"Ikäheimo develops a distinctive and cogent case for the centrality of recognition to our nature as social animals and grounds it in a highly sophisticated analysis of the philosophical foundations of the concept of recognition. The resulting account of the complex, multifaceted, nature of social recognition is a significant contribution to the field."
Cillian McBride, Queens University Belfast, UK
"It takes an unusual combination of philosophical talents to accomplish what is so splendid and original about this book: presenting an overview of the origins and further elaborations of the German notion of 'recognition' by simultaneously outlining a systematic account of recognitions role in the human form of life. Ikäheimos synthesis of conceptual history and systematization is at the same time hermeneutically sensitive and analytically rigorous, knowledgeable both of the history of German Idealism and of the current debates on human nature. For anyone interested in the richly layered role of recognition in human life this well-written and strongly argued book is a must-read."
Axel Honneth, Columbia University, USA
"Ikäheimos book proves his outstanding competence regarding one of the most influential theories in modern social philosophy: mutual recognition. He is both expert in its main sourcesGerman idealism, critical theory, and pragmatismand well versed with modern psychological and sociological evidence. Perhaps the most important achievement of the book is a justification of the universal claim to recognition on the basis of a constant human form of life, constituted by social cooperation under shared norms, aimed at future well-being and the development of 'full-fledged personhood'."
Ludwig Siep, University of Münster, Germany
"In his unconditionality thesis, Ikäheimo has even more fervently than Hegel accepted a certain romantic version of the love model for social recognition. Which is a reason for, not against, reading this book. Because of the breadth and its always acute argumentation, Ikäheimo's book is not only essential reading for philosophers interested in the philosophy of recognition, but even more essential reading for those who believe that philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and moral theory can be done in the absence of a theory recognition."
J.M. Bernstein, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews