Preface |
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xi | |
Acknowledgments |
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xiii | |
Authors |
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xv | |
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PART I Building an Understanding of RCA |
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Chapter 1 The Need for Root Cause Analysis (RCA) |
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3 | (8) |
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1.1 Why Investigate Healthcare Unintended Events? |
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3 | (1) |
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1.2 Caring for Caregivers |
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3 | (1) |
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4 | (3) |
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1.3.1 Aviation's Breakthrough |
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5 | (2) |
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1.4 Leadership Support for a Culture of Safety |
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7 | (1) |
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1.4.1 Leadership Responsibility for RCA |
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7 | (1) |
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1.5 Patients at the Center |
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8 | (1) |
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1.6 Questions to Consider |
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9 | (2) |
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Chapter 2 Forms of Analysis |
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11 | (12) |
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11 | (1) |
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2.2 Simple Problem-Solving |
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11 | (1) |
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2.3 Complex Problem-Solving |
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12 | (1) |
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12 | (1) |
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12 | (1) |
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2.6 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis |
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13 | (1) |
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14 | (1) |
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2.8 Apparent-Cause Analysis |
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14 | (1) |
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14 | (1) |
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15 | (1) |
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15 | (1) |
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2.12 Morbidity and Mortality Conference |
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16 | (1) |
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2.13 Summary of the Different Forms |
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16 | (1) |
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2.14 Selecting the Form of Analysis |
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16 | (2) |
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18 | (4) |
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2.15.1 Telephone Cutover Disaster: A Case Study |
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18 | (1) |
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2.15.2 5 Whys, Fishbone, and Bimodal Methods |
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19 | (3) |
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2.16 Questions to Consider |
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22 | (1) |
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Chapter 3 Pre-Work for an RCA Team Meeting |
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23 | (14) |
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3.1 Early Investigation and Preservation of Evidence |
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23 | (3) |
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26 | (9) |
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3.2.1 Denning Serious Safety Events |
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27 | (1) |
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27 | (3) |
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30 | (1) |
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3.2.4 The Logic Tree Top Box |
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31 | (2) |
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3.2.5 Top Boxes with Two Modes |
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33 | (1) |
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34 | (1) |
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3.3 Exercise 1: Chronology |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (1) |
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3.5 Questions to Consider |
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36 | (1) |
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Chapter 4 Creating the Logic Tree |
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37 | (24) |
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4.1 Logic Tree Root Causes |
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37 | (3) |
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4.1.1 Exercise 2: Types of Roots |
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39 | (1) |
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4.2 Logic Tree Hypothesizing |
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40 | (5) |
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40 | (2) |
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4.2.2 How Could versus Why |
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42 | (1) |
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4.2.3 Two Approaches to Hypothesizing |
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43 | (1) |
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44 | (1) |
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4.3 Risks Associated with Hypothesizing |
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45 | (3) |
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4.3.1 Categories versus Hypotheses |
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45 | (1) |
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45 | (1) |
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4.3.2 Latent Roots as Hypotheses |
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46 | (1) |
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46 | (1) |
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4.3.3 Hypotheses Are Too Broad |
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46 | (1) |
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47 | (1) |
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4.3.4 Hypotheses Are Too Narrow |
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47 | (1) |
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48 | (1) |
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4.4 The Importance of Facilitating Hypothesizing |
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48 | (2) |
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4.4.1 Exercise 3: Hypothesis Generation |
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50 | (1) |
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4.5 Verifying and Testing the Logic Tree |
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50 | (9) |
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50 | (1) |
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51 | (1) |
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51 | (1) |
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52 | (1) |
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52 | (1) |
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52 | (1) |
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4.5.2 Documenting Verifications |
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53 | (1) |
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4.5.3 Strength of the Evidence |
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54 | (1) |
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55 | (2) |
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57 | (1) |
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4.5.6 Exercise 4: Logic Tree |
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57 | (2) |
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4.6 Latent Roots versus Contributing Factors |
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59 | (1) |
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59 | (1) |
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60 | (1) |
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4.9 Questions to Consider |
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60 | (1) |
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Chapter 5 Effective Action Plans |
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61 | (12) |
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5.1 The Reality of Most RCA Action Plans |
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61 | (1) |
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5.2 A New and Novel Approach to RCA Action Planning |
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61 | (3) |
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5.3 Elements of the Action Plan |
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64 | (1) |
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65 | (1) |
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65 | (2) |
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5.5.1 Action Plan Metrics |
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67 | (1) |
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67 | (4) |
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67 | (2) |
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69 | (1) |
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5.6.3 Process Observation |
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69 | (1) |
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5.6.4 Abnormality Tracker |
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69 | (1) |
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70 | (1) |
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71 | (1) |
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5.8 Questions to Consider |
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71 | (2) |
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Chapter 6 RCA Facilitation |
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73 | (10) |
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73 | (1) |
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6.2 Practical Aspects for Facilitation |
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73 | (5) |
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6.2.1 Paper Based or Software |
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73 | (1) |
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74 | (1) |
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6.2.3 Shared Facilitation |
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75 | (1) |
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75 | (1) |
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6.2.5 Active Facilitation |
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76 | (1) |
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6.2.6 Facilitating the Logic Tree |
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77 | (1) |
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78 | (1) |
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6.4 Questions to Consider |
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79 | (1) |
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6.5 Exercise 5: Logic Tree 2 |
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79 | (4) |
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PART II Root Cause Analysis Champions |
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Chapter 7 RCA Standardized Work by Role |
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83 | (6) |
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7.1 Standardized Work by Role |
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83 | (3) |
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83 | (1) |
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84 | (1) |
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84 | (1) |
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85 | (1) |
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7.1.5 Subject Matter Experts |
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85 | (1) |
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85 | (1) |
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7.2 Implementing Standardized Work |
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86 | (1) |
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87 | (1) |
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7.4 Questions to Consider |
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87 | (2) |
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Chapter 8 Barriers to RCA and Their Countermeasures |
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89 | (10) |
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89 | (3) |
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92 | (4) |
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93 | (1) |
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94 | (1) |
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94 | (1) |
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8.2.4 RCA Evaluation Tool |
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94 | (2) |
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96 | (1) |
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8.4 Questions to Consider |
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97 | (2) |
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Chapter 9 Strategies for No Repeat Events |
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99 | (8) |
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9.1 Repeat Events Defined |
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99 | (2) |
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9.2 Strategies for No Repeat Events |
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101 | (4) |
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9.2.1 Review of Action Plans within the Department/Unit |
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101 | (1) |
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9.2.2 Review of Mode Categories across the Organization |
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101 | (1) |
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9.2.2.1 Trending at the Event Level |
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101 | (1) |
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9.2.2.2 Trending at the Mode Level |
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101 | (1) |
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9.2.2.3 Trending at the Latent Root Cause Level |
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102 | (1) |
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9.2.2.4 Spreading Action Plans |
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103 | (1) |
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9.2.3 Systems Reliability |
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104 | (1) |
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105 | (2) |
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107 | (10) |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (9) |
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109 | (1) |
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109 | (2) |
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111 | (2) |
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113 | (1) |
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10.2.2.1 Training Exercise #1 |
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113 | (1) |
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10.2.2.2 Training Exercise #2 |
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113 | (1) |
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10.2.2.3 Training Exercise #3 |
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114 | (1) |
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10.2.2.4 Student Handout Training Exercise #1: Train Derailment |
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114 | (1) |
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10.2.2.5 Student Handout Training Exercise #2: Canceled Surgery |
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114 | (3) |
References |
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117 | (2) |
Appendix 1 Logic Tree for Train Derailment Exercise |
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119 | (2) |
Appendix 2 Logic Tree for Canceled Surgery Exercise |
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121 | (2) |
Index |
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123 | |