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E-grāmata: Semantic Challenges to Realism: Dummett and Putnam

  • Formāts: 320 pages
  • Sērija : Toronto Studies in Philosophy
  • Izdošanas datums: 10-Jul-2000
  • Izdevniecība: University of Toronto Press
  • ISBN-13: 9781442679740
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  • Formāts: 320 pages
  • Sērija : Toronto Studies in Philosophy
  • Izdošanas datums: 10-Jul-2000
  • Izdevniecība: University of Toronto Press
  • ISBN-13: 9781442679740
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Although many philosophers espouse anti-realism, the only sustained arguments for the position are due to Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam. Gardiner's unpretentious style and lucid organization make sense of Dummett's and Putnam's discourse.



Anti-realism entered the philosophical scene some twenty years ago, and has since become a widely accepted view. But although many philosophers espouse anti-realism, the only sustained arguments for the position are due to Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam. Much discussion of their views has appeared in the journals, especially concerning some of Putnam's pithy and memorable expositions, like the 'Brain in the Vat'; however, this is the first book to provide a thorough examination and rebuttal of their arguments.

Dummett's and Putnam's arguments are long, complex, and often technical. They have been developed over time, often in response to criticisms of earlier formulations or to the parallel but independent research of others, and accordingly, each of their premises gives rise to a host of issues, questions, and concerns. Mark Gardiner guides us through this difficult terrain, discussing the abundant literature on the subject along the way. With its compelling argument and accessible style, this thorough and authoritative study will provide an important contribution to the realism/anti-realism debate.

Preface ix
Introduction 3(6)
PART I: DUMMETT'S SEMANTIC ANTI-REALISM
Dummett's Constraints -- Meaning and Metaphysics
9(11)
Dummett's Critique of Semantic Realism
20(34)
The Acquisition Argument
25(6)
The Manifestation Argument
31(23)
Responses to the Negative Program
54(52)
Decidability
56(14)
Decidability and Temporality
58(6)
Decidability and Persons
64(4)
Decidability and Capacities
68(2)
Are There Any Undecidable Sentences?
70(26)
Inaccessible Regions
71(4)
Surveying Infinite Totalites
75(4)
Use of Subjunctive Conditionals
79(17)
Other Sources of Undecidability?
96(10)
Responses to the Positive Program
106(33)
Does an Anti-Realist Semantics Harmonize with the Constraints on Understanding?
106(5)
Realist Routes to Manifestation
111(9)
The Naivety of Both Realist and Anti-Realist Semantics
120(19)
PART II: PUTNAM'S INTERNAL REALISM
Portraits: Metaphysical and Internal Realisms
139(18)
The Model-Theoretic Argument
157(26)
Against the ``Just More Theory'' Ploy
164(9)
Against the Very Idea of an Epistemically Ideal Theory
173(10)
Brains in Vats
183(16)
The Argument
183(4)
Version 1
184(1)
Version 2
185(2)
Responses to the Argument
187(3)
The Vat Argument and Realism
190(9)
The Argument from Equivalence
199(20)
Against Verisimilitude
203(2)
Against the Existential Claim
205(4)
Empirical Equivalence and the Model-Theoretic Argument
209(5)
A Second Argument from Equivalence
214(5)
Conclusion 219(6)
Notes 225(28)
Bibliography 253(10)
Index 263
Mark Q. Gardiner is an instructor in the Department of Humanities, Mount Royal College, Calgary, Alberta.