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Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts 1st ed. 2016 [Hardback]

  • Formāts: Hardback, 176 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, weight: 4085 g, IX, 176 p., 1 Hardback
  • Sērija : Studies in Economic Theory 30
  • Izdošanas datums: 30-May-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Springer Verlag, Singapore
  • ISBN-10: 9811010390
  • ISBN-13: 9789811010392
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Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts 1st ed. 2016Palielināt
  • Formāts: Hardback, 176 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, weight: 4085 g, IX, 176 p., 1 Hardback
  • Sērija : Studies in Economic Theory 30
  • Izdošanas datums: 30-May-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Springer Verlag, Singapore
  • ISBN-10: 9811010390
  • ISBN-13: 9789811010392
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9789811010392.html
Keywords:
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.
Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.
This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
1 Introduction
1(14)
References
11(4)
2 Ambiguity, Robustness, and Contract Design
15(20)
2.1 A Model of Ambiguity Aversion
18(2)
2.2 Equilibrium Theory and Ambiguity
20(3)
2.3 Ambiguity Aversion and the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
23(3)
2.4 Ambiguity Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Contractual Incompleteness
26(3)
2.5 Some Other Economic Effects of Pessimism
29(3)
2.5.1 Robustness and Linear Contracts: Uncertainty Over Agent's Actions
30(1)
2.5.2 Monetary Equilibria with Wary Agents
31(1)
2.6 Concluding Remarks
32(3)
References
33(2)
3 Evolution of Preferences, Social Norms, and Decision Rules
35(22)
3.1 Evolution of Preferences
35(3)
3.1.1 Evolution of Optimal Preferences Under Bounded Rationality
37(1)
3.2 Evolution of Decision Rules
38(3)
3.3 Evolution of Social Norms
41(12)
3.3.1 Evolution of Conventions with Mobile Players and Spatially Homogeneous Payoffs
43(10)
3.4 On Coevolution of Preferences, Social Norms, and Decision Rules
53(4)
References
55(2)
4 Complexity Constraints and Optimal Contracts
57(12)
4.1 A Model of Computational Complexity
58(4)
4.1.1 A Formal Model
59(3)
4.2 A Model of Linguistic Complexity
62(2)
4.3 Complexity as the Number of Unforeseen Contingencies
64(3)
4.4 Complexity and Economics: A Summary
67(2)
References
68(1)
5 Probabilistic Choice and Optimal Contracts
69(38)
5.1 Trembling Hands and Optimal Screening
69(3)
5.2 Nonlinear Pricing Under Bounded Rationality
72(9)
5.2.1 Mussa and Rosen Model Revisited
73(2)
5.2.2 Introducing Bounded Rationality in the Mussa and Rosen Model
75(6)
5.3 Bounded Rationality and the Revelation Principle
81(7)
5.3.1 A Model of Boundedly Rational Behavior
84(1)
5.3.2 The Optimal Menu of Contracts and a Comparison with Some Other Mechanisms
85(3)
5.4 Oligopoly, Bounded Rationality, and Optimal Obfuscation
88(5)
5.4.1 The Bertrand Model with Boundedly Rational Consumers
90(3)
5.5 Emotional Temperature and the Power of Optimal Incentives
93(9)
5.5.1 Optimal Emotional Temperature
95(3)
5.5.2 Effect of Emotional Temperature on the Power of Optimal Incentives
98(4)
5.6 All-Pay Auctions with Boundedly Rational Bidders
102(5)
References
105(2)
6 Bounded Rationality, Learning, and Optimal Contracts
107(12)
References
116(3)
7 Social Norms and Optimal Contracts
119(28)
7.1 A Model of Reciprocal Wage Setting
121(7)
7.1.1 An Evolutionary Model of Reciprocity
124(4)
7.2 When to Hire a Local?
128(4)
7.3 Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs
132(5)
7.4 High-Performance Work Systems and Interaction-Based Approach to Socioeconomic Behavior
137(7)
7.5 Social Norms and Incentives: What Have We Learned?
144(3)
References
145(2)
8 Miscellaneous Models
147(22)
8.1 Monopoly Pricing with Viscous Demand and Customer Turnover
149(6)
8.1.1 A Model of Viscous Demand
150(4)
8.1.2 The Customer Turnover Rate and the Monopolist's Profits
154(1)
8.2 Auctions with Opportunistic Experts
155(4)
8.2.1 The Model
157(2)
8.3 A Model of Boundedly Rational Addiction
159(10)
8.3.1 The Model
160(2)
8.3.2 Unique Asymptotically Stable Steady State
162(1)
8.3.3 The Run-Away Regime
162(1)
8.3.4 Multiple Steady States
163(1)
8.3.5 Discussion of Empirical Evidence
163(1)
8.3.6 Switching Regimes and Policy Applications
164(2)
References
166(3)
9 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
169
References
175
Suren Basov is a visitor to the Centre for Economics and Financial Econometrics at Deakin University, Australia. His research interests lie in the areas of mechanism design, with a particular emphasis on multidimensional screening models, the theory of bounded rationality, and evolutionary game theory. He also does research in the areas of directed search and unemployment, and incentive provision within clubs, with a particular application to Islamic finance.