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E-grāmata: Rethinking Legal Reasoning

  • Formāts: EPUB+DRM
  • Sērija : Rethinking Law series
  • Izdošanas datums: 31-Aug-2018
  • Izdevniecība: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781784712617
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  • Formāts: EPUB+DRM
  • Sērija : Rethinking Law series
  • Izdošanas datums: 31-Aug-2018
  • Izdevniecība: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781784712617

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'Rethinking' legal reasoning seems a bold aim given the large amount of literature devoted to this topic. In this thought-provoking book, Geoffrey Samuel proposes a different way of approaching legal reasoning by examining the topic through the context of legal knowledge (epistemology). What is it to have knowledge of legal reasoning?

At a more specific level the pursuit of this understanding is conducted through posing a number of questions that are founded on different approaches. What has legal reasoning been? What are the institutional and conceptual legacies of this history? What is the literature and textual heritage? How does it compare with medical reasoning and with reasoning in the humanities? Can it be demystified? In exploring these questions Samuel suggests a number of frameworks that offer some new insights into the nature of legal reasoning.

The author also puts forward two key ideas. First, that the legal notion of an 'interest' might perhaps be a very suitable artefact for rethinking legal reasoning; and, secondly, that fiction theory might be the most viable 'epistemological attitude' for understanding, if not rethinking, reasoning in law.

This book will be of great interest to academics who are researching legal method and legal reasoning, as well as epistemology of the social sciences and aspects of comparative law. It will also be an insightful text for those interested in legal history and historical perspectives on legal reasoning.

Recenzijas

'This excellent book pursues the author's relentless ontological and epistemological project of thinking (and rethinking) legal reasoning, with a view to showing the relevance of law for the social sciences and the humanities: there is more indeed to law as a discipline than description of, and reasoning about, rules!' --Horatia Muir Watt, Ecole de Droit, Sciences-po, France

Preface ix
Permissions x
Table of common law cases and practice directions
xi
Table of common law legislation
xvi
General introduction 1(11)
1 What was the contribution of the medieval civilians?
12(21)
1.1 General remarks
12(2)
1.2 Glossators
14(3)
1.3 Methods of the glossators
17(4)
1.4 Post-Glossators (Commentators)
21(3)
1.5 Theory and methods of the Post-Glossators
24(3)
1.6 Ius commune and the development of method
27(6)
2 What was the contribution of the Roman lawyers?
33(24)
2.1 General overview
33(3)
2.2 Institutes: persons, things and actions
36(2)
2.3 Casuistry and categorisation
38(3)
2.4 Philosophical and theory contexts
41(1)
2.5 Attitude and specific techniques
42(5)
2.6 Logic and rationalisation
47(2)
2.7 Reasoning and texts
49(2)
2.8 Legal fictions
51(1)
2.9 Assessing the contribution of the Roman jurists
52(5)
3 What was the contribution of the later civilians and the common lawyers?
57(30)
3.1 Humanist re-orientation
57(3)
3.2 Civilian rationalists
60(5)
3.3 Nominalism and rights
65(2)
3.4 Codification and reasoning
67(3)
3.5 Codification and legal science
70(3)
3.6 Social interests
73(1)
3.7 Common law reaction
74(5)
3.8 Reacting to civilian formalism
79(3)
3.9 Legal argumentation
82(2)
3.10 Legal argumentation and the civilians
84(2)
3.11 Quovadisl
86(1)
4 What is the institutional legacy?
87(30)
4.1 Introduction
87(2)
4.2 Rule model
89(6)
4.3 Interpretation model
95(4)
4.4 Rights model
99(6)
4.5 Interest model
105(4)
4.6 Policy model
109(2)
4.7 Remedies model
111(3)
4.8 Legal models: some concluding remarks
114(3)
5 What is the legal literature legacy?
117(26)
5.1 Teaching and practice of law
117(3)
5.2 Common law teachers
120(2)
5.3 Legal taxonomy
122(4)
5.4 Taxonomy and reasoning
126(2)
5.5 Taxonomy and fact
128(3)
5.6 Mapping and reasoning
131(1)
5.7 Representing knowledge
132(2)
5.8 Unjust enrichment
134(2)
5.9 Scientific and legal taxonomy
136(2)
5.10 Empirical categories
138(2)
5.11 Rationalisation and reasoning
140(3)
6 How do legal reasoners treat facts?
143(25)
6.1 Introduction: law and fact
143(2)
6.2 Institutional model and facts
145(2)
6.3 Ex facto ius oritur
147(4)
6.4 Law and causation
151(4)
6.5 Proof of causation
155(3)
6.6 Causing damage and causing a risk
158(2)
6.7 Ex iure factum oritur (virtual facts)
160(3)
6.8 Competing narratives
163(3)
6.9 Theorising fact
166(2)
7 Is legal reasoning like medical reasoning?
168(29)
7.1 Introduction: patients and clients
168(2)
7.2 Legal and medical reasoning: generalities
170(1)
7.3 Diagnosing a legal problem
171(3)
7.4 Reasoning and models
174(2)
7.5 Knowledge models and reasoning about facts
176(3)
7.6 Induction
179(2)
7.7 Deduction
181(3)
7.8 Coherence versus policy: dialectical and functional reasoning
184(4)
7.9 Explanation, understanding and confrontation
188(2)
7.10 Explanation and manipulation
190(7)
8 Is legal reasoning like reasoning in film studies?
197(32)
8.1 Preliminary problems
197(5)
8.2 Form and content (personification theory)
202(5)
8.3 Role of anima
207(2)
8.4 Childish (and elitist) introspection
209(2)
8.5 Representation and dimensions
211(2)
8.6 Depicting reality: representation theory
213(3)
8.7 Competing images
216(2)
8.8 Reception theory
218(4)
8.9 From theory to interpretation
222(3)
8.10 Theory versus interpretative frameworks
225(3)
8.11 Towards fiction theory?
228(1)
9 Is legal reasoning based on fictions?
229(29)
9.1 Introduction: fiction theory
229(2)
9.2 Epistemological attitude
231(2)
9.3 Legal reasoning and concepts
233(3)
9.4 Reasonable person
236(2)
9.5 Nomen iuris
238(1)
9.6 Inferential legal reasoning
238(3)
9.7 Fiction and policy
241(2)
9.8 Fact and fiction
243(3)
9.9 Interpretation and fiction
246(2)
9.10 Taxonomy and fiction
248(3)
9.11 Fiction and knowledge representation
251(4)
9.12 Conclusion: legal reasoning and reality
255(3)
10 Can legal reasoning be rethought?
258(27)
10.1 Introduction: demystifying legal reasoning
258(2)
10.2 Rule model and system
260(3)
10.3 Analogy
263(4)
10.4 Analogy and the rule model
267(3)
10.5 Casuistic reasoning
270(3)
10.6 Reasoning about facts: schemes of intelligibility
273(3)
10.7 Lessons from social science schemes
276(1)
10.8 Demystification and the rule model of law
277(2)
10.9 Paradigm question
279(6)
11 Rethinking legal reasoning: should jurists take interests more seriously?
285(22)
11.1 Introduction
285(1)
11.2 Rights and interests
286(3)
11.3 Defining an interest
289(2)
11.4 Advantages attaching to the notion of an interest
291(3)
11.5 Interests attaching to the persona
294(4)
11.6 Interests attaching to the res
298(3)
11.7 Interests attaching to the actio
301(5)
11.8 Interests and the institutional plan
306(1)
12 Should jurists take interests more seriously (continued)?
307(22)
12.1 Abuse of a right
307(3)
12.2 Liberty, expectations and interests
310(2)
12.3 Damages, debt and interests
312(3)
12.4 Penalties and interests
315(2)
12.5 Sectional interests
317(4)
12.6 Mediating role of an interest
321(2)
12.7 Diluting tendencies of interests
323(2)
12.8 Rights versus interests
325(2)
12.9 Taking interests seriously
327(2)
Concluding remarks 329(4)
Bibliography 333(14)
Index 347
Geoffrey Samuel, Professor Emeritus, Kent Law School, UK