We have increasingly sophisticated ways of acquiring and communicating knowledge, but efforts to spread this knowledge often encounter resistance to evidence. The phenomenon of resistance to evidence, while subject to thorough investigation in social psychology, is acutely under-theorised in the philosophical literature. Mona Simion's book is concerned with positive epistemology: it argues that we have epistemic obligations to update and form beliefs on available and undefeated evidence. In turn, our resistance to easily available evidence is unpacked as an instance of epistemic malfunctioning. Simion develops a full positive, integrated epistemological picture in conjunction with novel accounts of evidence, defeat, norms of inquiry, permissible suspension, and disinformation. Her book is relevant for anyone with an interest in the nature of evidence and justified belief and in the best ways to avoid the high-stakes practical consequences of evidence resistance in policy and practice. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Recenzijas
'People who deny well established truths are an obtrusive feature of the contemporary world. Mona Simion argues that such denial manifests a breach of our epistemic obligation to respond to easily available evidence. As well as shedding light on an important phenomenon, she develops new accounts of evidence, defeat, disinformation and our obligations as inquirers. This rich and wide-ranging book will be essential reading for all epistemologists, as well as anyone interested in the root causes of so much contemporary political dysfunction.' Neil Levy, University of Oxford
Papildus informācija
Explores the phenomenon of distrusting evidence coming from reliable sources with current examples including climate change and vaccine scepticism.
Introduction; Part I. The Epistemology and Psychology of Resistance to
Evidence:
1. Resistance to evidence: triggers and epistemic status;
2.
Evidence one has and the impermissibility of resistance;
3. Evidence you
should have had and resistance;
4. Permissible suspension and evidence
resistance;
5. Resistance to evidence, epistemic responsibility, and
epistemic vice; Part II. Resistance to Evidence and Epistemic Proper
Function:
6. Resistance to evidence as epistemic malfunction;
7. Evidence as
knowledge indicators;
8. Defeaters as ignorance indicators;
9. Permissible
suspensions and permissible withholdings; Part III. Theoretical Upshots:
10.
Epistemic oughts and epistemic dilemmas;
11. Scepticism as resistance to
evidence;
12. Knowledge and disinformation; Concluding remarks: the way
forward in policy and practice; Bibliography; Index.
Mona Simion is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre at the University of Glasgow. Her publications include Sharing Knowledge (Cambridge, 2021) and Shifty Speech and Independent Thought (2021).
