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xv | |
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xvii | |
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xliii | |
Author Biographies |
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xlix | |
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1 "Who's Afraid of MiFID II?: An Introduction |
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1 | (13) |
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II Investment Firms and Investment Services |
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14 | (15) |
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29 | (16) |
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IV Supervision and Enforcement |
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45 | (3) |
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V The Broader View and the Future of MiFID |
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48 | (4) |
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52 | |
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II INVESTMENT FIRMS AND INVESTMENT SERVICES |
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1 | (1) |
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II Investment Firms under MiFID II |
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2 | (13) |
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15 | (1) |
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IV Investment Firms under the CRR |
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16 | (10) |
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26 | (3) |
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VI General Exemptions to MiFID II Applicability |
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29 | (8) |
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VII Trading on Own Account |
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37 | (5) |
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VIII Dealings in Emission Allowances |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (8) |
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X Insurance Companies and Insurance Intermediaries |
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51 | (4) |
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XI Managers of Collective Investment Undertakings |
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55 | (2) |
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XII Data-Reporting Service Providers |
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57 | (3) |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | |
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3 Governance of Investment Firms under MiFID II |
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1 | (3) |
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II Governance-related Regulation of Investment Firms between Prudential and Conduct-of-Business Regulation |
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4 | (17) |
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III The Technical Framework under MiFID II |
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21 | (44) |
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65 | |
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4 The Overarching Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the Client in MiFID II |
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1 | (3) |
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II Antecedents of the Investment Firm's Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the Client |
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4 | (3) |
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III The Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the Client in MiFID II |
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7 | (9) |
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IV The Duty's Functions and Contents |
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16 | (16) |
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V The Articulation of the Duty with Respect to Individual Services and Activities |
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32 | (41) |
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VI A Look Across the Atlantic |
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73 | (9) |
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82 | |
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5 Product Governance and Product Intervention under MiFID II/MiFIR |
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1 | (1) |
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2 | (39) |
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41 | (33) |
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74 | |
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6 Independent Financial Advice |
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1 | (2) |
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3 | (12) |
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15 | (5) |
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20 | (25) |
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45 | |
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I Foundations of the Regime |
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1 | (30) |
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II The Regime by Single Stages and Examples |
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31 | (56) |
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87 | |
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Larissa Silverentand Jasha Sprecher |
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1 | (3) |
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4 | (14) |
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III The Dutch Inducement Ban |
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18 | (12) |
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IV The UK Inducement Rules |
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30 | (7) |
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37 | (23) |
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VI Research as an Inducement |
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60 | (7) |
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67 | |
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9 Agency and Principal Dealing under MiFID I and MiFID II |
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1 | (3) |
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II Four Transaction Types |
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4 | (15) |
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19 | (4) |
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IV Acting as Agent or as Principal: Not a Justified Distinction to Serve as a Basis for Determining the Degree of Investor Protection |
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23 | (32) |
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55 | |
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10 MiFID II/MiFIR's Regime for Third-Country Firms |
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1 | (3) |
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II Scope of MiFID II/MiFIR's Regime for Third-Country Firms |
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4 | (13) |
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III Eligible Counterparties and Per Se Professional Clients |
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17 | (28) |
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IV Retail Clients and Opt Up Professional Clients |
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45 | (12) |
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V Retail Clients, Professional Clients, and Eligible Counterparties |
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57 | (8) |
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65 | (11) |
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76 | |
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11 Governance and Organization of Trading Venues: The Role of Financial Market Infrastructure Groups |
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1 | (2) |
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II Trading Facilities: Concept and Regulatory Framework |
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3 | (29) |
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III The EU Scenario of Trading Venues |
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32 | (26) |
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IV FMI Groups in an MiFID II World |
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58 | (28) |
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86 | |
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12 EU Financial Governance and Transparency Regulation: A Test for the Effectiveness of Post-Crisis Administrative Governance |
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I Transparency Regulation and EU Financial Governance: Why It Matters |
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1 | (9) |
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II Transparency Regulation and EU Financial Governance |
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10 | (24) |
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III MiFIR, Transparency, and Supervisory Administrative Governance |
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34 | (11) |
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IV MiFIR, Transparency, and Administrative Regulatory Governance |
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45 | (11) |
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56 | |
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1 | (3) |
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II Existing Alternative Markets for SMEs in Europe |
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4 | (11) |
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III SME Growth Markets under MiFID II |
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15 | (19) |
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IV Alternative Disclosure Obligations? |
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34 | (13) |
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V What Role for the `SME Growth Market' Label? Some Reflections on Alternative Scenarios |
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47 | (7) |
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54 | |
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14 Dark Trading under MiFID II |
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1 | (9) |
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II Dark Pools: Motivation, Classification, and Related Literature |
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10 | (29) |
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III Dark Pools under MiFID I |
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39 | (20) |
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IV Dark Pool Regulation under MiFID II/MiFIR |
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59 | (42) |
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101 | |
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15 Derivatives: Trading, Clearing, STP, Indirect Clearing, and Portfolio Compression |
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1 | (5) |
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II The Trading Obligation |
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6 | (26) |
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III The Clearing Obligation |
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32 | (17) |
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IV The Straight-Through-Processing Obligations |
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49 | (27) |
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V The Obligations in Respect of Indirect Clearing |
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76 | (29) |
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VI The Obligations in Respect of Portfolio Compression |
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105 | (23) |
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128 | |
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Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi |
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1 | (7) |
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II Features of the Commodity Derivatives Markets and Its Relation to the Crisis |
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8 | (9) |
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III Overview of the Most Important EU Provisions on Commodity Derivatives |
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17 | (25) |
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IV The Regulatory Perimeter of the MiFID II/MiFIR Package |
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42 | (21) |
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V The New Position Limits Regime |
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63 | (20) |
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VI A New Set of Intervention Powers for Authorities and Trading Venues |
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83 | (7) |
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90 | |
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17 Algorithmic Trading and High-Frequency Trading (HFT) |
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1 | (21) |
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22 | (20) |
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III High-Frequency Trading |
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42 | (19) |
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61 | |
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18 MiFID II and Equity Trading: A US View |
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4 | (36) |
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II High-Frequency Trading |
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40 | (54) |
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III Dark Pools and Internalization |
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94 | (11) |
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IV Conclusions: Reflections on Issues Raised by MiFID II |
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105 | |
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IV SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT |
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19 Public Enforcement of MiFID II |
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1 | (6) |
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II Structure of the Study |
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7 | (4) |
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III Competent Authorities: General Aspects, Powers, and Redress Procedures |
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11 | (72) |
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IV Cooperation Arrangements |
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83 | (44) |
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V Concluding Remarks and Assessment |
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127 | |
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20 The Private Law Effect of MiFID I and MiFID II: The Genii Case and Beyond |
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1 | (2) |
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II May Civil Courts Be Less Strict Than MiFID I and MiFID II? |
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3 | (2) |
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III May Civil Courts Be Stricter Than MiFID I and MiFID II? |
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5 | (16) |
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IV May Contracting Parties Be Less Strict Than MiFID I and MiFID II? |
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21 | (1) |
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V May Contracting Parties Be Stricter Than MiFID I and MiFID II? |
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22 | (6) |
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VI Influence of MiFID I and MiFID II on the Principle of Relativity |
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28 | (2) |
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VII Influence of MiFID I and MiFID II on Proof of Causation |
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30 | (6) |
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VIII Influence of MiFID I and MiFID II on a Contractual Limitation or Exclusion of Liability |
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36 | (3) |
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IX MiFID I and MiFID II Assessments by the Courts of Their Own Motion in Relation to Private Investors? |
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39 | (1) |
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40 | |
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V THE BROADER VIEW AND THE FUTURE OF MIFID |
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21 MiFID II in Relation to Other Investor Protection Regulation: Picking Up the Crumbs of a Piecemeal Approach |
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1 | (3) |
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4 | (23) |
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III MiFID II and IDD versus UCITS KII and PRIIPs KID |
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27 | (25) |
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IV Cross-Selling Practices |
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52 | (5) |
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57 | |
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22 Shadow Banking and the Functioning of Financial Markets |
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1 | (9) |
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II Shadow Banking: Concept and Terminology |
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10 | (7) |
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III Non-Regulated Activity According to the FSB Approach |
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17 | (10) |
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IV What Financial Activity is not Subject to Banking Supervision? |
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27 | (8) |
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V The European Response to Shadow Banking |
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35 | (97) |
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132 | |
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23 Investment-Based Crowdfunding: Is MiFID II Enough? |
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1 | (3) |
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II Benefits, Risks, and Challenges |
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4 | (8) |
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12 | (6) |
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IV National Approaches to Crowdfunding |
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18 | (16) |
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34 | (21) |
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55 | (638) |
Index |
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693 | |