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Ruling by Cheating: Governance in Illiberal Democracy [Mīkstie vāki]

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(Central European University, Budapest)
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 320 pages, height x width x depth: 228x151x21 mm, weight: 493 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Sērija : Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
  • Izdošanas datums: 12-Aug-2021
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108948634
  • ISBN-13: 9781108948630
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  • Cena: 44,31 €
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Ruling by Cheating: Governance in Illiberal DemocracyPalielināt
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 320 pages, height x width x depth: 228x151x21 mm, weight: 493 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Sērija : Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
  • Izdošanas datums: 12-Aug-2021
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108948634
  • ISBN-13: 9781108948630
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9781108948630.html
Keywords:
Populist, illiberal regimes that claim power in the name of relative majorities are often characterized as quasi-authoritarian. Analysing the constitutional system of illiberal democracies and illiberal phenomena in 'mature democracies', the author argues that this drift to mild despotism is not authoritarianism, but an abuse of constitutionalism.

There is widespread agreement that democracy today faces unprecedented challenges. Populism has pushed governments in new and surprising constitutional directions. Analysing the constitutional system of illiberal democracies (from Venezuela to Poland) and illiberal phenomena in 'mature democracies' that are justified in the name of 'the will of the people', this book explains that this drift to mild despotism is not authoritarianism, but an abuse of constitutionalism. Illiberal governments claim that they are as democratic and constitutional as any other. They also claim that they are more popular and therefore more genuine because their rule is based on conservative, plebeian and 'patriotic' constitutional and rule of law values rather than the values liberals espouse. However, this book shows that these claims are deeply deceptive - an abuse of constitutionalism and the rule of law, not a different conception of these ideas.

Recenzijas

'Andrįs Sajó is one of Europe's great defenders of human rights and democracy and one of its finest constitutional scholars. This book is an unparalleled anatomy of illiberal democracy, and its message is vitally important: all democracies, including ones that think they are immune, remain vulnerable to the corruption, institutional capture and authoritarian temptations of the illiberal form. An essential book for 2022.' Michael Ignatieff, Rector Emeritus Central European University ' a fascinating book.' Rafael Plancarte-Escobar, Jindal Global Law Review

Papildus informācija

Illiberal democracies are not quasi-authoritarian but plebiscitarian regimes. By cheating on constitutionalism, they expose the authoritarian vulnerabilities of overconfident democracies.
Acknowledgments xi
Abbreviations xii
Introduction 1(17)
1 Placing Illiberal Democracy: Caesarism, Totalitarian Democracy, and Unfinished Constitutionalism
18(38)
1.1 Introduction
18(5)
1.2 "Illiberal Democracy" Is an Appropriate Term
23(4)
1.3 Caesarism and Plebiscitarian Leader Democracy
27(4)
1.4 Illiberal Mass Democracy and Its Totalitarian Potential
31(6)
1.5 Illiberalism in Constitutional Democracies and Its Unfolding
37(12)
1.6 Authoritarian Predispositions
49(7)
2 The Emergence of the Illiberal State
56(36)
2.1 Introduction
56(6)
2.2 Constitution-Making and Preconstitutional Changes
62(4)
2.2.1 Venezuela
62(2)
2.2.2 Hungary
64(1)
2.2.3 Turkey
65(1)
2.3 Constitutional (Apex) Courts First to Go, the Rest of the Judiciary to Follow
66(15)
2.3.1 Constitutional Courts
66(9)
2.3.2 The Ordinary Judiciary
75(6)
2.4 Other Institutional Changes
81(11)
2.4.1 Changes in Personnel
81(3)
2.4.2 Broadcasting and the Press
84(6)
2.4.3 Independent Agencies
90(2)
3 Creating Dependence
92(20)
3.1 Introduction
92(1)
3.2 Neopatrimonial Patronage
93(12)
3.3 Reducing Autonomy
105(7)
4 They, the People
112(41)
4.1 Introduction
112(2)
4.2 The People and Its Sovereignty
114(9)
4.2.1 Meanings of People
114(3)
4.2.2 People's Authority and Legitimacy
117(2)
4.2.3 Popular Sovereignty
119(4)
4.3 The Use of the People in Victorious Populism
123(27)
4.3.1 People's Unity: Homogeneity
124(7)
4.3.2 Unity Is Identitarian
131(6)
4.3.3 The (Relative) Majority as People: The Rule of the Part as a Whole
137(3)
4.3.4 The Democratic Legitimacy of Populist Popular Sovereignty
140(3)
4.3.5 The People of the Leader and Total (Unbound) Popular Sovereignty
143(7)
4.4 Populism as Democracy?
150(3)
5 Constitutional Structure
153(45)
5.1 Introduction
153(2)
5.2 The Spirit of Constitutionalism and Its Absence
155(15)
5.2.1 Constitutional Background Assumptions
155(5)
5.2.2 Illiberalism as a Consequence of Identity Politics
160(10)
5.3 Majoritarianism, Anti-institutionalism, and Instrumentalism
170(5)
5.3.1 How Populism in Power Tries to Solve the Problem of Democracy
170(2)
5.3.2 Instrumentalism
172(3)
5.4 From Separation of Powers to Executive Domination
175(23)
5.4.1 Constitutional Courts
183(2)
5.4.2 Parliament without Deliberation
185(6)
5.4.3 Electoral Law
191(3)
5.4.4 Referendum
194(4)
6 The Fate of Human Rights
198(39)
6.1 Introduction
198(2)
6.2 Diminishing International Respect (Authority) of Human Rights
200(4)
6.3 The Many Sources of Delegitimation
204(3)
6.4 Substantive Changes in Human Rights and Ensuing Difficulties
207(7)
6.4.1 From Vulnerability to Security
208(5)
6.4.2 The Cult of the Local
213(1)
6.5 Inflation, Overreach, Abuse
214(3)
6.5.1 Inflation and Overextension
214(2)
6.5.2 "Human Rightism"
216(1)
6.6 Direct Attacks
217(1)
6.7 Fundamental Rights and Illiberalism
218(19)
7 Profiting from the Rule of Law
237(42)
7.1 The Ambiguity of the Rule of Law
237(10)
7.1.1 What Is the Rule of Law Good For?
240(3)
7.1.2 What Is the Rule of Law?
243(3)
7.1.3 How Far Does the Rule of Law Go?
246(1)
7.2 Populist Antilegalism
247(13)
7.2.1 The Early Fervor
251(1)
7.2.2 Duality and Ambiguities in Caesar's Legal System
252(6)
7.2.3 Material (Substantive) vs. Formal Justice
258(2)
7.3 Fundamental Precepts of the Rule of Law, and Their (Ab)use in Illiberal Democracies
260(19)
7.3.1 Generality of the Law and Ad Hominem Laws, and Interpretations Favoring the Powers That Be
261(4)
7.3.2 Honesty and the Application of the Law
265(3)
7.3.3 Selective Impunity: The Principles of Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena and Nonretroactivity
268(4)
7.3.4 How (If at all) Does the Illiberal Regime Fit into the Rule of Law Paradigm?
272(7)
8 Cheating: The Legal Secret of Illiberal Democracy
279(49)
8.1 The Moral and Cognitive Problem of Cheating
279(12)
8.1.1 Defining Cheating
280(3)
8.1.2 The Meaning of Cheating in Law
283(8)
8.2 Abuse as a Constant of (Constitutional) Law: Limiting Techniques
291(9)
8.2.1 Objective Difficulty of Identification
294(6)
8.3 Cheating in Illiberal Democracy
300(23)
8.3.1 Techniques of Legal Cheating
302(19)
8.3.2 Cheating as a System
321(2)
8.4 The Consequences of Cheating
323(5)
Index 328
Andrįs Sajó is a University Professor at Central European University and a Former Vice-President-Judge at the European Court of Human Rights. He holds an Honorary Doctorate from the European University Institute and Visiting Professorships at Cardozo Law School, University of Chicago Law School, NYU Law School and Harvard Law School. His recent publications include Constitutional Sentiments (2011) and, with R. Uitz, The Constitution of Freedom (2017).