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E-grāmata: Rethinking Historical Jurisprudence

  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Sērija : Rethinking Law series
  • Izdošanas datums: 21-Oct-2022
  • Izdevniecība: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781802200744
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  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Sērija : Rethinking Law series
  • Izdošanas datums: 21-Oct-2022
  • Izdevniecība: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781802200744

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This stimulating book considers the ways in which historical jurisprudence deserves to be rethought, arguing that there is much more to the history of legal thought than the ideas, and ideology, of the nineteenth and early twentieth century jurists, such as Karl von Savigny and Sir Henry Maine.

This stimulating book considers the ways in which historical jurisprudence deserves to be rethought, arguing that there is much more to the history of legal thought than the ideas, and ideology, of the nineteenth and early twentieth century jurists, such as Karl von Savigny and Sir Henry Maine.



In doing so, Geoffrey Samuel looks at the history of legal thought, method and reasoning from the position of three questions that will help readers to reflect on the nature of legal knowledge. First, what has legal knowledge been in the past? Secondly, taking a cue from the work of Thomas Kuhn, have there been scientific revolutions in the history of law? Thirdly, do jurists today know more about law as a body of knowledge than jurists of the past? In other words, does the history of law reveal a body of cumulative knowledge? This nuanced book shows how in re-examining legal knowledge from a diachronic perspective historical jurisprudence can be rethought as a domain concerned with contemporary legal epistemology.



Ambitious in its scope, Rethinking Historical Jurisprudence will be a key resource for students and scholars in the fields of legal philosophy, legal theory and history and research methods in law.

Recenzijas

Geoffrey Samuel is a leading legal comparatist and epistemologist whose decades-long scholarship has made fundamental contributions to the nature and dynamics of legal reasoning in both Common and Civil law jurisdictions. Rethinking Historical Jurisprudence represents a major step along Samuels rich intellectual path. It makes a compelling and much-needed case for reconsidering what amounts to historical legal thought. Learned yet accessible, Rethinking Historical Jurisprudence is a must-read for all those interested in the history and epistemology of legal reasoning. -- Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, University of Dundee, UK

Preface ix
Acknowledgements xi
Introduction to historical jurisprudence 1(7)
1 Paradigms and revolutions
8(26)
1 Introduction
8(2)
2 Obstacles and revolutions
10(3)
3 Epistemological questions
13(3)
4 Realism and anti-realism
16(2)
5 Social science and revolutions
18(2)
6 Law as science
20(5)
7 Validation
25(2)
8 Law as social science
27(4)
9 Science and progress
31(2)
10 Concluding remark
33(1)
2 Schemes and paradigm orientations
34(22)
1 Introduction
34(3)
2 Authority paradigm
37(5)
3 Holism versus individualism
42(2)
4 Level of observation
44(2)
5 Truth versus fiction
46(4)
6 Schemes of intelligibility
50(3)
7 Dialectical scheme
53(1)
8 Concluding remarks
54(2)
3 Roman legal methods and reasoning (1)
56(23)
1 Introduction: schemes of intelligibility and roman texts
56(1)
2 Overview of the Roman texts
57(3)
3 Roman legal reasoning: general overview
60(5)
4 Formalism and structuralism
65(5)
5 Casuistry and causality
70(2)
6 Dialectical analysis
72(3)
7 Analogy and inference: the language and structure of facts
75(2)
8 Summarising observations
77(2)
4 Roman legal methods and reasoning (2)
79(25)
1 Utilitas and functionality
79(2)
2 Fiction and functionalism
81(5)
3 Regulae iuris
86(3)
4 Interpretatio (ars hermeneutica)
89(2)
5 Rules and reasoning
91(2)
6 The whole (form) and its parts (substance)
93(5)
7 Roman law as myth
98(2)
8 Concluding observations
100(4)
5 Post-Roman methods and methodologies
104(33)
1 Method and authority
104(5)
2 Scholastic epistemology
109(4)
3 Hermeneutical turn (ars hermeneutica)
113(2)
4 Interpretation (de verborum significatione)
115(3)
5 Structural turn (ins civile in artem redactum)
118(3)
6 Mathematical turn (mos mathematicus)
121(4)
7 Scientific turn (methodus dogmaticus)
125(2)
8 Dogmatics and the common lawyer
127(2)
9 Dialectical tradition (dialectica britannica)
129(5)
10 Methodology and formalism: some reflections
134(3)
6 Contemporary methods and methodological issues
137(26)
1 Functionalist turn {utilitas)
137(5)
2 Actionalist turn {homo singularis)
142(2)
3 Causal turn
144(4)
4 Causality and economics
148(2)
5 Culturalist turn (ex cultura ius oritur)
150(2)
6 Culturalism and method
152(3)
7 Culturalism and theory
155(3)
8 Culturalism and epistemology
158(4)
9 Concluding remark
162(1)
7 Terminology and the foundations of legal theory
163(27)
1 Introduction
163(2)
2 Terms and names
165(2)
3 Terminology and definition
167(2)
4 Defining law (/us) itself
169(2)
5 Iusnaturale
171(3)
6 Ius commune
174(2)
7 Ownership (dominium, proprietas)
176(3)
8 Ius possessionis
179(4)
9 Right (ius and dominium)
183(6)
10 Concluding remark
189(1)
8 Taxonomy and theory building
190(33)
1 Order and knowledge (ars et scientia)
190(2)
2 Private law (ius privatum)
192(8)
3 Law of persons (ius personarum)
200(5)
4 Law of things (ius rerum)
205(4)
5 Law of actions (ius actionum)
209(3)
6 Public law (/us publicum)
212(4)
7 Contract (contractus) (I): ius publicum and political theory
216(2)
8 Contract (2): ius privatum
218(4)
9 Concluding remark
222(1)
9 Private law theory and the resurgence of formalism
223(24)
1 Introduction: neo-formalism
223(4)
2 Formalism: historical considerations
227(3)
3 Foundations of modern formalism
230(3)
4 Formalism and the common law
233(4)
5 External formalism
237(4)
6 Formalism and objectivity
241(4)
7 Concluding remarks
245(2)
10 Have there been scientific revolutions in law?
247(27)
1 Revolutions and legal thought
247(5)
2 Was legal humanism a revolution?
252(2)
3 Revolutions and the common law
254(3)
4 English law in the Nineteenth Century
257(3)
5 Revolution in the Nineteenth Century?
260(2)
6 Revolutions in the modern law
262(4)
7 Why no revolutions?
266(4)
8 Weaker Kuhn thesis?
270(4)
11 Is legal knowledge cumulative (or has there been progress in law)? (1)
274(26)
1 Introduction
274(1)
2 Preliminary difficulties
275(4)
3 Models and programmes
279(3)
4 Cumulative knowledge in the social and human sciences
282(2)
5 Explanation (causation) and understanding (hermeneutics)
284(3)
6 Vertical and horizontal movements
287(4)
7 Legal humanism and its contribution
291(5)
8 Legal evolution
296(2)
9 Dialectics to structuralism (and back)
298(2)
12 Is legal knowledge cumulative (or has there been progress in law)? (2)
300(27)
1 Progress (or not)?
300(5)
2 Legal theory and progress
305(4)
3 Progress or refining?
309(3)
4 Historical jurisprudence and society
312(3)
5 Systems and society
315(4)
6 Law and discourse on law
319(4)
7 Back to Baldus via the natural lawyers?
323(3)
8 Concluding remark
326(1)
Conclusion 327(5)
Bibliography 332(31)
Index of names 363(4)
Index of subjects 367
Geoffrey Samuel, Professor Emeritus, Kent Law School, UK