Brian Skyrms presents eighteen essays which apply adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory. Altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling are treated from this perspective. Correlation is seen to be of fundamental importance. Interactions with neighbors in space, on static networks, and on co-evolving dynamics networks are investigated. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.
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vii | |
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| Acknowledgments |
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xi | |
| Introduction |
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xiii | |
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Part I Correlation and the Social Contract |
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1 | (26) |
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1 Evolution and the Social Contract |
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3 | (24) |
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Part II Importance of Dynamics |
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27 | (120) |
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2 Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract |
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31 | (7) |
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3 Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? |
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38 | (12) |
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4 Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models |
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50 | (23) |
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5 Dynamics of Conformist Bias |
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73 | (10) |
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6 Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics |
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83 | (27) |
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7 Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-person Stag Hunt Dilemmas |
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110 | (18) |
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8 Learning to Take Turns: The Basics |
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128 | (7) |
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9 Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms |
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135 | (12) |
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Part III Dynamic Networks |
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147 | (74) |
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149 | (14) |
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11 A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation |
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163 | (24) |
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12 Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run |
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187 | (18) |
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13 Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models |
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205 | (16) |
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Part IV Dynamics of Signals |
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221 | (116) |
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14 Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-level Reinforcement Model |
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225 | (25) |
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250 | (24) |
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16 Signals, Evolution, and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information |
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274 | (24) |
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17 Co-Evolution of Pre-play Signaling and Cooperation |
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298 | (16) |
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18 Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers |
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314 | (23) |
| Index |
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337 | |
Brian Skyrms is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and Economics at the University of California, Irvine. His interests cover a range of topics, including the evolution of conventions, the social contract, inductive logic, decision theory, rational deliberation, the metaphysics of logical atomism, causality, and truth. He is the author of Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (OUP, 2010) and From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity. Coherence, and Induction (OUP, 2012).
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