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E-grāmata: Resonance: From Probability To Epistemology And Back

(Univ Of Washington, Usa)
  • Formāts: 428 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 26-May-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Imperial College Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781783269228
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  • Formāts: 428 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 26-May-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Imperial College Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781783269228

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Resonance examines some building blocks of epistemology as a prelude to the careful analysis of the foundations of probability. The concept of resonance is introduced to shed light on the philosophical problems of induction, consciousness, intelligence and free will. The same concept is later applied to provide support for a new philosophical theory of probability.Although based on existing ideas and theories, the epistemological concept of resonance is investigated for the first time in this book. The best-known philosophical theories of probability, frequency and subjective, are shown to be unrealistic and dissociated from the two main branches of statistics: frequency statistics and Bayesian statistics.Written in an accessible style, this book can be enjoyed by philosophers, statisticians and mathematicians, and also by anyone looking to expand their understanding of the disciplines of epistemology and probability.
Preface vii
About the Author ix
1 Introduction
1(16)
1.1 Knowledge
1(1)
1.2 Probability
2(1)
1.3 Summary of the Main Claims
3(8)
1.3.1 Resonance
3(1)
1.3.2 Critique of frequency and subjective philosophies of probability
4(1)
1.3.2.1 Positive philosophical ideas
5(1)
1.3.2.2 Negative philosophical ideas
6(2)
1.3.2.3 Innovative technical ideas
8(1)
1.3.3 Scientific laws of probability
8(1)
1.3.4 Statistics and philosophy
9(2)
1.4 Historical and Social Context
11(2)
1.5 Disclaimers
13(4)
Philosophy of Probability
17(124)
2 Main Philosophies of Probability
19(22)
2.1 The Classical Theory
20(1)
2.2 The Logical Theory
20(2)
2.3 The Propensity Theory
22(1)
2.4 The Subjective Theory
22(9)
2.4.1 Interpreting subjectivity
23(1)
2.4.2 Verification of probabilistic statements
24(2)
2.4.3 Subjectivity as an escape from the shackles of verification
26(1)
2.4.4 The Dutch book argument
27(2)
2.4.5 The axiomatic system
29(1)
2.4.6 Identification of probabilities and decisions
30(1)
2.4.7 The Bayes theorem
30(1)
2.5 The Frequency Theory
31(2)
2.6 Summary of Philosophical Theories of Probability
33(1)
2.7 From Ideas to Theories
34(1)
2.8 Popular Philosophy
35(3)
2.9 Is There Life Beyond Von Mises and De Finetti?
38(3)
3 Skepticism
41(18)
3.1 How Do You Prove that You are Not a Camel?
41(1)
3.2 Skepticism
42(5)
3.2.1 Frustration of philosophers
46(1)
3.3 Anything Goes
47(1)
3.4 Von Mises' Brand of Skepticism
48(3)
3.4.1 The smoking gun
49(1)
3.4.2 Inconsistencies in von Mises' theory
49(2)
3.5 De Finetti's Brand of Skepticism
51(4)
3.5.1 How to eat the cake and have it too
52(3)
3.6 On Approximate Theories
55(1)
3.7 Temperature, Beauty and Probability
56(1)
3.8 Latter Day Subjectivism
57(2)
4 The Frequency Philosophy of Probability
59(20)
4.1 Collective as an Elementary Concept
59(2)
4.2 Applications of Probability Do Not Rely on Collectives
61(4)
4.2.1 Stochastic processes
61(1)
4.2.2 Unlikely events
62(1)
4.2.3 Graphical communication
63(2)
4.3 Collectives in Real Life
65(2)
4.4 Collectives and Symmetry
67(1)
4.5 Frequency Theory and the Law of Large Numbers
68(1)
4.6 Why is Mathematics Useful?
69(1)
4.7 Benefits of Imagination and Imaginary Benefits
70(1)
4.8 Imaginary Collectives
71(1)
4.9 Computer Simulations
72(1)
4.10 Frequency Theory and Individual Events
73(1)
4.11 Collectives and Populations
74(1)
4.12 Are All i.i.d. Sequences Collectives?
75(1)
4.13 Are Collectives i.i.d. Sequences?
76(1)
4.14 Martin-Lof Sequences
77(2)
5 The Subjective Philosophy of Probability
79(46)
5.1 "Subjective" --- A Word with a Subjective Meaning
80(1)
5.2 The Subjective Theory of Probability is Objective
81(2)
5.3 A Science without Empirical Content
83(1)
5.4 If Probability does not Exist, Everything is Permitted
84(4)
5.4.1 Creating something out of nothing
85(1)
5.4.2 The essence of probability
86(2)
5.5 De Finetti's Ultimate Failure
88(7)
5.5.1 Lazy decision maker
90(1)
5.5.2 Interpreting Dutch book
91(1)
5.5.3 Dutch book with a lapse of time
92(1)
5.5.3.1 The butterfly effect
93(1)
5.5.4 Rule of conditionalization
94(1)
5.6 All Sequential Decisions are Consistent
95(1)
5.7 Honest Mistakes
96(2)
5.8 Cohabitation with an Evil Demiurge
98(2)
5.9 Why Bother to Use Probability?
100(1)
5.10 The Dutch Book Argument is Rejected by Bayesians
100(1)
5.11 Insurance Against Everything
101(1)
5.12 No Need to Collect Data
102(1)
5.13 Empty Promises
103(1)
5.14 The Meaning of Consistency
104(1)
5.15 Interpreting Miracles
105(2)
5.16 Science, Probability and Subjectivism
107(1)
5.17 Apples and Oranges
108(1)
5.18 Arbitrage
109(1)
5.19 Subjective Theory and Atheism
110(1)
5.20 Imagination and Probability
111(2)
5.21 A Misleading Slogan
113(1)
5.22 Axiomatic System as a Magical Trick
114(1)
5.23 The Meaning of Subjectivity
114(5)
5.24 Probability and Chance
119(3)
5.25 Conflict Resolution
122(3)
6 The Logical Philosophy of Probability
125(6)
6.1 Falsifiability
125(2)
6.2 Why Do Scientists Ignore the Logical Philosophy of Probability?
127(1)
6.3 Probabilities of Propositions and Events
128(3)
7 Common Issues
131(10)
7.1 Law Enforcement
131(2)
7.2 The Value of Extremism
133(1)
7.3 Common Elements in Frequency and Subjective Theories
133(1)
7.4 Common Misconceptions
134(2)
7.5 Shattered Dreams of Perfection
136(1)
7.6 What Exists?
137(1)
7.7 Abuse of Language
137(4)
7.7.1 Expected value
138(1)
7.7.2 Standard deviation
138(1)
7.7.3 Subjective opinions
138(1)
7.7.4 Optimal Bayesian decisions
138(1)
7.7.5 Confidence intervals
138(1)
7.7.6 Significant difference
138(1)
7.7.7 Consistency
139(1)
7.7.8 Objective Bayesian methods
139(1)
7.7.9 Prior
140(1)
7.7.10 Non-informative prior
140(1)
Epistemology
141(74)
8 Epistemology
143(34)
8.1 The Problem of Induction
143(6)
8.1.1 An ill posed problem
144(2)
8.1.1.1 On intuitively obvious propositions
146(1)
8.1.2 Induction is a law of nature
147(1)
8.1.3 Anthropic principle
148(1)
8.2 Resonance
149(15)
8.2.1 Information and knowledge
149(1)
8.2.2 Resonance complexity
150(1)
8.2.3 Facts
151(2)
8.2.4 Learning resonance
153(2)
8.2.5 Resonance level reduction
155(1)
8.2.6 Properties of resonance
156(1)
8.2.7 Physical basis of resonance
157(2)
8.2.8 Information and knowledge revisited
159(1)
8.2.9 Resonance and subjectivity
160(1)
8.2.10 Raw resonance
161(1)
8.2.11 Resonance and philosophy of Hume
162(1)
8.2.12 Is resonance a new concept?
163(1)
8.3 Consciousness
164(2)
8.4 Intelligence
166(5)
8.4.1 Artificial Intelligence
169(1)
8.4.2 Social Context of Intelligence
170(1)
8.5 Free Will
171(3)
8.6 From Philosophy to Science
174(3)
9 Religion
177(4)
10 Science
181(34)
10.1 Science as a Communication System
181(3)
10.2 Some Attributes of Science
184(3)
10.2.1 Interpersonal character
184(1)
10.2.2 The role and limitations of resonance
185(1)
10.2.3 Convergence to the truth?
185(1)
10.2.4 Science control
186(1)
10.2.5 Beyond simple induction
186(1)
10.2.6 Science as a web
187(1)
10.3 Science for Scientists
187(1)
10.4 Alien Science
188(2)
10.4.1 A lonely alien
189(1)
10.5 Sources and Perils of Loyalty
190(5)
10.5.1 Science as an antidote to manipulation
193(1)
10.5.2 Dependent information sources
194(1)
10.6 Falsificationism and Resonance
195(2)
10.7 Falsificationism as a Religion
197(3)
10.7.1 Sainthood in science
198(2)
10.8 Technology
200(1)
10.9 Multiple Personality Disorder
200(2)
10.10 Reality, Philosophy and Science
202(2)
10.11 Decision Making
204(1)
10.12 Major Trends in Philosophy of Science
205(8)
10.12.1 Real science --- the big picture
207(1)
10.12.2 Probabilism and Bayesianism in philosophy of science
208(2)
10.12.3 Levels of philosophical analysis
210(1)
10.12.4 Position of my theory in philosophy of science
211(2)
10.13 Circularity
213(2)
Science of Probability
215(116)
11 The Science of Probability
217(54)
11.1 Interpretation of (L1)--(L6)
218(8)
11.1.1 Events
218(1)
11.1.2 Symmetry
219(2)
11.1.3 Enforcement
221(1)
11.1.4 Limits of applicability
221(1)
11.1.5 (L1)--(L6) as a starting point
222(1)
11.1.6 Approximate probabilities
223(1)
11.1.7 Statistical models
224(1)
11.1.8 The Bayes theorem
225(1)
11.1.9 Probability of past events
225(1)
11.1.10 Purely mathematical independence
226(1)
11.1.11 Ruelle's view of probability
226(1)
11.2 Scientific Verification of (L1)--(L6)
226(3)
11.3 Predictions
229(13)
11.3.1 Predictions at various reliability levels
230(2)
11.3.2 Predictions in existing scientific and philosophical theories
232(1)
11.3.3 Predictions, conditioning and hypothesis tests
233(1)
11.3.4 Prediction examples
233(1)
11.3.5 Histograms and image reconstruction
234(2)
11.3.6 Contradictory predictions
236(2)
11.3.7 Multiple predictions
238(4)
11.4 Symmetry, Independence and Resonance
242(1)
11.5 Symmetry is Relative
243(1)
11.6 Moderation is Golden
244(2)
11.7 Applications of (L1)--(L6): Some Examples
246(4)
11.7.1 Poisson process
246(1)
11.7.2 Laws (L1)--(L6) as a basis for statistics
247(1)
11.7.3 Long run frequencies and (L1)--(L6)
247(1)
11.7.4 Life on Mars
248(2)
11.8 Symmetry and Data
250(1)
11.9 Probability of a Single Event
251(1)
11.10 On Events that Belong to Two Sequences
252(1)
11.11 Events Are More Fundamental Than Random Variables
253(1)
11.12 Deformed Coins
254(2)
11.13 Are Coin Tosses i.i.d. or Exchangeable?
256(1)
11.14 Mathematical Foundations of Probability
257(1)
11.15 Axioms versus Laws of Science
258(1)
11.16 Objective and Subjective Probabilities
259(1)
11.17 Physical and Epistemic Probabilities
260(1)
11.18 Can Probability Be Explained?
261(2)
11.19 Propensity
263(1)
11.20 Countable Additivity
264(1)
11.21 Yin and Yang
265(1)
11.22 Are Laws (L1)--(L6) Necessary?
266(1)
11.23 Quantum Mechanics
266(1)
11.24 The History of (L1)--(L6) in Philosophy of Probability
267(1)
11.25 Symmetry and Theories of Probability
268(3)
12 Decision Making
271(20)
12.1 Common Practices
271(1)
12.2 Decision Making in the Context of (L1)--(L6)
272(8)
12.2.1 Maximization of expected gain
272(3)
12.2.2 Maximization of expected gain as an axiom
275(1)
12.2.3 Stochastic ordering of decisions
275(3)
12.2.4 Generating predictions
278(1)
12.2.5 Intermediate decision problems
279(1)
12.3 Decision Making and Resonance
280(2)
12.4 Events with No Probabilities
282(2)
12.5 Utility
284(6)
12.5.1 Variability of utility in time
284(1)
12.5.2 Nonlinearity of utility
285(2)
12.5.3 Utility of non-monetary rewards
287(1)
12.5.4 Unobservable utilities
288(1)
12.5.5 Can utility be objective?
288(1)
12.5.6 What is the utility of gazillion dollars?
289(1)
12.6 Identification of Decisions and Probabilities
290(1)
13 Frequency Statistics
291(16)
13.1 Confidence Intervals
291(3)
13.1.1 Practical challenges with statistical predictions
292(2)
13.1.2 Making predictions is necessary
294(1)
13.2 Estimation
294(5)
13.2.1 Estimation and (L1)--(L6)
297(1)
13.2.2 Unbiasedness --- a concept with a single application
297(2)
13.3 Hypothesis Testing
299(4)
13.3.1 Hypothesis tests and collectives
300(1)
13.3.2 Hypothesis tests and the frequency interpretation of probability
301(1)
13.3.3 Hypothesis testing and (L1)--(L6)
301(1)
13.3.3.1 Sequences of hypothesis tests
301(1)
13.3.3.2 Single hypothesis test
302(1)
13.4 Hypothesis Testing and (L6)
303(1)
13.5 Hypothesis Testing and Falsificationism
304(1)
13.6 Does Frequency Statistics Need the Frequency Philosophy of Probability?
304(3)
14 Bayesian Statistics
307(24)
14.1 Two Faces of Subjectivity
307(2)
14.1.1 Non-existence versus informal assessment
307(1)
14.1.2 Are all probabilities subjective?
308(1)
14.1.3 Conditioning versus individuality
308(1)
14.1.4 Non-existent decisions
309(1)
14.2 Elements of Bayesian Analysis
309(1)
14.3 Models
310(1)
14.3.1 Bayesian models are totally objective
310(1)
14.3.2 Bayesian models are totally subjective
311(1)
14.4 Priors
311(6)
14.4.1 Objective priors
312(1)
14.4.2 Bayesian statistics as an iterative method
313(2)
14.4.3 Truly subjective priors
315(2)
14.5 Resonance at Work
317(1)
14.6 Data
318(1)
14.7 Posteriors
318(3)
14.7.1 Non-convergence of posterior distributions
319(2)
14.8 Bayesian Statistics and (L1)--(L6)
321(1)
14.9 Spurious Predictions
321(1)
14.10 Who Needs Subjectivism?
322(1)
14.11 Preaching to the Converted
323(3)
14.12 Constants and Random Variables
326(2)
14.13 Criminal Trials
328(3)
Miscellanea
331(60)
15 On Ideologies
333(20)
15.1 On Ideologies and Their Photo-Negatives
333(4)
15.2 Experimental Statistics --- A Missing Science
337(3)
15.3 Statistical Time Capsules
340(1)
15.4 Is Statistics a Science?
341(2)
15.5 Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Philosophy of Probability
343(1)
15.6 From Intuition to Science
344(2)
15.7 Science as Service
346(1)
15.8 The Three Aspects of Probability
347(1)
15.9 Is Probability a Science?
348(1)
15.10 Are Probability and Logic Experimental Sciences?
349(4)
16 Paradoxes, Wagers and Rules
353(22)
16.1 St. Petersburg Paradox
353(2)
16.2 Pascal's Wager
355(6)
16.2.1 Scientific aspects of Pascal's wager
356(1)
16.2.1.1 Two kinds of infinity
356(1)
16.2.1.2 Minor sins
357(1)
16.2.1.3 On the utility of eternal life in hell
358(1)
16.2.1.4 Exponential discounting
358(1)
16.2.2 A sociological analysis of Pascal's wager
359(2)
16.3 Cromwell's Rule
361(5)
16.3.1 Cromwell's rule: practical implementation
361(3)
16.3.2 Cromwell's rule: philosophical problems
364(2)
16.4 Principal Principle
366(1)
16.5 A New Prisoner Paradox
367(2)
16.5.1 Analysis of the new prisoner paradox
368(1)
16.6 Ellsberg Paradox
369(3)
16.7 The Probability of God
372(3)
17 Teaching Probability
375(8)
17.1 Teaching Independence
378(1)
17.2 Probability and Frequency
379(1)
17.3 Undergraduate Textbooks
380(3)
18 Mathematical Methods of Probability and Statistics
383(8)
18.1 Probability
383(3)
18.1.1 Law of large numbers, central limit theorem and large deviations principle
385(1)
18.1.2 Exchangeability and de Finetti's theorem
385(1)
18.2 Frequency Statistics
386(1)
18.3 Bayesian Statistics
387(1)
18.4 Contradictory Predictions
388(3)
Bibliography 391(6)
Index 397