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Short Course in Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus [Mīkstie vāki]

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(Brown University, Rhode Island), (Brown University, Rhode Island)
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 394 pages, height x width x depth: 254x178x20 mm, weight: 680 g, 5 Tables, unspecified; 128 Line drawings, unspecified
  • Izdošanas datums: 26-Nov-2012
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1107623766
  • ISBN-13: 9781107623767
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Short Course in Intermediate Microeconomics with CalculusPalielināt
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 394 pages, height x width x depth: 254x178x20 mm, weight: 680 g, 5 Tables, unspecified; 128 Line drawings, unspecified
  • Izdošanas datums: 26-Nov-2012
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1107623766
  • ISBN-13: 9781107623767
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9781107623767.html
Keywords:
This book provides a concise treatment of the core concepts of microeconomic theory at the intermediate level with calculus integrated into the text. The authors, Roberto Serrano and Allan M. Feldman, start with consumer theory and then discuss preferences and utility, budget constraints, the consumer's optimal choice, demand and the consumer's choices about labor and savings. They next turn to welfare economics: when is one policy better for society than another? Following are chapters presenting the theory of the firm and profit maximization in several alternative and partial equilibrium models of competitive markets, monopoly markets and duopoly markets. The authors then provide general equilibrium models of exchange and production and analyze market failures created by externalities, public goods and asymmetric information. Finally, they offer introductory treatments of decision theory under uncertainty and game theory. Graphic analysis is presented where necessary but distractions are avoided.

Recenzijas

'This is an excellent text on intermediate microeconomics, one of the very best I have seen for some time. I am particularly impressed by the clarity of the presentation of the material. This is not surprising, given that this text is written by two top scholars. I anticipate it will be a huge success.' Abhinay Muthoo, University of Warwick 'Roberto Serrano and Allan Feldman have done it again. Having already written a leading text on welfare economics and social choice, they have now produced a beautifully clear and concise book on intermediate microeconomics. Textbooks, however necessary, are not always a pleasure to read. This one is.' Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University 'Students who are comfortable with simple calculus will have access in this textbook to sophisticated microeconomic concepts and results usually confined to graduate teaching. With consummate pedagogical talent, carefully designed exercises, and no compromise on intellectual rigor, Serrano and Feldman bring to life the Slutsky equation, Walrasian equilibrium, strategic competition, asymmetric information, the axiomatization of expected utility, and much more. Professional economists will love the opportunity to teach closer to their actual craft.' Hervé Moulin, Rice University 'The book is very well written. It is elegant and precise and it touches on all that should be touched. There is quite a large consensus about what an intermediate microeconomics course should include and this manuscript, happily, follows this consensus.' David Pérez-Castrillo, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona

Papildus informācija

This book provides a concise treatment of the core concepts of microeconomic theory at the intermediate level with calculus.
Preface xi
1 Introduction
1(6)
Part I Theory of the Consumer
2 Preferences and Utility
7(18)
2.1 Introduction
7(1)
2.2 The Consumer's Preference Relation
8(5)
2.3 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
13(3)
2.4 The Consumer's Utility Function
16(2)
2.5 Utility Functions and the Marginal Rate of Substitution
18(3)
2.6 A Solved Problem
21(4)
Exercises
22(2)
Appendix. Differentiation of Functions
24(1)
3 The Budget Constraint and the Consumer's Optimal Choice
25(18)
3.1 Introduction
25(1)
3.2 The Standard Budget Constraint, the Budget Set, and the Budget Line
25(2)
3.3 Shifts of the Budget Line
27(1)
3.4 Odd Budget Constraints
28(1)
3.5 Income and Consumption over Time
29(3)
3.6 The Consumer's Optimal Choice: Graphical Analysis
32(3)
3.7 The Consumer's Optimal Choice: Utility Maximization Subject to the Budget Constraint
35(1)
3.8 Two Solved Problems
36(7)
Exercises
38(2)
Appendix. Maximization Subject to a Constraint: The Lagrange Function Method
40(3)
4 Demand Functions
43(21)
4.1 Introduction
43(1)
4.2 Demand as a Function of Income
44(2)
4.3 Demand as a Function of Price
46(3)
4.4 Demand as a Function of Price of the Other Good
49(3)
4.5 Substitution and Income Effects
52(4)
4.6 The Compensated Demand Curve
56(1)
4.7 Elasticity
57(2)
4.8 The Market Demand Curve
59(2)
4.9 A Solved Problem
61(3)
Exercises
62(2)
5 Supply Functions for Labor and Savings
64(22)
5.1 Introduction to the Supply of Labor
64(1)
5.2 Choice between Consumption and Leisure
64(3)
5.3 Substitution and Income Effects in Labor Supply
67(2)
5.4 Other Types of Budget Constraints
69(5)
5.5 Taxing the Consumer's Wages
74(2)
5.6 Saving and Borrowing: The Intertemporal Choice of Consumption
76(4)
5.7 The Supply of Savings
80(3)
5.8 A Solved Problem
83(3)
Exercises
84(2)
6 Welfare Economics 1: The One-Person Case
86(17)
6.1 Introduction
86(1)
6.2 Welfare Comparison of a Per-Unit Tax and an Equivalent Lump-Sum Tax
86(3)
6.3 Rebating a Per-Unit Tax
89(2)
6.4 Measuring a Change in Welfare for One Person
91(4)
6.5 Measuring Welfare for Many People; A Preliminary Example
95(1)
6.6 A Solved Problem
96(7)
Exercises
98(1)
Appendix. Revealed Preference
99(4)
7 Welfare Economics 2: The Many-Person Case
103(18)
7.1 Introduction
103(1)
7.2 Quasilinear Preferences
104(2)
7.3 Consumer's Surplus
106(3)
7.4 A Consumer's Surplus Example with Quasilinear Preferences
109(3)
7.5 Consumers' Surplus
112(2)
7.6 A Last Word on the Quasilinearity Assumption
114(1)
7.7 A Solved Problem
115(6)
Exercises
116(5)
Part II Theory of the Producer
8 Theory of the Firm 1: The Single-Input Model
121(20)
8.1 Introduction
121(1)
8.2 The Competitive Firm's Problem, Focusing on Its Output
122(10)
8.3 The Competitive Firm's Problem, Focusing on Its Input
132(4)
8.4 Multiple Outputs
136(2)
8.5 A Solved Problem
138(3)
Exercises
139(2)
9 Theory of the Firm 2: The Long-Run, Multiple-Input Model
141(22)
9.1 Introduction
141(2)
9.2 The Production Function in the Long Run
143(7)
9.3 Cost Minimization in the Long Run
150(5)
9.4 Profit Maximization in the Long Run
155(4)
9.5 A Solved Problem
159(4)
Exercises
161(2)
10 Theory of the Firm 3: The Short-Run, Multiple-Input Model
163(14)
10.1 Introduction
163(1)
10.2 The Production Function in the Short Run
164(1)
10.3 Cost Minimization in the Short Run
165(4)
10.4 Profit Maximization in the Short Run
169(2)
10.5 A Solved Problem
171(6)
Exercises
173(4)
Part III Partial Equilibrium Analysis: Market Structure
11 Perfectly Competitive Markets
177(22)
11.1 Introduction
177(1)
11.2 Perfect Competition
177(2)
11.3 Market/Industry Supply
179(4)
11.4 Equilibrium in a Competitive Market
183(2)
11.5 Competitive Equilibrium and Social Surplus Maximization
185(5)
11.6 The Deadweight Loss of a Per-Unit Tax
190(4)
11.7 A Solved Problem
194(5)
Exercises
197(2)
12 Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition
199(22)
12.1 Introduction
199(1)
12.2 The Classical Solution to Monopoly
200(4)
12.3 Deadweight Loss from Monopoly: Comparing Monopoly and Competition
204(2)
12.4 Price Discrimination
206(6)
12.5 Monopolistic Competition
212(4)
12.6 A Solved Problem
216(5)
Exercises
219(2)
13 Duopoly
221(21)
13.1 Introduction
221(1)
13.2 Cournot Competition
222(5)
13.3 More on Dynamics
227(1)
13.4 Collusion
228(4)
13.5 Stackelberg Competition
232(1)
13.6 Bertrand Competition
233(5)
13.7 A Solved Problem
238(4)
Exercises
240(2)
14 Game Theory
242(21)
14.1 Introduction
242(1)
14.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Idea of Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
243(3)
14.3 Prisoners' Dilemma Complications: Experimental Evidence and Repeated Games
246(1)
14.4 The Battle of the Sexes, and the Idea of Nash Equilibrium
247(2)
14.5 Battle of the Sexes Complications: Multiple or No Nash Equilibria, and Mixed Strategies
249(2)
14.6 The Expanded Battle of the Sexes, When More Choices Make Players Worse Off
251(2)
14.7 Sequential Move Games
253(4)
14.8 Threats
257(1)
14.9 A Solved Problem
258(5)
Exercises
259(4)
Part IV General Equilibrium Analysis
15 An Exchange Economy
263(21)
15.1 Introduction
263(1)
15.2 An Economy with Two Consumers and Two Goods
263(2)
15.3 Pareto Efficiency
265(7)
15.4 Competitive or Walrasian Equilibrium
272(3)
15.5 The Two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
275(5)
15.6 A Solved Problem
280(4)
Exercises
282(2)
16 A Production Economy
284(21)
16.1 Introduction
284(1)
16.2 A Robinson Crusoe Production Economy
285(1)
16.3 Pareto Efficiency
286(3)
16.4 Walrasian or Competitive Equilibrium
289(4)
16.5 When There Are Two Goods, Bread and Rum
293(4)
16.6 The Two Welfare Theorems Revisited
297(3)
16.7 A Solved Problem
300(5)
Exercises
301(4)
Part V Market Failure
17 Externalities
305(20)
17.1 Introduction
305(1)
17.2 Examples of Externalities
306(2)
17.3 The Oil Refiner and the Fish Farm
308(4)
17.4 Classical Solutions to the Externality Problem: Pigou and Coase
312(4)
17.5 Modern Solutions for the Externality Problem: Markets for Pollution Rights
316(1)
17.6 Modern Solutions for the Externality Problem: Cap and Trade
317(3)
17.7 A Solved Problem
320(5)
Exercises
322(3)
18 Public Goods
325(21)
18.1 Introduction
325(1)
18.2 Examples of Public Goods
326(1)
18.3 A Simple Model of an Economy with a Public Good
327(5)
18.4 The Samuelson Optimality Condition
332(1)
18.5 The Free Rider Problem and Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms
333(2)
18.6 How to Get Efficiency in Economies with Public Goods
335(7)
18.7 A Solved Problem
342(4)
Exercises
343(3)
19 Uncertainty and Expected Utility
346(13)
19.1 Introduction and Examples
346(1)
19.2 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility: Preliminaries
347(3)
19.3 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility: Assumptions and Conclusion
350(2)
19.4 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility: Examples
352(4)
19.5 A Solved Problem
356(3)
Exercises
357(2)
20 Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information
359(18)
20.1 Introduction
359(1)
20.2 When Sellers Know More Than Buyers: The Market for "Lemons"
360(1)
20.3 When Buyers Know More Than Sellers: A Market for Health Insurance
361(2)
20.4 When Insurance Encourages Risk Taking: Moral Hazard
363(3)
20.5 The Principal-Agent Problem
366(5)
20.6 What Should Be Done about Market Failures Caused by Asymmetric Information
371(2)
20.7 A Solved Problem
373(4)
Exercises
374(3)
Index 377
Roberto Serrano is Harrison S. Kravis University Professor at Brown University, Rhode Island, and Research Associate at the Madrid Institute for Advanced Studies, Spain. He has contributed to different areas in microeconomic theory and game theory and his research has been published in leading journals including Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior and the SIAM Review. He has received prestigious fellowships and prizes, including the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellowship in 1988 and the Fundación Banco Herrero Prize in 2004, awarded to the best Spanish economist under forty. He is managing editor of Economics Letters and the associate editor of the International Journal of Game Theory and Mathematical Social Sciences. At Brown, he was director of graduate studies from 2006 to 2012 and has served as economics department chair since 2010. Allan M. Feldman is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Brown University. His research has appeared in the Review of Economic Studies, Econometrica, the American Economic Review, Public Choice, the Journal of Economic Theory, the American Law and Economics Review and other journals. He is co-author (with Roberto Serrano) of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd edition (2006). Professor Feldman taught economics at Brown University for thirty-eight years, including the intermediate microeconomics course. He was director of undergraduate studies in the Economics Department at Brown for nearly fifteen years.