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Reasoning about Preference Dynamics [Hardback]

  • Formāts: Hardback, 204 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, weight: 500 g, XVI, 204 p., 1 Hardback
  • Sērija : Synthese Library 354
  • Izdošanas datums: 01-Jun-2011
  • Izdevniecība: Springer
  • ISBN-10: 9400713436
  • ISBN-13: 9789400713437
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Reasoning about Preference DynamicsPalielināt
  • Formāts: Hardback, 204 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, weight: 500 g, XVI, 204 p., 1 Hardback
  • Sērija : Synthese Library 354
  • Izdošanas datums: 01-Jun-2011
  • Izdevniecība: Springer
  • ISBN-10: 9400713436
  • ISBN-13: 9789400713437
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9789400713437.html
Keywords:
Our preferences determine how we act and think, but exactly what the mechanics are and how they work is a central cause of concern in many disciplines. This book uses techniques from modern logics of information flow and action to develop a unified new theory of what preference is and how it changes. The theory emphasizes reasons for preference, as well as its entanglement with our beliefs. Moreover, the book provides dynamic logical systems which describe the explicit triggers driving preference change, including new information, suggestions, and commands. In sum, the book creates new bridges between many fields, from philosophy and computer science to economics, linguistics, and psychology. For the experienced scholar access to a large body of recent literature is provided and the novice gets a thorough introduction to the action and techniques of dynamic logic.

Reasoning about Preference Dynamics explores what it takes for logical systems to deal with information dynamics and preference change in an integrated way. The text covers all aspects of reasoning and agency, while providing a framework accessible to readers from various fields.

Recenzijas

"This is an excellent book.  It offers a clear and concise overview of dynamic preference logic and logics that can reason about both beliefs and preferences.  Fenrong has managed to provide an accessible and comprehensive overview of recent work in this area, including very interesting connections with deontic logic and game theory.  I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in using logical models to reason about rational agents." Eric Pacuit, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, The Netherlands

"Reasoning about Preference Dynamics is an innovative and unusually well-written account of human preferences and how they change. It is a must for anyone interested in the dynamics of preferences." Sven Ove Hansson, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden

"This nice book presents a survey of preference logics and preference dynamics, very much state-of-the-art, and Fenrong Liu is extremely well-informed about the relevant literature. She has a remarkable talent on how to restrict herself to the essentials, in order to convey the message and produce something very readable." Hans van Ditmarsch, University of Sevilla, Spain

Part I Introduction
1 Introduction
3(16)
1.1 A Brief Historical Sketch of Preference Logic
3(5)
1.1.1 Von Wright and the Basic Ideas
3(2)
1.1.2 Preference in Logic and Philosophy
5(2)
1.1.3 Preference in Decision Theory and Game Theory
7(1)
1.1.4 Preference in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence
7(1)
1.2 The Main New Themes in this Book
8(3)
1.2.1 Richer Representations: Reasons for Preference
9(1)
1.2.2 Entanglement: Preference, Knowledge and Belief
9(1)
1.2.3 Preference Change
10(1)
1.2.4 The Total Theory
10(1)
1.3 Guide for the Reader
11(4)
1.3.1 Part II: Dynamics of Information
11(1)
1.3.2 Part III: Preference Over Worlds
11(1)
1.3.3 Part IV: Preference from Priorities
12(1)
1.3.4 Part V: A Two-Level Perspective on Preference
13(1)
1.3.5 Part VI: Applications and Discussions
14(1)
1.3.6 Part VII: Finale
15(1)
1.4 Some Major Influences on This Book
15(4)
Part II Dynamics of Information
2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
19(14)
2.1 Introduction
19(1)
2.2 Epistemic Logic
20(2)
2.3 Public Announcement Logic
22(3)
2.4 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
25(2)
2.5 Methodology
27(6)
Part III Preference over Worlds
3 Preference over Worlds: Static Logic
33(10)
3.1 Introduction
33(1)
3.2 Modal Betterness Logic
34(3)
3.3 Expressive Power
37(3)
3.3.1 Generic Preference: Quantifier Lifts
37(1)
3.3.2 Expressing Generic Preferences in LB
38(1)
3.3.3 Conditional Preference
39(1)
3.4 Preservation and Characterization of A-Preference
40(2)
3.5 Conclusion
42(1)
4 Preference over Worlds: Dynamic Logic
43(12)
4.1 Introduction
43(2)
4.2 Dynamic Betterness Logic
45(3)
4.2.1 Upgrade as Relation Change
45(2)
4.2.2 Dynamics of Generic Preferences
47(1)
4.3 Preservation and General Betterness Transformers
48(4)
4.3.1 Preservation Properties of Upgrade
48(1)
4.3.2 Upgrade and Model Transformation
49(1)
4.3.3 A Program Format for Relation Change
49(3)
4.4 A Different Illustration: Default Reasoning
52(2)
4.4.1 Default Reasoning
52(1)
4.4.2 Complication: Coherence and Conflicting Suggestions
53(1)
4.5 Conclusion
54(1)
5 Entanglement of Preference, Knowledge and Belief
55(16)
5.1 Introduction
55(1)
5.2 Juxtaposing Knowledge and Betterness
56(4)
5.2.1 Static Logic
56(2)
5.2.2 Dynamic Logic and Some New Operations
58(2)
5.3 Connecting Belief with Betterness
60(5)
5.3.1 Belief Statics and Dynamics on Their Own
60(2)
5.3.2 Beliefs Together with Betterness
62(3)
5.4 Deeper Entanglement: Merged Belief and Betterness
65(3)
5.4.1 Static Logic
65(2)
5.4.2 Dynamic Logic
67(1)
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion
68(3)
6 Intermezzo: A Quantitative Approach
71(16)
6.1 Introduction
71(1)
6.2 Epistemic Evaluation Logic
72(3)
6.3 Dynamic Epistemic Evaluation Logic
75(3)
6.3.1 Evaluation Product Update
75(2)
6.3.2 Dynamic Epistemic Evaluation Logic
77(1)
6.4 Excursion: Bisimulation for Evaluation Languages
78(2)
6.5 Excursion: Numerical Measures in Deontics
80(2)
6.6 Conclusion
82(5)
Part IV Preference from Priorities
7 Preference from Priorities: Static Logic
87(12)
7.1 Introduction
87(2)
7.2 From Priorities to Preference
89(3)
7.2.1 Priority-Based Preference
89(1)
7.2.2 Syntactic Versus Semantic Views
90(2)
7.3 Order: Some Basics
92(1)
7.4 Preference Logic and a Representation Theorem
93(2)
7.5 Discussion and Conclusion
95(4)
8 Belief-Based Preference
99(16)
8.1 Introduction
99(1)
8.2 Doxastic Preference Logic
100(4)
8.2.1 Three Notions of Belief-Based Preference
100(2)
8.2.2 Doxastic Preference Logic
102(2)
8.3 Extension to the Multi-agent Case
104(3)
8.3.1 Multi-agent Doxastic Preference Logic
104(2)
8.3.2 Cooperative and Competitive Agents
106(1)
8.4 Preference over Propositions
107(6)
8.4.1 Preference over Propositions and Preference over Objects
111(2)
8.5 Conclusion
113(2)
9 Preference from Priorities: Dynamic Logic
115(8)
9.1 Introduction
115(1)
9.2 Preference Change due to Priority Change
116(1)
9.3 Preference Change due to Belief Change
117(2)
9.3.1 Hard Information
118(1)
9.3.2 Soft Information
118(1)
9.4 Conclusion
119(4)
Part V A Two-Level Perspective on Preference
10 A Two-Level Perspective on Preference
123(18)
10.1 Introduction
123(1)
10.2 An Extension to Priority Graphs
124(3)
10.2.1 Priority Graphs and Extrinsic Betterness
124(1)
10.2.2 An Extended Representation Theorem
125(2)
10.3 Basic Operations on Priority Graphs
127(2)
10.3.1 Basic Graph Update
127(1)
10.3.2 Graph Algebra
128(1)
10.4 Logics for Priority and Extrinsic Preference
129(3)
10.4.1 Modal Logic of Graph-Induced Betterness
129(1)
10.4.2 Internal Versus External Graph Language
130(2)
10.5 Relating Betterness and Priority Dynamics
132(5)
10.5.1 Cases of Harmony
133(1)
10.5.2 General Connections
134(2)
10.5.3 Obstacles to a Complete Match
136(1)
10.6 Discussion and Conclusion
137(4)
Part VI Applications and Discussions
11 Deontic Reasoning
141(20)
11.1 Introduction
141(1)
11.2 Priorities, Betterness and CTDs
142(5)
11.2.1 Priority Sequences
143(1)
11.2.2 P-Sequences and CTDs
144(1)
11.2.3 "To Make the Best of Sad Circumstances"
145(1)
11.2.4 `Best' in Modal Betterness Logic
146(1)
11.3 Deontics as Founded on Classification and Betterness
147(5)
11.3.1 Connecting Obligations to What is the Best
148(2)
11.3.2 Chisholm Paradox Revisited
150(2)
11.4 Betterness Dynamics and Deontics
152(2)
11.4.1 Two Level Dynamics in Deontics
152(2)
11.4.2 Discussion: Betterness Dynamics and Norm Change
154(1)
11.5 Conclusion
154(1)
11.6 Appendix: A Semantic Excursion on Imperatives
155(6)
11.6.1 Motivation
155(2)
11.6.2 Update Semantics for Conflicting Imperatives
157(4)
12 Games and Actions
161(24)
12.1 Introduction
161(1)
12.2 Preference Logic in Strategic Games
162(2)
12.3 Preference Logic in Extensive Games
164(4)
12.3.1 Dynamic Logic of Actions and Strategies
165(1)
12.3.2 Adding Preferences: The Case of Backward Induction
165(1)
12.3.3 Backward Induction in Preference-Action Logic
166(2)
12.4 Solution Dynamics in Extensive Games
168(2)
12.5 From Games to Preference Logic
170(2)
12.6 From Preference Logic to Games
172(9)
12.6.1 Preference Change in Games
172(4)
12.6.2 Rationalization Procedures and Game Change
176(4)
12.6.3 Adding Priority to Game Representation
180(1)
12.7 Preference in a Long-Term Perspective
181(1)
12.8 Conclusion
182(3)
Part VII Finale
13 Conclusion
185(4)
References 189(10)
Index 199
Fenrong Liu is an associate professor at Tsinghua University, Beijing, one of the most prestigious universities in China. She received her first Ph.D degree in Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2001 on default reasoning, a topic linking philosophy with Artificial Intelligence. From 2003-2008, she worked at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) at the University of Amsterdam, where she obtained a second Ph.D degree in Science on dynamic logics of preference. She has published some  40 papers, and has organized many events, including a new Chinese conferences series on Logic, Rationality, and Intelligent Interaction (LORI). Her research is aimed at understanding how information changes guide rational agency in terms of beliefs and preference, and in modelling similarities and differences between agents, making room for agent diversity in logic. In addition, she pursues an active program in Chinese Ancient Logic, reading Chinese old texts by modern logical theories.