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Short Course in Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus 2nd Revised edition [Mīkstie vāki]

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(Brown University, Rhode Island), (Brown University, Rhode Island)
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 524 pages, height x width x depth: 254x204x18 mm, weight: 1020 g, Worked examples or Exercises; 129 Line drawings, black and white
  • Izdošanas datums: 13-Sep-2018
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108439195
  • ISBN-13: 9781108439190
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Short Course in Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus 2nd Revised editionPalielināt
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 524 pages, height x width x depth: 254x204x18 mm, weight: 1020 g, Worked examples or Exercises; 129 Line drawings, black and white
  • Izdošanas datums: 13-Sep-2018
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108439195
  • ISBN-13: 9781108439190
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9781108439190.html
Keywords:
This second edition retains the positive features of being clearly written, well organized, and incorporating calculus in the text, while adding expanded coverage on game theory, experimental economics, and behavioural economics. It remains more focused and manageable than similar textbooks, and provides a concise yet comprehensive treatment of the core topics of microeconomics, including theories of the consumer and of the firm, market structure, partial and general equilibrium, and market failures caused by public goods, externalities and asymmetric information. The book includes helpful solved problems in all the substantive chapters, as well as over seventy new mathematical exercises and enhanced versions of the ones in the first edition. The authors make use of the book's full color with sharp and helpful graphs and illustrations. This mathematically rigorous textbook is meant for students at the intermediate level who have already had an introductory course in microeconomics, and a calculus course.

This book is aimed at undergraduates taking intermediate-level microeconomics, who have studied calculus. It covers all the standard topics in microeconomics, including theories of the consumer and of the firm, market structure, partial and general equilibrium, market failure, economics of uncertainty and expanded coverage on game theory and exercises.

Recenzijas

'There are many textbooks covering intermediate microeconomics, but this one is distinctive for how clearly yet concisely it conveys the material. I highly recommend it.' Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University, Massachusetts 'This thoughtfully conceived and beautifully written textbook covers all of the material that one would hope to see in a modern course on intermediate microeconomics, from consumer theory and general equilibrium, to game theory and markets with asymmetric information. Rich examples and exercises follow each chapter and, all-combined, make this a masterfully executed book.' Philip J. Reny, Hugo F. Sonnenschein Distinguished Service Professor in Economics, University of Chicago

Papildus informācija

This second edition continues to present all the standard topics in microeconomics, with calculus, concisely, clearly and with a sense of humor.
Preface xiii
1 Introduction
1(4)
Part I Theory of the Consumer
5(122)
2 Preferences and Utility
7(19)
2.1 Introduction
7(1)
2.2 The Consumer's Preference Relation
8(6)
2.3 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
14(2)
2.4 The Consumer's Utility Function
16(3)
2.5 Utility Functions and the Marginal Rate of Substitution
19(2)
2.6 A Solved Problem
21(1)
Exercises
22(3)
Appendix: Differentiation of Functions
25(1)
3 The Budget Constraint and the Consumer's Optimal Choice
26(21)
3.1 Introduction
26(1)
3.2 The Standard Budget Constraint, the Budget Set, and the Budget Line
26(2)
3.3 Shifts of the Budget Line
28(1)
3.4 Odd Budget Constraints
29(2)
3.5 Income and Consumption Over Time
31(2)
3.6 The Consumer's Optimal Choice: Graphical Analysis
33(3)
3.7 The Consumer's Optimal Choice: Utility Maximization Subject to the Budget Constraint
36(2)
3.8 Two Solved Problems
38(2)
Exercises
40(3)
Appendix: Maximization Subject to a Constraint: The Lagrange Function Method
43(4)
4 Demand Functions
47(23)
4.1 Introduction
47(1)
4.2 Demand as a Function of Income
48(2)
4.3 Demand as a Function of Price
50(4)
4.4 Demand as a Function of Price of the Other Good
54(2)
4.5 Substitution and Income Effects
56(4)
4.6 The Compensated Demand Curve
60(1)
4.7 Elasticity
61(3)
4.8 The Market Demand Curve
64(2)
4.9 A Solved Problem
66(1)
Exercises
67(1)
Appendix: The Slutsky Equation
68(2)
5 Supply Functions for Labor and Savings
70(24)
5.1 Introduction to the Supply of Labor
70(1)
5.2 Choice between Consumption and Leisure
70(3)
5.3 Substitution and Income Effects in Labor Supply
73(2)
5.4 Other Types of Budget Constraints
75(4)
5.5 Taxing the Consumer's Wages
79(4)
5.6 Saving and Borrowing: The Intertemporal Choice of Consumption
83(3)
5.7 The Supply of Savings
86(3)
5.8 A Solved Problem
89(2)
Exercises
91(3)
6 Welfare Economics 1: The One-Person Case
94(18)
6.1 Introduction
94(1)
6.2 Welfare Comparison of a Per-Unit Tax and an Equivalent Lump-Sum Tax
94(3)
6.3 Rebating a Per-Unit Tax
97(1)
6.4 Measuring a Change in Welfare for One Person
98(5)
6.5 Measuring Welfare for Many People: A Preliminary Example
103(1)
6.6 A Solved Problem
104(2)
Exercises
106(2)
Appendix: Revealed Preference
108(4)
7 Welfare Economics 2: The Many-Person Case
112(15)
7.1 Introduction
112(1)
7.2 Quasilinear Preferences
113(1)
7.3 Consumer's Surplus
114(4)
7.4 A Consumer's Surplus Example with Quasilinear Preferences
118(3)
7.5 Consumers' Surplus
121(2)
7.6 A Last Word on the Quasilinearity Assumption
123(1)
7.7 A Solved Problem
124(1)
Exercises
125(2)
Part II Theory of the Producer
127(60)
8 Theory of the Firm 1: The Single-Input Model
129(21)
8.1 Introduction
129(1)
8.2 The Competitive Firm's Problem: Focusing on Its Output
130(9)
8.3 The Competitive Firm's Problem: Focusing on Its Input
139(4)
8.4 Multiple Outputs
143(3)
8.5 A Solved Problem
146(1)
Exercises
147(3)
9 Theory of the Firm 2: The Long-Run, Multiple-Input Model
150(24)
9.1 Introduction
150(1)
9.2 The Production Function in the Long Run
151(7)
9.3 Cost Minimization in the Long Run
158(5)
9.4 Profit Maximization in the Long Run
163(4)
9.5 A Solved Problem
167(2)
Exercises
169(2)
Appendix: Two Slightly More Mathematical Techniques
171(3)
10 Theory of the Firm 3: The Short-Run, Multiple-Input Model
174(13)
10.1 Introduction
174(1)
10.2 The Production Function in the Short Run
174(1)
10.3 Cost Minimization in the Short Run
175(5)
10.4 Profit Maximization in the Short Run
180(2)
10.5 A Solved Problem
182(2)
Exercises
184(3)
Part III Partial Equilibrium: Market Structure
187(92)
11 Perfectly Competitive Markets
189(23)
11.1 Introduction
189(1)
11.2 Perfect Competition
189(2)
11.3 Market/Industry Supply
191(5)
11.4 Equilibrium in a Competitive Market
196(1)
11.5 Competitive Equilibrium and Social Surplus Maximization
197(5)
11.6 The Deadweight Loss of a Per-Unit Tax
202(4)
11.7 A Solved Problem
206(3)
Exercises
209(3)
12 Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition
212(23)
12.1 Introduction
212(1)
12.2 The Classical Solution to Monopoly
213(3)
12.3 Deadweight Loss from Monopoly: Comparing Monopoly and Competition
216(3)
12.4 Price Discrimination
219(5)
12.5 Monopolistic Competition
224(4)
12.6 A Solved Problem
228(4)
Exercises
232(3)
13 Duopoly
235(23)
13.1 Introduction
235(1)
13.2 Cournot Competition
236(5)
13.3 More on Dynamics
241(1)
13.4 Collusion
242(4)
13.5 Stackelberg Competition
246(2)
13.6 Bertrand Competition
248(4)
13.7 A Solved Problem
252(2)
Exercises
254(2)
Appendix: The Competitive Limit
256(2)
14 Game Theory
258(21)
14.1 Introduction
258(1)
14.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Idea of Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
259(2)
14.3 The Battle of the Sexes, and the Idea of Nash Equilibrium
261(2)
14.4 Multiple or No Nash Equilibria, and Mixed Strategies
263(2)
14.5 The Expanded Battle of the Sexes: When More Choices Make Players Worse Off
265(2)
14.6 Sequential-Move Games
267(4)
14.7 Threats
271(1)
14.8 Experimental Evidence, Behavioral Economics, and Repeated Games
272(2)
14.9 A Solved Problem
274(2)
Exercises
276(3)
Part IV General Equilibrium
279(48)
15 An Exchange Economy
281(25)
15.1 Introduction
281(1)
15.2 An Economy with Two Consumers and Two Goods
281(2)
15.3 Pareto Efficiency
283(7)
15.4 Competitive or Walrasian Equilibrium
290(3)
15.5 The Two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
293(4)
15.6 A Solved Problem
297(3)
Exercises
300(2)
Appendix: A Simple Proof of the First Welfare Theorem
302(4)
16 A Production Economy
306(21)
16.1 Introduction
306(1)
16.2 A Robinson Crusoe Production Economy
306(1)
16.3 Pareto Efficiency
307(4)
16.4 Walrasian or Competitive Equilibrium
311(4)
16.5 When There Are Two Goods, Bread and Rum
315(4)
16.6 The Two Welfare Theorems Revisited
319(2)
16.7 A Solved Problem
321(2)
Exercises
323(4)
Part V Market Failure
327(78)
17 Externalities
329(22)
17.1 Introduction
329(1)
17.2 Examples of Externalities
330(1)
17.3 The Oil Refiner and the Fish Farm
331(5)
17.4 Classical Solutions to the Externality Problem: Pigou and Coase
336(3)
17.5 Modern Solutions for the Externality Problem: Markets for Pollution Rights
339(2)
17.6 Modern Solutions for the Externality Problem: Cap and Trade
341(3)
17.7 A Solved Problem
344(2)
Exercises
346(3)
Appendix: Efficient Pollution Abatement in Cap and Trade
349(2)
18 Public Goods
351(21)
18.1 Introduction
351(1)
18.2 Examples of Public Goods
352(1)
18.3 A Simple Model of an Economy with a Public Good
353(5)
18.4 The Samuelson Optimality Condition
358(1)
18.5 The "Free Rider" Problem and Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms
359(2)
18.6 How To Get Efficiency in Economies with Public Goods
361(6)
18.7 A Solved Problem
367(2)
Exercises
369(3)
19 Uncertainty and Expected Utility
372(14)
19.1 Introduction and Examples
372(1)
19.2 Von Neumann--Morgenstern Expected Utility: Preliminaries
373(2)
19.3 Von Neumann--Morgenstern Expected Utility: Assumptions and Conclusion
375(2)
19.4 Von Neumann--Morgenstern Expected Utility: Examples
377(5)
19.5 A Solved Problem
382(1)
Exercises
383(3)
20 Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information
386(19)
20.1 Introduction
386(1)
20.2 When Sellers Know More Than Buyers: The Market for "Lemons"
387(1)
20.3 When Buyers Know More Than Sellers: A Market for Health Insurance
388(2)
20.4 When Insurance Encourages Risk Taking: Moral Hazard
390(2)
20.5 The Principal-Agent Problem
392(6)
20.6 What Should Be Done about Market Failures Caused by Asymmetric Information?
398(1)
20.7 A Solved Problem
399(2)
Exercises
401(4)
Index 405
Roberto Serrano is the Harrison S. Kravis University Professor of Economics at Brown University. He received his B.A. in economics from Universidad Complutense de Madrid in 1987, and a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University in 1992, when he began teaching at Brown University. He is the co-author (with Feldman) of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd edition (2005). He was elected Fellow of the Game Theory Society in 2017, member of its Council from 2005 to 2011, Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2013, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellow in 1998, and received the Fundacion Banco Herrero Prize in 2004 (awarded to the best Spanish economist under 40). He has delivered a high number of plenary and keynote lectures at economic theory and game theory meetings, and his editorial responsibilities include being an Associate Editor of Games and Economic Behavior and the International Journal of Game Theory, and having been the Editor-in-Chief of Economics Letters. Allan M. Feldman is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Brown University. He received an Sc.B. in mathematics from the University of Chicago in 1965, an M.A. in anthropology from the University of Chicago in 1967, and a Ph.D. in economics from The Johns Hopkins University in 1972. His articles have been published in Review of Economic Studies, Econometrica, American Economic Review, Public Choice, the Journal of Public Economics, the Journal of Economic Theory, and other journals. He is author (with Serrano) of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd edition (2005). He taught economics at Brown University for 38 years, where he taught intermediate microeconomics course to thousands of students, and developed Brown's calculus-based version of the microeconomics course. He was a winner of the Department's teacher of the year award; he was director of undergraduate studies in the economics department at Brown University for around fifteen years, director of graduate studies for two years, and an economics concentration advisor for around twenty years.