theoretical Dynamics.-  3. Belief Revision.-
4. Belief Merging.-
5. Some
Remarks.- 5.1 Admitting Beliefs.- 5.2 Degrees of Belief.- References.-
Negation in the Logic of First Degree Entailment and Tonk: A Dialogical
Study; Shahid Rahman.-
1. Introduction.-
2. Dialogical Logic and Meaning.-
2.1Local Meaning.- 2.2 Global Meaning.- 2.3 Play level, Strategic Level and
Tonk-like-Operators.-
3. The Dialogical Meaning of Negation and the Logic of
First Degree Entailment.- The Logic of First-Degree Entailment.- 3.1
Hintikkas Trees for Enquiry Games and FDE-Negation.- 3.2 Micheal Dunns
relational semantics for FDE.- 3.3 A Dialogical Study of FDE-Negation.-
Switch of Choices. Is Duality-Negation a Tonk-Like Operator?.- Dual Negation
and Dual Dialogical-Contexts.- The conditional in Dual Contexts.-
Appendices.- Appendix
1. Note on symmetric and asymmetric versions of the
E-Rule.- Appendix
2. The disjunctive property and the symmetric rule for
intuitionistic logic.- Appendix
3. Examples.- Appendix
4. Soundness and
completeness of Hintikka-trees* for Enquiry Games in relation to M. Dunns
relational semantics for FDE.- References.- Necessary Truth and Proof;
Stephen Read.-
1. Truthmaker Realism.-
2. Incompleteness.-
3. Anti-realism.-
4. Logical Pluralism.-
5. Contingency.- References.- Anti-Realist Classical
Logic and Realist Mathematics; Greg Restall.-
1. Introduction.-
2. Logic.-
3.
Mathematical Practice and Mathematical Theories.-
4. Consequences of the
View.-
5. Miscellaneous Concluding Remarks.-  References.- A Tale of two
Anti-Realisms; Sanford Shieh.-
1. Epistemological Anti-Realism.-
2. The
Bivalence Argument.-
3. Conceptual Anti-Realism.-
4. The Rejection of the
Bivalence Argument.-
5. Proof-Theoretic Validity.- References.- A Double
Diamond of Judgement; Goran Sundholm.-
1. Introduction.- 2.Judgement and
inference: the traditional picture.-
3. The great Bohemian: unary judgement.-
4. Brentano and an alternative unary approach.-
5. Freges judgement: truth
applied to function/argument structure.-
6. Cambridge truth-making.-
7.
Constructivist alternative: Proofs of propositions.- References.- Stable
Philosophical Systems and Radical Anti-Realism; Joseph Vidal-Rosset..-
1.
Philosophical systems and philosophy of logic.-1.1 Vuillemins
classification.- 1.2 What is a stable philosophical system?.-
2. A case of
philosophical dispute: Strict Finitism vs.Intuitionism.- 2.1 The contemporary
strict finitist argument.- 2.2 Linear Logic and Radical Anti-Realism.- 2.3
The feasibility criteria: polynomial time computability.-
3. Conclusion:
laziness or heroism?.- References.- Two Diamonds Are More Than One; Elia
Zardini.-
1. Introduction and Overview.-
2. The Paradox of Knowability and
the Restriction Strategy.-
3. A New Threat of Collapse of Feasible
Knowability on Actual Knowledge.- 4.Transitivity, Factivity, and the
Relativity of Accessibility.-
5. Epistemic Possibility of Knowledge and
Feasible Knowability.-
6. Conclusion.- References.-