This book proposes a novel theory of truth and falsity. It argues that truth is a form of reference and falsity is a form of reference failure.
Most of the philosophical literature on truth concentrates on certain ontological and epistemic problems. This book focuses instead on language. By utilizing the Fregean idea that sentences are singular referring expressions, the author develops novel connections between the philosophical study of truth and falsity and the huge literature in in the philosophy of language on the notion of reference. The first part of the book constructs the authors theory and argues for it in length. Part II addresses the ways in which the theory relates to, and is different from, some of the basic theories of truth. Part III takes up how to account for the truth of sentences with logical operators and quantifiers. Finally, Part IV discusses the applications and implications of the theory for longstanding problems in philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology.
A Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and linguistics.
Most of the philosophical literature on truth concentrates on certain ontological and epistemic problems. This book proposes a novel theory of truth and falsity. It argues that truth is a form of reference and falsity is a form of reference failure.
Part I: The Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity:
1. Introducing the
Referential Theory,
2. Freges Theory of Truth and Falsity,
3. Whenglish: A
Language with No Sentences,
4. Slingshot Argument. Part II: Some Common
Theories of Truth in Relation to the Referential Theory:
5. Correspondence
Theories,
6. Identity Theory,
7. Truthmaker Theories,
8. Deflationism. Part
III: Sentences with Logical Operators:
9. Negation,
10. Disjunctions and
Conditionals,
11. Existential and General Statements. Part IV: Applications
and Implications of the Referential Theory:
12. Liar Paradox,
13. Sentence
Reference and User Reference,
14. Ostensible versus Inostensible Reference,
15. Sentences as Rigid and Accidental Designators,
16. Necessity and
Contingency,
17. Knowledge and Curiosity,
18. Evolution of Language and
Emergence of Truth and Falsity.