Atjaunināt sīkdatņu piekrišanu

E-grāmata: Responsibility in Law and Morality

  • Formāts: 320 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 17-Apr-2002
  • Izdevniecība: Hart Publishing
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781847310262
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
  • Formāts - PDF+DRM
  • Cena: 42,82 €*
  • * ši ir gala cena, t.i., netiek piemērotas nekādas papildus atlaides
  • Ielikt grozā
  • Pievienot vēlmju sarakstam
  • Šī e-grāmata paredzēta tikai personīgai lietošanai. E-grāmatas nav iespējams atgriezt un nauda par iegādātajām e-grāmatām netiek atmaksāta.
Responsibility in Law and MoralityPalielināt
  • Formāts: 320 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 17-Apr-2002
  • Izdevniecība: Hart Publishing
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781847310262
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

DRM restrictions

  • Kopēšana (kopēt/ievietot):

    nav atļauts

  • Drukāšana:

    nav atļauts

  • Lietošana:

    Digitālo tiesību pārvaldība (Digital Rights Management (DRM))
    Izdevējs ir piegādājis šo grāmatu šifrētā veidā, kas nozīmē, ka jums ir jāinstalē bezmaksas programmatūra, lai to atbloķētu un lasītu. Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu, jums ir jāizveido Adobe ID. Vairāk informācijas šeit. E-grāmatu var lasīt un lejupielādēt līdz 6 ierīcēm (vienam lietotājam ar vienu un to pašu Adobe ID).

    Nepieciešamā programmatūra
    Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu mobilajā ierīcē (tālrunī vai planšetdatorā), jums būs jāinstalē šī bezmaksas lietotne: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Lai lejupielādētu un lasītu šo e-grāmatu datorā vai Mac datorā, jums ir nepieciešamid Adobe Digital Editions (šī ir bezmaksas lietotne, kas īpaši izstrādāta e-grāmatām. Tā nav tas pats, kas Adobe Reader, kas, iespējams, jau ir jūsu datorā.)

    Jūs nevarat lasīt šo e-grāmatu, izmantojot Amazon Kindle.

Lawyers who write about responsibility tend to focus on criminal law at the expense of civil and public law; while philosophers tend to treat responsibility as a moral concept,and either ignore the law or consider legal responsibility to be a more or less distorted reflection of its moral counterpart. This book aims to counteract both of these biases. By adopting a comparative institutional approach to the relationship between law and morality, it challenges the common view that morality stands to law as critical standard to conventional practice. It shows how law and morality interact symbiotically, and how careful study of legal concepts of responsibility can add significantly to our understanding of responsibility more generally. At the heart of this book lie two questions: what does it mean to say we are responsible? And, what are our responsibilities? Its aim is not to answer these questions but to challenge some traditional approaches to answering them and more importantly, to suggest fruitful alternative approaches that take law seriously.

Recenzijas

...an impressive and comprehensive discussion of the treatment of responsibility in the law-a discussion that ranges across nearly every field of law, and across jurisdictions, supported by detailed references to cases and supplemented by knowledgeable summaries of commentary by lawyers, legal philosophers, and moral philosophers. Brian H. Bix Ethics Oct 06 Peter Cane has written an impressively wide-ranging and illuminating booka truly commendable piece of work. Cane's book deserves a large audience among legal, moral, and political philosophers. Matthew H. Kramer, Cambridge University Philosophical Review May 2005 ...it offers a notably clear and robust formulation of a social approach towards responsibility... he has plenty of interesting and illuminating insights to offer...lawyers and philosphers alike will learn a great deal from this careful dissection of topics... Jeremy Watkins Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 26, No 3 (2006), pp 593-608 This is a wide-ranging, highly sophisticated work which looks at concepts of responsibility in law across a range of areas. Alan Norrie Adelaide Law Review May 2002 'Responsibility in Law and Morality' is a challenging and valuable book. Although I have criticised Cane's account of responsibilty in this review, I do not wish to leave the reader with the impression that his book is anything but valuable and rewarding it is an illuminating study of responsibilty in law. It is my view that modern lawyers have a great deal to learn from its approach. Accordingly, apart from being essential reading for anyone interested in legal theory, the book has much to teach any lawyer with even the smallest interest in the justifications of legal liability. Allan Beever Melbourne University Law Review May 2002

1. Moral and Legal Responsibility 1(28)
1.1 Prospectus
1(5)
1.1.1 Starting points and themes
1(3)
1.1.2. The structure of the book
4(2)
1.2 The institutions of law and morality
6(6)
1.2.1 Law
6(4)
1.2.2 Morality
10(2)
1.3 The relationship between law and morality
12(3)
1.4 Moral reasoning and legal reasoning
15(13)
1.4.1 Practical and analytical reasoning
16(6)
1.4.2 Context and levels of abstraction
22(3)
1.4.3 Deduction, induction and analogy
25(3)
1.5. Summary
28(1)
2. The Nature and Functions of Responsibility 29(36)
2.1 Varieties of responsibility
29(14)
2.1.1 Hart's taxonomy
29(2)
2.1.2 The temporal element in responsibility
31(8)
2.1.3 Personal and vicarious responsibility
39(1)
2.1.4 Individual, shared and group responsibility
40(3)
2.2 Responsibility and sanctions
43(1)
2.3 Responsibility, evidence and proof
44(5)
2.4 Responsibility as a relational phenomenon
49(7)
2.4.1 Responsibility, agents and outcomes: three paradigms of legal responsibility
49(4)
2.4.2 Responsibility and social values
53(3)
2.4.3 Summary
56(1)
2.5 Functions of responsibility practices
56(4)
2.6 Responsibility, liability and the functions of law
60(3)
2.7 Conclusion
63(2)
3. Responsibility and Culpability 65(48)
3.1 Responsibility, liability and culpability
65(1)
3.2 Responsibility and luck
66(12)
3.2.1 Limited sensitivity to luck
66(3)
3.2.2 Limited sensitivity to circumstantial luck
69(3)
3.2.3 Limited sensitivity to dispositional luck
72(4)
3.2.4 Liability, sanctions and dispositional luck
76(2)
3.3 Criteria of legal liability
78(7)
3.3.1 Fault
78(4)
3.3.2 Strict liability
82(3)
3.4 The incidence of fault-based and strict liability
85(3)
3.5 The nature and function of legal criteria of liability
88(6)
3.5.1 Liability criteria are nested
88(1)
3.5.2 Liability criteria are building blocks
89(1)
3.5.3 Liability criteria and answers
89(3)
3.5.4 Liability criteria and sanctions
92(2)
3.6 Responsibility, fault and culpability
94(16)
3.6.1 "Moral responsibility requires intentionality"
95(1)
3.6.2 Some definitional preliminaries
96(1)
3.6.3 The importance of choice
97(13)
3.7 Summary
110(3)
4. Responsibility and Causation 113(30)
4.1 Causation, consequences and outcomes
114(1)
4.2 The nature of causation in law
115(5)
4.2.1 The scope of the causation question
115(1)
4.2.2 The temporal orientation of causation
116(1)
4.2.3 The meaning of "cause"
117(1)
4.2.4 Causation as interpretation
118(1)
4.2.5 Causation in the criminal law and civil law paradigms
119(1)
4.3 Factual causation
120(8)
4.3.1 The but-for and NESS tests
120(3)
4.3.2 Causation, proof and uncertainty
123(5)
4.4 Attributive causation
128(8)
4.4.1 The relationship between causation and responsibility
128(2)
4.4.2 Principles of causal responsibility
130(6)
4.5 Causation in law and morality
136(4)
4.6 Conclusion
140(3)
5. Responsibility and Personality 143(38)
5.1 Three issues of personality and responsibility
143(1)
5.2 Approaches to the relationship between personality and responsibility
143(2)
5.3 Legal personality and the corporation
145(3)
5.4 Legal principles of group personality
148(10)
5.4.1 Responsibility, personality and rules of attribution
148(2)
5.4.2 Responsibility and capacity
150(1)
5.4.3 Basic legal rules of attribution
151(7)
5.5 Group responsibility and division of labour
158(4)
5.6 The scope and functions of group responsibility
162(1)
5.7 Legal and moral group responsibility
163(2)
5.8 Modified humanistic approaches
165(4)
5.9 Divided minds
169(2)
5.10 Shared responsibility
171(8)
5.10.1 The relationship between group and shared responsibility
171(1)
5.10.2 Joint and concurrent responsibility
172(1)
5.10.3 Contributory negligence
173(1)
5.10.4 Secondary responsibility
173(1)
5.10.5 Secondary and group responsibility
174(1)
5.10.6 Vicarious responsibility
175(2)
5.10.7 Assessing shares of responsibility
177(2)
5.11 Conclusion
179(2)
6. Grounds and Bounds of Responsibility 181(44)
6.1 The basic argument and a prospectus
181(1)
6.2 Responsibility, protected interests and the functions of law
181(5)
6.3 Responsibility, distributive justice and the functions of law
186(4)
6.4 Protected interests, proscribed conduct and distributive justice
190(1)
6.5 Grounds of legal responsibility
191(19)
6.5.1 Breach of promises and undertakings
191(5)
6.5.2 Interference with rights
196(2)
6.5.3 Uttering untruths
198(2)
6.5.4 Breach of trust
200(2)
6.5.5 Doing harm
202(4)
6.5.6 Creating risks of harm
206(2)
6.5.7 Making gains
208(1)
6.5.8 Contemplating crimes
209(1)
6.6 The bounds of legal responsibility
210(14)
6.6.1 For breach of promises and undertakings
210(1)
6.6.2 For interference with rights
211(2)
6.6.3 For uttering untruths
213(1)
6.6.4 For breach of trust
213(1)
6.6.5 For doing harm
214(7)
6.6.6 For creating risks of harm
221(1)
6.6.7 For making gains
221(2)
6.6.8 For contemplating crimes
223(1)
6.7 Conclusion
224(1)
7. Realising Responsibility 225(26)
7.1 The "law in the books" vs the "law in action"
225(1)
7.2 Settlement
226(13)
7.2.1 The nature of settlements
226(3)
7.2.2 The dynamics of the settlement process
229(3)
7.2.3 For and against settlement
232(3)
7.2.4 Settlement and responsibility
235(4)
7.3 Selective enforcement
239(2)
7.4 Spreading legal responsibility
241(8)
7.4.1 The importance of insurance in civil law
241(1)
7.4.2 Insurance and interpretations of tort law
242(3)
7.4.3 A relational and functional account of the relationship between responsibility and liability insurance
245(4)
7.5 Conclusion
249(2)
8. Responsibility in Public Law 251(28)
8.1 The public law paradigm
251(3)
8.2 The institutional framework of public law
254(2)
8.3 The province of public law
256(2)
8.4 Grounds of public law responsibility
258(14)
8.4.1 Civil liability
258(6)
8.4.2 Criminal liability
264(4)
8.4.3 Judicial review
268(4)
8.5 Bounds of public law responsibility
272(3)
8.5.1 Civil liability
272(1)
8.5.2 Criminal liability
273(1)
8.5.3 Judicial review
273(2)
8.6 Public law responsibility and "the problem of dirty hands"
275(3)
8.7 Conclusion
278(1)
9. Thinking about Responsibility 279(6)
References 285(12)
Index 297


For 20 years, Peter Cane taught law at Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Since 1997 he has been a Professor of Law in the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University.
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/97818473102622e.html
Keywords: