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E-grāmata: Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution: Judicial Competence and Independence in the United Kingdom

(University of Durham)
  • Formāts: EPUB+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 02-Dec-2010
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780511853005
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  • Formāts: EPUB+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 02-Dec-2010
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780511853005

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In this 2010 book, Roger Masterman examines the dividing lines between the powers of the judicial branch of government and those of the executive and legislative branches in the light of two of the most significant constitutional reforms of recent years: the Human Rights Act (1998) and Constitutional Reform Act (2005). Both statutes have implications for the separation of powers within the United Kingdom constitution. The Human Rights Act brings the judges into much closer proximity with the decisions of political actors than previously permitted by the Wednesbury standard of review and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, while the Constitutional Reform Act marks the emergence of an institutionally independent judicial branch. Taken together, the two legislative schemes form the backbone of a more comprehensive system of constitutional checks and balances policed by a judicial branch underpinned by the legitimacy of institutional independence.

Recenzijas

'Roger Masterman, of the law faculty at Durham, has produced an erudite treatise in the finest tradition of English legal scholarship, and one that, despite its thorough and detailed grounding in the intricacies of legal materials, should be perused by political scientists. (The notes alone, in fact, are a treasure trove).' Jerold Waltman, British Politics Group Quarterly

Papildus informācija

A 2010 analysis of the dividing lines between judicial, executive and legislative power in the United Kingdom constitution.
Acknowledgements xi
Table of cases xii
Introduction 1(6)
The contemporary separation of powers
1(6)
Part I Separation of powers, the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights 7(80)
1 A doctrine of uncertain scope and application
9(24)
Meaning(s) and aim(s) of separation of powers
9(7)
Separation of powers in the United Kingdom constitution
16(4)
The supremacy of Parliament
20(1)
'Theory, as usual, followed upon fact...'
21(1)
A relationship of equal branches?
22(2)
A descriptive, or normative, device?
24(2)
The centrality of judicial independence
26(5)
The contemporary separation of powers
31(2)
2 The Human Rights Act 1998 and the separation of powers
33(27)
Introduction
33(1)
Rights as questions of law and/or politics
34(8)
The parliamentary bill of rights model
42(2)
The Human Rights Act in the United Kingdom constitution
44(2)
Integrating rights concerns into the legislative process
46(2)
Interpretations and declarations of incompatibility
48(2)
Separation of powers at the macro-level: an inter-institutional dialogue on rights?
50(2)
Strong form review by stealth?
52(2)
Operating in the shadow of Strasbourg
54(2)
The separation of powers implications of the dialogic model
56(4)
3 The Strasbourg influence
60(27)
Introduction
60(3)
The standard of review and requirement of proportionate interference
63(2)
The inadequacy of Wednesbury review
65(1)
Proportionate interference
66(4)
The Strasbourg jurisprudence on separated governmental functions
70(4)
Executive involvement in 'judicial' decisions - sentencing
74(2)
Judicial review of 'administrative' decisions
76(2)
The Strasbourg jurisprudence on separated institutions
78(1)
An independent and impartial tribunal
79(1)
The circumstantial approach to impartiality
80(2)
The strict separation approach to impartiality
82(2)
Conclusion
84(3)
Part II Judicial engagement with the 'political' branches 87(56)
4 Justiciability
89(26)
The extended range of review
89(1)
The justiciability of the Convention rights
90(3)
Public resources
93(3)
National security
96(3)
'High policy' and prerogative powers
99(1)
Deployment of the armed forces
100(1)
Foreign relations and the power to enter into treaties
101(2)
The withering of non-justiciability doctrines
103(2)
Towards legislative review?
105(8)
Conclusion
113(2)
5 Deference and proportionality
115(28)
Introduction
115(1)
Deference
116(1)
Deference or a margin of appreciation?
117(2)
Constraining judicial power under a statutory bill of rights
119(2)
Deference under the Human Rights Act
121(2)
'...servility, or perhaps gracious concession'?
123(2)
A fig leaf for non-justiciability?
125(3)
An autonomous or an integrated concept?
128(1)
Proportionality and the intensity of review
129(3)
The structure of proportionality review
132(3)
The integration of proportionality and deference
135(4)
Proportionality, legitimacy and merits review
139(2)
Conclusion
141(2)
Part III The creative powers of courts 143(62)
6 Statutory interpretation and declarations of incompatibility
145(36)
Introduction
145(1)
The judge as law-maker
146(5)
Interpretative latitude under the Human Rights Act
151(3)
Interpretative law-making on the Human Rights Act model
154(2)
A power of invalidation through interpretation?
156(4)
Implied terms and additional words
160(3)
Deference to the legislature and the limitations of judicial interpretation
163(5)
Democratic dialogue in practice: parliamentary and executive responses to incompatibility
168(8)
Conclusion
176(5)
7 Developing the common law and the meaning of 'the Convention rights'
181(24)
Introduction
181(1)
The incremental nature of common law development
181(2)
The Human Rights Act and law-making at common law
183(1)
The transformative potential of models of horizontality
183(3)
The modification of breach of confidence
186(3)
Towards directly effective rights to privacy and expression at common law?
189(2)
The meaning and application of 'the Convention rights'
191(1)
'The Convention rights' in domestic law
192(7)
The scope for creative judicial interpretation of 'the Convention rights'
199(3)
Conclusion
202(3)
Part IV The separation of the judicial branch 205(49)
8 The independence of the judiciary
207(38)
Introduction
207(1)
The institutional independence of the judiciary
208(1)
The distinction between institutional and individual independence
208(4)
The pressure for increased institutional autonomy
212(2)
The office of Lord Chancellor
214(2)
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary
216(3)
Structural independence secured? The Constitutional Reform Act 2005
219(2)
Independence of the executive
221(4)
Independence of the legislature
225(2)
Independence, legitimacy and the separation of functions
227(2)
The emergence of a separation of powers jurisprudence?
229(3)
Asserting the division between legislator and judge: procedural mess at common law
232(1)
Endorsing the Convention's circumstantial approach
232(4)
Towards a 'strict' separation of functions at common law?
236(3)
The reach of separation by fair process
239(3)
Towards a constitutionally separate judicial branch?
242(3)
9 Towards constitutional separation
245(9)
Descriptive or substantive principles of separation?
245(9)
Select bibliography 254(13)
Index 267
Roger Masterman is Senior Lecturer in Law at Durham Law School, where his teaching and research interests lie in the area of constitutional law and reform.