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E-grāmata: Robot Rights

3.92/5 (113 ratings by Goodreads)
(Northern Illinois University)
  • Formāts: 256 pages
  • Sērija : Robot Rights
  • Izdošanas datums: 19-Oct-2018
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262348560
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  • Formāts: 256 pages
  • Sērija : Robot Rights
  • Izdošanas datums: 19-Oct-2018
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262348560
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A provocative attempt to think about what was previously considered unthinkable: a serious philosophical case for the rights of robots.We are in the midst of a robot invasion, as devices of different configurations and capabilities slowly but surely come to take up increasingly important positions in everyday social reality—self-driving vehicles, recommendation algorithms, machine learning decision making systems, and social robots of various forms and functions. Although considerable attention has already been devotedto the subject of robots and responsibility, the question concerning the social status of these artifacts has been largely overlooked. In this book, David Gunkel offers a provocative attempt to think about what has been previously regarded as unthinkable: whether and to what extent robots and other technological artifacts of our own making can and should have any claim to moral and legal standing.In his analysis, Gunkel invokes the philosophical distinction (developed by David Hume) between “is” and “ought” in order to evaluate and analyze the different arguments regarding the question of robot rights. In the course of his examination, Gunkel finds that none of the existing positions or proposals hold up under scrutiny. In response to this, he then offers an innovative alternative proposal that effectively flips the script on the is/ought problem by introducing another, altogether different way to conceptualize the social situation of robots and the opportunities A provocative attempt to think about what was previously considered unthinkable: a serious philosophical case for the rights of robots.
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1(12)
1 Thinking the Unthinkable
13(40)
1.1 Robot
14(12)
1.1.1 Science Fiction
15(4)
1.1.2 Indeterminate Determinations
19(3)
1.1.3 Moving Target
22(1)
1.1.4 Results/Summary
23(3)
1.2 Rights
26(7)
1.2.1 Definition
26(4)
1.2.2 Theories of Rights
30(3)
1.3 Robot Rights or the Unthinkable
33(15)
1.3.1 Ridiculous Distractions
34(4)
1.3.2 Justifiable Exclusions
38(5)
1.3.3 Literal Marginalization
43(1)
1.3.4 Exceptions that Prove the Rule
44(4)
1.4 Summary
48(5)
2 !S1→!S2: Robots Cannot Have Rights; Robots Should Not Have Rights
53(26)
2.1 Default Understanding
53(2)
2.2 Literally Instrumental
55(7)
2.2.1 Being vs. Appearance
57(2)
2.2.2 Ontology Precedes Ethics
59(1)
2.2.3 Limited Rights
60(2)
2.3 Instrumentalism at Work
62(4)
2.3.1 Expertise
63(1)
2.3.2 Robots Are Tools
64(1)
2.3.3 Is/Ought Inference
65(1)
2.4 Duty Now and for the Future
66(3)
2.5 Complications, Difficulties, and Potential Problems
69(7)
2.5.1 Tool != Machine
69(3)
2.5.2 Not Just Tools
72(3)
2.5.3 Ethnocentrism
75(1)
2.6 Summary
76(3)
3 SI→S2: Robots Can Have Rights; Robots Should Have Rights
79(28)
3.1 Evidence, Instances, and Examples
80(13)
3.1.1 Philosophical Arguments
80(8)
3.1.2 Legal Arguments
88(4)
3.1.3 Common Features and Advantages
92(1)
3.2 Complications, Difficulties, and Potential Problems
93(12)
3.2.1 Infinite Deferral
94(1)
3.2.2 Is/Ought Inference
95(10)
3.3 Summary
105(2)
4 S1 !S2: Although Robots Can Have Rights, Robots Should Not Have Rights
107(26)
4.1 The Argument
107(3)
4.2 Complications, Difficulties, and Potential Problems
110(20)
4.2.1 Normative Proscriptions
111(4)
4.2.2 Ethnocentrism
115(2)
4.2.3 Slavery 2.0
117(13)
4.3 Summary
130(3)
5 !S1 S2: Even If Robots Cannot Have Rights, Robots Should Have Rights
133(26)
5.1 Arguments and Evidence
134(8)
5.1.1 Anecdotes and Stories
134(1)
5.1.2 Scientific Studies
135(3)
5.1.3 Outcomes and Consequences
138(4)
5.2 Complications, Difficulties, and Potential Problems
142(15)
5.2.1 Moral Sentimentalism
142(3)
5.2.2 Appearances
145(5)
5.2.3 Anthropocentrism, or "It's Really All About Us"
150(4)
5.2.4 Critical Problems
154(3)
5.3 Summary
157(2)
6 Thinking Otherwise
159(28)
6.1 Levinas 101
160(10)
6.1.1 A Different Kind of Difference
161(4)
6.1.2 Social and Relational
165(3)
6.1.3 Radically Superficial
168(2)
6.2 Applied (Levinasian) Philosophy
170(7)
6.2.1 The Face of the Robot
171(4)
6.2.2 Ethics Beyond Rights
175(2)
6.3 Complications, Difficulties, and Potential Problems
177(7)
6.3.1 Anthropocentrism
177(3)
6.3.2 Relativism and Other Difficulties
180(4)
6.4 Summary
184(3)
Notes 187(16)
References 203(32)
Index 235