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E-grāmata: Single Economic Entity Doctrine and Corporate Group Responsibility in European Antitrust Law

  • Formāts: 304 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 10-Jul-2014
  • Izdevniecība: Kluwer Law International
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9789041152732
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Single Economic Entity Doctrine and Corporate Group Responsibility in European Antitrust LawPalielināt
  • Formāts: 304 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 10-Jul-2014
  • Izdevniecība: Kluwer Law International
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9789041152732
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In light of a changing corporate culture, the European institutions have been faced with interpretative questions that were not contemplated by the original statutory schemes of European antitrust enforcement. One of these issues eE ' the application of the European antitrust provisions to the relationship between a parent and a subsidiary company eE ' has led the Commission and the ECJ to develop the concept eE -single economic entityeE - for the purpose of applying the antitrust provisions to corporate groups. However, both the Commission and the Court have regularly refrained from a detailed analysis of the specific circumstances of consideration for this legal concept; and as a result the assessment of legally independent but economically affiliated companies is one of the most contentiously debated issues of European antitrust law.
Foreword xv
Acknowledgements xvii
Introduction 1(4)
Chapter 1 The Single Economic Entity Doctrine as an Essential Criterion for the Application of Antitrust Law on a Corporate Group
5(24)
§1.01 Issue of Discussion
5(3)
§1.02 Problem Assignment: The Contested Facts of a `Single Economic Entity'
8(13)
[ A] The `Group-or Concern Privilege' under Article 101(1) TFEU
9(2)
[ B] The Determination of a `Single Economic Entity'
11(4)
[ C] The Application of the Concept of a `Single Economic Entity' for the Attribution of Liability
15(6)
§1.03 Terminological Determinations
21(8)
[ A] Affiliated Undertakings, Corporate Groups, Concerns
21(2)
[ B] Joint Ventures
23(3)
[ C] Topic Delineation
26(3)
Chapter 2 The Implementation of Article 101(1) TFEU on a Corporate Group of Companies: Practice of the Commission and the European Courts
29(96)
§2.01 The Intra Enterprise Doctrine or `Group Privilege' as Original Basis for the Assumption of an `Economic Entity'
34(16)
[ A] Initial Decisions Recognizing the Distinctiveness of Group-Intern Agreements
34(1)
[ 1] The Primary Decision of `Christiani & Nielsen'
34(2)
[ 2] Further Cases Substantiating the `Group-Privilege'
36(1)
[ a] The Kodak Case
36(2)
[ b] Beguelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import Export
38(1)
[ c] Centrafarm I & II
39(2)
[ B] Subsequent Adjudication Leading to the Current Position of Assessing Agreements between Affiliated Companies
41(1)
[ 1] The Classification of a `Single Economic Entity'
41(1)
[ a] Hydrotherm Geratebau GmbH v. Ing. Mario Andreoli
41(3)
[ b] Corinne Bodson v. S.A. Pompes Funebres des Regions Liberies
44(1)
[ i] The Decision of Viho Constituting the Status Quo of European Case Law on Intra-group Agreements
45(5)
§2.02 The Concept of a `Single Economic Entity' and the Attribution of Antitrust Responsibility
50(75)
[ A] The Employment of the Concept of a `Single Economic Entity' for the Issue of Attributing Conduct between Companies of a Corporate Group
51(1)
[ 1] The Development of Attributing Liability in European Competition Law
51(1)
[ a] Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. and Others
51(4)
[ b] Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents
55(3)
[ 2] The Concept of an `Economic Entity' Requiring a Certain Level of Corporate Integration: Distinction of the Objectives of Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU
58(1)
[ a] Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen & Silver Line Reisebiiro GmbH
58(2)
[ b] Societa Italiana Vetro SpA v. EC Commission
60(2)
[ B] The Development of a Legal Presumption for Wholly Owned Subsidiaries Leading to an Ambiguous Standard of Attributing Liability
62(1)
[ 1] The `Belt and Braces' Approach to Antitrust Liability
62(1)
[ a] AEG-Telefunken v. EC Commission
62(4)
[ b] Stora Kopparsberg Bergslag AB v. EC Commission
66(4)
[ c] Assessment of the Stora-Decision in Subsequent European Practice
70(1)
[ i] The Burden of Proving `Decisive Influence'
70(3)
[ ii] The Ascertainment of the Correct Legal Entity in a Group of Companies
73(4)
[ iii] The Assessment of Indicia Pointing to `Decisive Influence'
77(2)
[ iv] The Parent Company's Rights of Defense
79(2)
[ d] Assessment of European Practice Following `Stora' under Principles of Corporate Law
81(3)
[ i] The Principles of Corporate `Entity Law'
84(2)
[ ii] The Concept of `Piercing the Corporate Veil'
86(2)
[ iii] The Criteria Parent Companies Have Relied on in an Attempt to Rebut the `Stora Presumption'
88(1)
[ iv] The Ambiguity of the `Stora-Presumption'
89(4)
[ 2] The ECJ's Judgment in the Case of Akzo Nobel
93(1)
[ a] The Court's Ruling
93(9)
[ b] Assessment of the Court's Ruling
102(1)
[ i] Review of the Necessity of Additional Criteria Pointing to the Existence of `Decisive Influence'
102(3)
[ ii] The `Rebuttable Presumption' for Wholly Owned Subsidiaries
105(3)
[ iii] The Necessity of Considering General Legal Principles
108(5)
[ iv] The Ambiguity of the Current Mode of Assessing `Parental Responsibility'
113(2)
[ v] Assessment on the Basis of General Legal Principles
115(3)
[ vi] The Legal Consequences of an Extensive Application of the `Single Economic Entity' Doctrine
118(7)
Chapter 3 The `Single Economic Entity' Doctrine: An Assessment of `Privileges and Responsibility' in a Corporate Group
125(78)
§3.01 The Classification of the `Single Economic Entity Doctrine'
134(36)
[ A] Assessment of an `Economic Entity' under the Facts of Article 101 TFEU
137(1)
[ 1] The Fact of `Agreements or Concerted Practices'
138(5)
[ 2] The Fact of an `Undertaking' in the Sense of Article 101(1) TFEU
143(2)
[ a] Legal Personality as a Precondition of an `Undertaking'
145(1)
[ b] The Requirement of an Autonomous `Entity' with Legal Personality as an Addressee of Article 101(1) TFEU
146(1)
[ i] Independent Entities as Addressees of Article 101 TFEU
147(1)
[ ii] The Term `Undertaking' in European Competition Law
148(2)
[ iii] The Danger of a Two-Tiered Definition of an Undertaking
150(1)
[ c] The Ambivalent Criteria of an `Economic Entity' under Current European Practice
151(1)
[ i] The Practice of Equalizing `Economic Entities' with a Unitary Undertaking
151(1)
[ ii] The Notion of `Control' Requires a Differentiated Assessment
152(1)
[ iii] Current Practice
153(1)
[ iv] Criticism of the Current Practice
154(1)
[ v] The Assessment of Commercial Agents
155(2)
[ d] Intermediate Result
157(1)
[ 3] The Fact of `Distortions to Competition'
158(1)
[ a] The Structure and Purpose of a `Prevention, Restriction or Distortion to Competition'
159(1)
[ i] The Objective of the Competition Principles
160(1)
[ ii] The Concept of Competition
160(1)
[ b] The Protection of Economic Freedom and Competition
161(1)
[ i] The Postulate of Economic Autonomy
162(2)
[ ii] The Concept of `Workable Competition'
164(1)
[ iii] The Protection of a Company's Freedom of Action
165(2)
[ c] Critical Assessment of the `Single Economic Entity'-Doctrine upon the Postulate of `Corporate Autonomy'
167(1)
[ i] The Position of Third Companies on the Market
167(1)
[ ii] The Necessity of a More Economic Approach
168(1)
[ iii] The Requirement of a Competitive Relationship
169(1)
§3.02 The Notion of `Control' in the Context of a `Single Economic Entity'
170(12)
[ A] Comparison to the Concept of `Control' under the European Merger Regulation
174(1)
[ 1] The Definition of Control under the European Merger Regulation
175(1)
[ 2] The Restriction of a Company's Economic Autonomy
176(1)
[ 3] The Modes of Exerting `Decisive Influence'
177(1)
[ B] The Commission's Approach under the Merger Regulation
177(1)
[ C] Elements Pointing to the Existence of `Decisive Influence'
178(1)
[ 1] The Requirement of Structural Links
179(1)
[ 2] The Necessity of `Decisive Influence' for a Certain Time Period
180(1)
[ 3] Similar Approach under U.S. Antitrust Law
181(1)
§3.03 The Requisite Degree of `Control'
182(15)
[ A] Potential versus Actual Control: A Uniform Application of the `Single Economic Entity Doctrine'
185(1)
[ 1] Assessment with Regard to Group-Intern Agreements
185(2)
[ 2] Assessment with Regard to Attributing Responsibility
187(1)
[ a] The Commission's Approach
187(1)
[ b] The Principle of Limited Liability
188(1)
[ c] The Preconditions of Article 23 Reg. No. 1/2003
189(1)
[ B] The Relevant Factors for Determining `Control'
190(1)
[ 1] Criteria Mentioned in European Case Law
191(2)
[ 2] The Necessity of an Actual Exertion of Decisive Influence
193(1)
[ 3] The Distribution of the Burden of Proof
194(1)
[ C] General Policy Considerations
195(1)
[ 1] The Requirement of a Positive Legal Basis for Attributing Liability
195(1)
[ 2] The Upper Limit of Fines
196(1)
[ 3] Determining Liability under the Principle of Organizational Negligence
196(1)
§3.04 The Assessment of `Joint Control'
197(6)
Chapter 4 Intermediate Result
203(2)
Chapter 5 The Concept of Corporate Liability
205(22)
§5.01 The Standard of `Legal Separation' under Corporate Entity Law
205(5)
[ A] The Principle of `Limited Liability' and the Consideration of `Enterprise Principles'
206(1)
[ 1] The Standard of `Limited Liability'
206(1)
[ 2] The Consideration of Subsidiary Companies
206(1)
[ 3] Attributing Liability under Enterprise Law
207(2)
[ B] The Standard of `Organizational Autonomy'
209(1)
§5.02 Employing the Standard for Attributing Liability in European Antitrust Law
210(17)
[ A] The Consideration of Corporate Affiliations
210(1)
[ 1] Current Practice
211(1)
[ 2] The Court's Role in Determining Antitrust Liability
212(1)
[ 3] Applying the Concept of Corporate Control under the ECMR
213(1)
[ B] The Respective Business Areas in Which Parental `Control' May Lead to the Assumption of an Actual Exertion of `Decisive Influence'
214(1)
[ 1] The Case of a Single Legal Representation
215(4)
[ 2] The Existence of a Common Commercial Strategy or Financial Dependence
219(3)
[ 3] Influence on the Operative or Personal Level
222(2)
[ 4] Intermediate Result
224(3)
Chapter 6 An Assessment of Corporate Group Liability on the Basis of `Organizational Autonomy'
227(42)
§6.01 The Consideration of Compliance Efforts under Current Procedural Standards of European Competition Law
229(18)
[ A] The Insufficient Identification of `Personal Liability' in European Competition Law
230(1)
[ 1] Intentional Conduct
230(1)
[ 2] Negligent Conduct
231(2)
[ B] The Significance of `Corporate Compliance Measures' in Setting Fines on `Controlling' Companies
233(1)
[ 1] The Preventive Value and Efficiency of Antitrust Compliance Programs
234(1)
[ 2] The Commission's Ambiguous Approach to Antitrust Compliance Measures
235(2)
[ a] The Standard of Intent or Negligence
237(2)
[ b] The Aspect of Prevention
239(2)
[ c] Dogmatic Inconsistency towards Leniency
241(1)
[ 3] The Possibility of a `Compliance Defense'
242(1)
[ a] The Commission's Burden of Proof
243(1)
[ b] The Duty to Review another Company's Conduct
244(1)
[ c] Reversal of the Burden of Proof for Compliance Programs
245(1)
[ 4] Resume
246(1)
§6.02 The Consideration of Compliance Measures: A Harmonization of Antitrust Jurisdictions
247(22)
[ A] The Extension of Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters and the Principles of International Law
248(2)
[ 1] The `Effects Doctrine' and Interest Balancing in U.S. Antitrust Law
250(1)
[ 2] A First Approach to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
250(1)
[ 3] The Alcoa Case and the `Effects' Doctrine in U.S. Antitrust Law
251(1)
[ 4] Restraints of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under Considerations of International Law
252(2)
[ B] The Extraterritorial Application of European Competition Law
254(1)
[ 1] The ECJ's Wood Pulp Decision
254(1)
[ 2] The Position of the CFI and the Commission and the Aspect of Positive Comity
255(3)
[ 3] The Extension of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Means of a `Single Economic Entity'
258(2)
[ C] The Consideration of Compliance Measures under the Aspect of `Positive Comity'
260(2)
[ 1] Different Substantive Approaches to Parental Liability: Comparison to U.S. Practice
262(1)
[ a] Approach under Common Law
262(1)
[ b] The Implications on an International Level
263(1)
[ c] Applying the FTAIA
264(1)
[ 2] The Reference to `Best-Practice-Compliance' for Internationally Active Corporate Groups
265(2)
[ D] Resume
267(2)
Chapter 7 Conclusion
269(4)
Index 273
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