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E-grāmata: Responsive Judicial Review: Democracy and Dysfunction in the Modern Age

(Scientia Professor of Law, University of New South Wales)
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Democratic dysfunction can arise in both 'at risk' and well-functioning constitutional systems. It can threaten a system's responsiveness to both minority rights claims and majoritarian constitutional understandings. Responsive Judicial Review aims to counter this dysfunction using examples
from both the global north and global south, including leading constitutional courts in the US, UK, Canada, India, South Africa, and Colombia, as well as select aspects of the constitutional jurisprudence of courts in Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, and Korea.

In this book, Dixon argues that courts should adopt a sufficiently 'dialogic' approach to countering relevant democratic blockages and look for ways to increase the actual and perceived legitimacy of their decisions—through careful choices about their framing, and the timing and selection of cases.
By orienting judicial choices about constitutional construction toward promoting democratic responsiveness, or toward countering forms of democratic monopoly, blind spots, and burdens of inertia, judicial review helps safeguard a constitutional system's responsiveness to democratic majority
understandings. The idea of 'responsive' judicial review encourages courts to engage with their own distinct institutional position, and potential limits on their own capacity and legitimacy.

Dixon further explores the ways that this translates into the embracing of a 'weakened' approach to judicial finality, compared to the traditional US-model of judicial supremacy, as well as a nuanced approach to the making of judicial implications, a 'calibrated' approach to judicial scrutiny or
judgments about proportionality, and an embrace of 'weak DS strong' rather than wholly weak or strong judicial remedies. Not all courts will be equally well-placed to engage in review of this kind, or successful at doing so. For responsive judicial review to succeed, it must be sensitive to
context-specific limitations of this kind. Nevertheless, the idea of responsive judicial review is explicitly normative and aspirational: it aims to provide a blueprint for how courts should think about the practice of judicial review as they strive to promote and protect democratic constitutional
values.

Recenzijas

In this masterful work, Rosalind Dixon returns judicial representation-reinforcement to center stage in our understanding of judicial review. Her theory of how judicial intervention can counteract democratic dysfunction is rooted in rich examples and a breadth and depth of comparative expertise that reflects her position as a leading scholar in the field. What makes this book of exceptional importance is its close attention to the opportunities and challenges in operationalizing responsive judicial review; Dixon speaks directly to judges in outlining how constitutional courts might function as democracy-protecting and democracy-promoting. In presenting a theory of judicial review alongside guidance for its implementation, Dixon reanimates our aspirations for courts as valued participants in achieving a society committed to democratic responsiveness. * Erin F. Delaney, Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law * Comprehensive in its sweep, systematic in its analysis, and yet distinctive in its focus, Rosalind Dixon's insightful book is a major contribution to the growing comparative literature on political process approaches to constitutional review. * Stephen Gardbaum, Stephen Yeazell Endowed Chair in Law, UCLA * Professor Dixon has written a landmark book on the theory of judicial review. Using excellent examples drawn from around the world, she shows how courts should modulate their decision-making in response to legal, social, and political context. Her book will become the go-to resource for the field, on which all future work will build. * David Landau, Mason Ladd Professor and Associate Dean for International Programs, Florida State University College of Law *

1 Introduction
1(24)
A Courts and Democratic Dysfunction: Promoting Democratic Responsiveness
2(6)
B Responsiveness to Context and Limits on Judicial Capacity
8(3)
C Responsive Judging: Responding to Litigants (and Disappointed Parties)
11(2)
D A Sometimes View of the Promise of Judicial Review
13(3)
E Structure of the Book
16(9)
PART 1 DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS
2 Constitutions and Constructional Choice
25(34)
A Judicial Review and Constructional Choice
27(10)
1 Abortion, sexual privacy, and same-sex marriage
27(6)
2 Implied speech and equality rights
33(1)
3 Structural social rights
33(3)
4 An unconstitutional amendment doctrine
36(1)
B Constitutional Theory and Constructional Choice
37(6)
1 Abortion
40(1)
2 Sexual privacy and equality
41(1)
3 Structural social rights
42(1)
C Why Courts? Constitutional Choice and Democracy
43(4)
D Ely's Response
47(5)
E Criticism of Ely's Approach
52(2)
F Representation-Reinforcement Beyond Ely
54(5)
3 Defining Democracy and Democratic Dysfunction
59(36)
A Defining Democracy
60(5)
B Democratic Dysfunction: Antidemocratic Monopoly Power
65(15)
1 Electoral monopoly
72(2)
2 Institutional monopoly
74(4)
3 Monopoly: Intent versus effect
78(2)
C Legislative Blind Spots and Burdens of Inertia
80(8)
1 Legislative blind spots
82(2)
2 Legislative burdens of inertia
84(4)
D "Deliberate" versus Interconnected Democratic Blockages
88(7)
PART 2 COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS
4 The Scope and Intensity of Responsive Judicial Review
95(48)
A The Legal and Political Legitimacy of Judicial Review
96(3)
B The Political Legitimacy of Constitutional Implications
99(3)
C Responsive Review in Practice
102(25)
1 Abortion rights
102(6)
2 LGBTQI+rights
108(7)
3 Implied rights to freedom of expression and equality
115(2)
4 Structural social rights
117(5)
5 Unconstitutional amendment doctrine
122(5)
D The Intensity of Judicial Review: Toward Calibrated Proportionality or Scrutiny
127(13)
1 Calibrating judgments about limitations on expression
131(3)
2 Calibrating judgments about discrimination
134(6)
E Deference and a Legislative Action/Inaction Distinction
140(3)
5 Democratic Dysfunction and the Effectiveness of Responsive Review
143(38)
A Detecting Democratic Dysfunction
145(6)
B Countering Dysfunction
151(6)
C Responsive Judicial Review in Practice
157(10)
1 Comparative LGBTQI + rights
158(3)
2 Structural social rights
161(4)
3 Unconstitutional amendment doctrine
165(2)
D Preconditions for Success
167(14)
1 Judicial independence and a political tolerance interval for judicial review
168(3)
2 Litigation support structure
171(5)
3 Jurisdiction and remedial toolkit
176(5)
6 Risks to Democracy: Reverse Inertia, Democratic Backlash, and Debilitation
181(23)
A Limits on Judicial Capacity and Legitimacy
182(3)
B Reverse Burdens of Inertia
185(9)
C Democratic Backlash
194(6)
D Democratic Debilitation
200(1)
E Judicial Prudence, Principle, and Pragmatism
201(3)
7 Toward Strong-Weak/Weak-Strong Judicial Review and Remedies
204(41)
A Weakened Judicial Review
205(11)
B Why (and How to) Weaken Review
216(12)
1 The democratic minimum core and the pragmatic argument for weak-strong judicial review
217(3)
2 Blind spots and burdens of inertia: a principled and pragmatic case for weak-strong review
220(8)
C Toward Strong-Weak/Weak-Strong Judicial Review
228(12)
D Conclusion
240(5)
PART 3 RESPONSIVE JUDGING AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
8 A Responsive Judicial Voice: Building a Court's Legitimacy
245(36)
A Why Responsive Judging--or a Responsive Judicial Voice
246(2)
B Judicial Framing and Responsive Judicial Review
248(6)
1 Authorship
248(2)
2 Tone: Respect or comity
250(2)
3 Narrative
252(2)
C Responsive Judicial Review and Judging: Building Support for LGBTQI+ Rights
254(7)
D Responsive Judging and the Democratic Minimum Core
261(4)
E Responsive Judging: Limits and Cautions
265(16)
1 Limits on responsive judging
265(2)
2 Democratic legitimacy versus legitimation
267(2)
3 A responsive judicial voice beyond the bench
269(2)
9 Conclusion: Toward a New Comparative Political Process Theory?
271(10)
Index 281
Rosalind Dixon is a leading global expert on comparative constitutional law, design, and democracy. She is Scientia Professor of Law at UNSW Sydney, and a former assistant professor at the University of Chicago Law School, visiting professor at Columbia Law School, Harvard Law School, and the National University of Singapore. She has served as co-president of the International Society of Public Law, and is a member of the Australian Academy of Law and Academy of Arts and Social Sciences.